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ABSTRACT 
 The dissertation traces the development of what I call “the problem of partiality” 
through the work of certain key figures in the British Moralist tradition: John Locke, 
Catharine Trotter Cockburn, Anthony Ashley Cooper (the Third Earl of Shaftesbury), 
Francis Hutcheson, John Gay, David Hume, Joseph Butler, and Adam Smith. On the one 
hand, we are committed to impartiality as a constitutive norm of moral judgment and 
conduct. On the other hand, we are committed to the idea that it is permissible, or even 
obligatory, to expend disproportionate resources promoting the good of our loved ones 
over the good of strangers. However, these two commitments conflict with one another. 
This problem challenges us to provide an account of the scope and limits of reasonable 
partiality that does justice to both commitments. I argue that confronting this tension is a 
central project of early modern ethics. I offer a rereading of the British Moralist tradition, 
centered on debates about partiality, and thereby shift discussion of the tradition away 
from concerns about meta-ethics and moral epistemology, to issues of practical ethics.  
  viii 
 The topic of partiality remains central in contemporary ethics, as is evident in 
ongoing debates about the place of empathy in moral judgment, and the role of love in 
shaping our moral commitments. Though the aim of the dissertation is not to settle 
questions about the scope and limits of reasonable partiality, the focus here remains fixed 
on how the concept of partiality was problematized in our ethical thought, and how it 
informs our discussions in normative ethics and moral psychology. Alongside building a 
bridge between early modern scholarship and recent work in ethics, the dissertation casts 
light on two understudied figures in the British Moralist tradition – Cockburn and Gay – 
who contributed greatly to debates about partiality. By examining their contributions, I 
reconsider their place in the history of modern ethics and therefore provide a more 
contextualized account of philosophical thought in the period.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 My dissertation traces the development of what I call the problem of partiality 
through the work of certain key figures in the British Moralist tradition: John Locke, 
Catharine Trotter Cockburn, Anthony Ashley Cooper (the Third Earl of Shaftesbury), 
Francis Hutcheson, John Gay, David Hume, Joseph Butler, and Adam Smith. On the one 
hand, we are committed to impartiality as a constitutive norm of moral judgment and 
conduct. On the other hand, we are committed to the idea that it is permissible, or even 
obligatory, to expend disproportionate resources promoting the good of our loved ones 
over the good of strangers. But these two commitments seem to conflict with one 
another.1 This problem challenges us to provide an account of the scope and limits of 
reasonable partiality that does justice to both commitments. I argue that the problem of 
partiality is a central concern of modern ethics. My dissertation offers a rereading of the 
British Moralist tradition, focused on debates about partiality.  
 The topic of partiality remains central in ethics, not only with the “puzzle of 
partiality” (in Simon Keller’s terms) but with discussions about the place of empathy in 
moral judgment, the role of love in shaping our moral commitments, and the proper scope 
                                                        
1 Simon Keller pursues a problem he refers to as the “puzzle of partiality.” He states the puzzle as 
follows: “If morality is all about promoting overall enjoyment, or respecting people as 
autonomous creatures, or respecting everyone’s rights, then special relationships would not 
appear to hold any moral significance. No one comes with a great capacity for enjoyment and 
suffering, to be more autonomous, or to have different basic right just because she is your friend, 
or just because she has any other particular connection to you. So why should a person’s 
particular connection to you give you any reason to treat her differently from how you treat 
others? Why should the fact that someone happens to share some relationship with you make a 
difference for how you ought to treat her, or how you may permissible treat her. This is the 
‘puzzle of partiality’.” Partiality (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2013), 4. Keller is not 
interested in the history of this puzzle, while that is my primary concern in this dissertation.  
  
2 
of moral concern.2 Though the aim of the dissertation is not to settle questions about the 
scope and limits of reasonable partiality, I am nonetheless concerned with how partiality 
is problematized in our ethical thought and how it informs our discussions in normative 
ethics and moral psychology. Alongside building a bridge between early modern 
philosophical scholarship and contemporary ethical theory, the dissertation casts light on 
two understudied figures in the British Moralist tradition – Cockburn and Gay – who 
contribute greatly to debates about partiality. By examining their contributions, I 
reconsider their place in the history of early modern ethics. Before examining this 
history, it is important to consider the topic of the dissertation – the problem of partiality.  
 
What is the Problem of Partiality?  
 What is the “problem of partiality”? The problem can be stated as follows. Most 
of us have a basic commitment to equality: every person, human or non-human animal, is 
deserving of equal moral regard. It is impermissible to disregard a person in our moral 
                                                        
2 Both empathy and love have recently received great attention in the philosophical literature. For 
more on the place of empathy in morality, see: Daniel Batson, Altruism in Humans (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011); Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical 
and Psychological Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Heidi Maibom 
(ed.), Empathy and Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Paul Bloom, Against 
Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion (New York: Harper Collins: 2016). For more on 
love and morality, see: David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion,” Ethics 109 (1999): 338–74; 
Niko Kolodny, “Love as Valuing a Relationship,” Philosophical Review 112 (2003): 135–89; 
Harry Frankfurt, Reasons of Love (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004); Kieran Setiya, 
“Love and the Value of a Life,” Philosophical Review 123 (2014): 251–80; Kyla Ebels-Duggan, 
“Love, Respect, and the Value of Humanity,” Re-Evaluating the Value of Humanity, ed. Sarah 
Buss and Nandi Theunissen (forthcoming); Kieran Setiya, “Other People,” Re-Evaluating the 
Value of Humanity. For work on the scope of reasonable partiality, see: Whiting, Jennifer, 
“Impersonal Friends,” Monist 74 (1991): 3–29; Dean Cocking and Jeanette Kennett, “Friendship 
and Moral Danger,” Journal of Philosophy 97 (2000): 278–296; Diane Jeske, Rationality and 
Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons (New York: Routledge, 2008); Brian Feltman 
and John Cottingham (ed.), Partiality and Impartiality: Morality, Special Relationships, and the 
Wider World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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decision-making, though their interests can be permissibly overridden. Every person 
should, in the dictum attributed to Jeremy Bentham by J.S. Mill, count for one, nobody 
for more than one. Our commitment to moral equality is thought to have originated in the 
17th and 18th centuries, with figures like Rousseau and Kant. There are reasons to doubt 
the sincerity and depth of our commitment to equality – consider the history of sexism, 
racism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, xenophobia, etc. – but it remains an ideal of moral 
thinking and the cornerstone of mainstream political philosophy.  
 That said, we may give more weight to our interests or those of our loved ones 
than to the interests of strangers, and not unreasonably so. We do not expect parents to 
expend the same level of effort or resources on other children as they do on their own. 
There are limits to reasonable preferential treatment. We question any person who claims 
to recognize no reasons to act for the good of strangers. If one is positioned to assist a 
stranger without putting oneself at risk, one has reasons to provide assistance in the 
manner that one is able. Still, no one is expected to spend their days attending solely to 
the interests of other people. We see nothing wrong with providing for one’s family; with 
pursuing passions and hobbies that give one’s life meaning; with spending Saturday night 
alone at the movies. Entertaining thoughts about another’s fulfilling, important, or 
harmless, desires often give us a sense of joy on their behalf. We cherish the thought of 
someone spending quality time with their family or discovering a new film. 
 Not only do we find it permissible that people favor the interests of their family, 
friends, and loved ones over the interests of others; we think these relationships provide 
them with special reasons to act and to structure their desires in certain ways. To have a 
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friend, child, or partner, requires one to at least partially recognize the legitimacy of 
certain agent-relative reasons over one’s conduct. We do not expect others to pay for our 
child’s piano lessons. Insofar as I have the requisite income and my child possesses a 
desire and curiosity about learning to play piano, there is a strong reason for me to see 
that they are given the option to play. Holding constant the desire and curiosity my child 
has to play the piano, it does not follow that my neighbor has a reason to subsidize my 
child’s playing unless they have agreed to do so. Once we enter into relationships, we are 
compelled to act in ways that we would not otherwise – to not recognize the force of 
these reasons would be an extraordinary error of practical reasoning.  
 That said, what is the limit to reasonable preferential treatment, and how do we 
weigh those reasons afforded us by our personal relationships with those reasons 
connected to matters of more general concern? There are two strategies philosophers 
typically use to answer these questions. One is to argue that there is an illicit connection 
made between our commitment to equality and the claim that the moral perspective is 
impartial. In other words: when we look at things from a moral perspective, we do so 
without privileging the interests or concerns of any individual or group. It is no surprise 
that preferential treatment comes under suspicion here. But one could also maintain a 
commitment to equality while rejecting the idea that the moral perspective is impartial. 
Perhaps morality begins from a concern for one’s family or friends but does not preclude 
a concern for, compatriots, immigrants, etc. This strategy confront, the problem of 
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partiality by rejecting the assumption on which it is constructed: that morality is 
impartial.3 
 Another strategy is to argue that, from an impartial perspective, one is able to 
justify degrees of preferential treatment.4 Were each individual to consider the interests 
of all in making decisions, the results would be disastrous. It is better that individuals 
remain primarily invested in the interests of those with whom they are most acquainted; 
when it comes to impacting the general welfare, we should not expect the same level of 
dedication. In this sense, it is possible to justify some degree of partiality on impartialist 
grounds – though the above case has a consequentialist flavor, it need not. One need only 
pinpoint reasons that authorize preferential conduct and delineate pro tanto justifiable 
conduct from unjustifiable conduct. The tension between our commitment to equality and 
our concern to focus on the good of our near and dear is merely apparent. Unlike the first 
strategy, which rejects the assumption on which the problem of partiality is based, the 
second resolves the problem by showing that it is less threatening than it appears.  
                                                        
3 The literature on this topic is vast. For some important writings that forward this general 
position, see: Michael Stocker, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of 
Philosophy 73.14 (1976): 453-66; Bernard Williams, “Persons, Character and Morality,” Moral 
Luck: Philosophical Papers: 1973-1980 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-20; 
Susan Wolf, “Morality and Partiality,” Philosophical Perspectives: Ethics 6 (1992): 243–259; 
Dean Cocking, Justin Oakley, “Indirect Consequentialism, Friendship, and the Problem of 
Alienation,” Ethics 106.1 (Oct. 1995): 86-111; Sarah Stroud, “Permissible Projects, Partiality, 
and Plural Agency,” Partiality and Impartiality, 131-49; Samuel Scheffler, “Morality and 
Reasonable Partiality,” Partiality and Impartiality, 98-130; Erroll Lord, “Justifying 
Partiality,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19.3 (2016): 569–90. 
4 The following only scratch the surface on this topic: Peter Railton, “Alienation, 
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 (1984): 134–
71; Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Elizabeth 
Ashford, “Utilitarianism, Integrity, and Partiality,” Journal of Philosophy 97.8 (2000): 421–39; 
David O. Brink “Impartiality and Associative Duties,” Utilitas 13.2 (2001): 152-72; Francis 
Kamm, Intricate Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007);; Brian McElwee, “Impartial 
Reasons, Moral Demands,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14.4 (2011): 457–66.  
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 How do we take our basic commitment to moral equality seriously while making 
room for reasonable levels of partiality in our decision making and conduct? There seems 
to be a tension here; regardless of how one chooses to resolve this tension, there is a 
downstream impact on one’s general views about ethics. As Simon Keller notes, “the 
debate about reasons of partiality is a site at which higher-level claims in ethical theory 
are tested and brought into conflict.”5 While the question of how to make room for the 
partialist aspects of our moral thinking in ethics is significant on its own grounds, it also 
forces interlocutors to get clear about their views on moral rules, motivation, reasons, etc. 
A similar situation plays out in debates about the role of love or empathy in morality. 
These debates allow scholars to consider abstract issues about partiality and impartiality 
by looking at more concrete issues, for which we have more settled intuitions. 
 I am concerned in this dissertation with how the problem of partiality arose and 
was treated in the British Moralist tradition. At the time, love was not a salient moral 
issue and empathy only became a topic of philosophical concern in the 18th century.6 
What led the British Moralists to question the limits of reasonable partiality were worries 
about factional conflict and conflicts in moral judgment. On one level, the fact of existing 
conflict drove philosophers to be concerned with how to ameliorate faction. On a moral 
level, philosophers like Locke sought to provide a set of constraints on action to which all 
could bind themselves. These philosophers saw themselves as defending theories that 
could be accepted by any reasonable person. Politically, they were supportive of social 
                                                        
5 Keller, Partiality, 7.   
6 See: Ryan Patrick Hanley, Love’s Enlightenment: Rethinking Charity in Modernity (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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orders that stressed toleration and the freedom of thought. Such an order, they argued, 
disarms faction and provides the conditions for moral progress. For reasons of space, I 
ignore this political dimension, though it is certainly a component of the history.   
 
Where Should One Begin? 
 A chief problem I confronted when deciding to write this dissertation was where 
to begin. For most interpreters, modern moral philosophy begins with Hobbes; for others, 
with Montaigne. For both, modern ethics begins with a response to a challenge – in the 
case of Montaigne, pyrrhonian skepticism; in the case of Hobbes, the political 
implications of skepticism.7 Versions of Montaigne’s and Hobbes’ views crop up 
throughout in the modern period, in the works of Mandeville, Nicole, Bayle, and others. 
As the narratives traditionally go, the writings of these figures precipitated a crisis in 
modern ethics and gave rise to moral realism and other amicable forms of constructivism. 
There is truth to that narrative. Few are the object of as much ire as Hobbes or 
Mandeville in 18th century conversations about ethics and politics. That said, the story of 
modern ethics as an outgrowth of concerns about moral and political skepticism has been 
told, and by scholars better equipped to do so than I am. I begin my dissertation not by 
                                                        
7 Schneewind is good on this point. See: Invention of Autonomy, 37-57; 82-101. See also: Richard 
H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism: From Savonrola to Bayle (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003); Margaret Wiley, The Subtle Knot: Creative Skepticism in Seventeenth-Century 
England (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952). 
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considering the alleged horrors of Hobbism, but with a figure responsible for much of the 
positive project of modern ethics: John Locke. 8  
 There has recently been increased attention paid to Locke’s ethical writings. 
Admittedly, it is difficult to discern what, if any, ethical theory can be gleaned from 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. When discussing ethics in Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke suggests the pupil only be instructed in the Holy 
Bible, Cicero’s De Officiis, and Pufendorf’s De Officio Hominis et Civis.9 He also 
suggests Pufendorf’s De Jure naturali et Gentium, which instructs one “in the natural 
rights of men, and the original and foundations of society, and the duties resulting from 
thence.”10 Locke’s, early works, Two Tracts on Government (1660-2) and Essays on the 
Law of Nature (1663-4), are concerned with the nature, scope, and authority of moral 
law. The first text concerns the extent to which an individual’s religious conscience 
                                                        
8 For recent work on Locke’s ethics, see: Mark D. Mathewson, “John Locke and the Problems of 
Moral Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006): 509–22; Patricia Sheridan, 
“Pirates, Kings, and Reasons to Act: Moral Motivation and the Role of Sanctions in Locke’s 
Moral Theory,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37.1 (2007): 35-48; Sorana Corneau, Regimens 
of the Mind: Boyle, Locke, and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2011); Antonia LoLordo, Locke's Moral Man (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012); Andrew Israelsen, “God, Mixed Modes, and Natural Law: An Intellectualist 
Interpretation of Locke’s Moral Philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.6 
(2013): 1111-1132; Patricia Sheridan, “Locke’s Latitudinarian Sympathies: An exploration of 
sentiment in Locke’s Moral Theory,” Locke Studies 15 (2015): 131-162; Elliot Rossiter, 
“Hedonism and Natural Law in Locke’s Moral Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
54.2 (2016): 203-225; Phillip Mitsis, “Locke on Pleasure, Law, and Moral Motivation,” Moral 
Motivation: A History, ed. Iakovos Vasiliou (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 153-
178. This is just a small collection of the recent literature on Locke’s ethical theory.  
9 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education and of the Conduct of the Understanding, 
edited by Ruth W. Grant and Nathan Tarcov (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 139. 
10 Locke, Some Thoughts, 139.  
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places a rightful limit on a magistrate’s political authority.11 The second text was penned 
as a series of disquisitions to be given at Christ Church, Oxford. The Essays are the 
culmination of Locke’s moral views as a student of natural law – along with the usual 
classical references, he engages with Grotius, Culverwell, Hooker, and Sanderson.12  
 Initially, one might see Locke as a Neo-Scholastic natural lawyer with absolutist 
tendencies. However, even in these earlier writings, Locke rejects the usual grounds for 
natural law – tradition or intuition – and argues that its grounds are “reason and sense-
perception.”13 Guided by reason, our senses help us uncover the laws of nature as laid 
down by God. Any reasonable human has access to the truths that God means us to 
comprehend. Locke notes that “[A]n agile, capable mind, versatile and ready for 
anything, furnished with reason and knowledge, and a body besides which is quick and 
easy to be moved hither and thither by virtue of the soul’s authority, that all this 
                                                        
11 Locke penned his Two Tracts as a response to a work by the noncomformist minister, Edward 
Bagshaw, titled The Great Question Concerning Things Indifferent to Religious Authority Bishop 
Robert Sanderson’s De Obligatione Conscientiae (1660). Robert Sanderson, a theologian and 
casuist, was most know in his day for the publication of Logicae Artis Compendium (1615), 
which was considered a standard logic text in the 17th century. The work to which Bagshaw is 
responding, De Obligatione Conscientiae, was published posthumously in 1660.  
12 Though I do not discuss Grotius in this dissertation he exercised enormous influence over 
Locke and others writing in the 17th century. Grotius’ De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (1625) was 
a great success. His work enjoyed further success when it was translated into English by Jean 
Barbeyrac in 1736. Nathaniel Culverwell is a lesser known theologian associated with the 
Cambridge Platonists. The influence of his work, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light 
of Nature (1652), published posthumously and originally given as a series of lectures in 1645-46, 
can be seen throughout Locke’s Essays. Likewise, Richard Hooker, the English theologian most 
known for his five volume work, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie (1594-97), exercised 
enormous influence over Locke’s political thought more generally, particularly when it comes to 
the optimistic account of human’s reasoning capacities to grasp natural law.  
13 John Locke, “Essays on the Laws of Nature,” Political Essays, ed. by Mark Goldie (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 100. 
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equipment for action is bestowed on him by a most wise creator.”14 Human beings feel 
“disposed and ready to contemplate God’s works and that wisdom and power of his 
which they display, and thereupon to assign and render praise, honour, and glory most 
worthy of so great and so beneficent a creator.”15 Experience and reason lead us to 
consider the glory of God and gives us knowledge of our duties to him; we discover our 
duties to others and also to ourselves through a similarly natural process.  
 Although human beings are well-positioned to appreciate the nature of their 
duties, Locke recognizes that the mere recognition that we are obligated to act morally is 
insufficient to motivate action. After proving the existence of the moral law and its 
attendant duties in the Essays, Locke recognizes he has yet to broach the issue of 
authority, noting that “we have already proved that this law is given as morally binding, 
and now we must discuss the extent it is in fact morally binding.”16 He notes that a “fixed 
and permanent rule of morals…[is] so firmly rooted in the soul of human nature…[that] 
human nature needs change before this law can either be altered or annulled.”17 While the 
recognition of duty is insufficient for action, there is a connection between the basis of 
morals and the human frame, such that we consider it “appropriate” to fulfill those things 
associated with our “rational nature.”18 Locke thinks that we have prudential reasons to 
                                                        
14 Locke, “Essays,” Political Essays, 105. 
15 Locke, “Essays,” Political Essays, 105-6. 
16 Locke, “Essays,” Political Essays, 122. 
17 Locke, “Essays,” Political Essays, 125. 
18 Locke, “Essays,” Political Essays, 125. 
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act morally. He expands his account of moral motivation in the 1670’s, when he begins to 
see the structure of our pleasure and pains as giving us information about how to act.19 
 As Locke’s writing turned to psychology, he developed an increasingly complex 
account of how people come to desire objects and to act on them. Locke’s account of 
sanction became more sophisticated, drawing on his work in medicine and in his reading, 
and in some cases translating, of moralists like Nicole. Locke continued to argue that 
morality is written on the human frame by God and the content of our duties are revealed 
through reflection – to care for ourselves, to enter into society, and to praise creation. 
Locke became increasingly tolerant of diversity as he began to factor in how customs and 
institutions can differently express the values representative of our core duties.20 We see 
this diversity most clearly in our duties to others. There is a plurality of ways to 
reasonably organize the family, according to Locke. The meaning of what it is to be a 
                                                        
19 One figure who got Locke to think more deeply about psychology was Pierre Nicole, the 
French Jansenist theologian, known for his joint publication of the La logique, ou l'art de penser 
(1662), with Antoine Arnauld, and for his fourteen-volume Essais de morale (1671-79). Locke 
was introduced to Nicole’s work while traveling in France during the mid-1670s. Locke had 
intended to translate the Essais into English but settled on translating three essays: “On the 
Existence of a God,” “On the Weakness of Man,” and “On the Way of Preserving Peace.” After 
producing the translations, Locke gave them as a gift to the Shaftesbury family, his patrons until 
the late-1670s. The translations did not see publication until 1828. See: John Locke, John Locke 
as Translator: Three of the ‘Essais’ of Pierre Nicole in French and English, ed. Jean S. Yolton 
(Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 2000). Locke also became acquainted with Pierre Gassendi’s work, 
whose scientific and moral views can be seen to have had an impact on Locke in the 1680s.  
20 As Daniel Carey has pointed out, Locke uses the methods of natural history, as seen in the 
work of Robert Boyle, and evidence given by travel literature that undercuts the claim that human 
beings possess innate knowledge of moral principles. After all, moral practices differ greatly 
around the globe and not all of these differences can be attributed to depravity or aberrations. 
Locke never let go of the idea that natural law exists, and that this law is binding on all human 
beings in virtue of God’s commands (which opens up the possibility that atheists fail to recognize 
the proper grounds of moral obligation). Still, he does not argue that the content of morality is 
everywhere the same. I recognize the controversial nature of my claim. In this way, my reading of 
Locke has been influenced by Carey’s reading in Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson: Contesting 
Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
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good child, parent, husband will change. Whatever the organization of the family 
happens to be, provided that it is beneficial, obligates those who live under its jurisdiction 
to act and to support and defend its continued existence. 
 Locke’s observation about the diversity of moral views, and his claim that there is 
a minimal, universal set of duties based in our nature, was exciting for many of his 
contemporaries. Notably, these moral duties tied us back to God – while their content was 
connected to human nature, their authority derived from the will of God. This view at 
once gave God an elevated role in morality while detaching him from its content. Locke 
preserves a place for God in morality while not accepting straightforward voluntarism, 
which he associates with the enthusiasm of religious mystics and extremists.21 Instead, 
we get the picture of a moral theory that is at once modest – not laying down rules for 
every area of conduct in human life and allowing for reasonable diversity – and scientific 
– being based in an understanding of human beings, the knowledge of which presumably 
becomes more sophisticated over time. In the 17th century era there was a great deal of 
skepticism about the progress of moral thought, and Locke’s writings signal a way 
forward.  
 But there was still disagreement about the way forward. This conflict comes out 
especially in the differences between first-generation Lockeans like Samuel Clarke, 
                                                        
21 I do not touch on the topic of enthusiasm in the dissertation – except briefly in Chapter 3. For 
more on this subject, see: Nicholas Jolley, “Reason’s Dim Candle: Locke’s Critique of 
Enthusiasm,” The Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives, ed. Peter Anstey (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 179-91; Victor Nuovo, “Enthusiasm,” The Bloomsbury Companion to Locke 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2010), 141-43; Nicholas Jolley, Toleration and Understanding in 
Locke (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Peter Anstey, “Locke, the Quakers and 
Enthusiasm,” Intellectual History Review (forthcoming); Kathryn Tabb, “Locke on Enthusiasm 
and the Association of Ideas,” Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy (forthcoming). 
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Catharine Trotter Cockburn, Damaris Masham, and Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third 
Earl of Shaftesbury. Each of these figures diverge in their moral views and depart from 
Locke’s writings in some manner. Take Clarke, the arch-rationalist and moral realist. For 
him, Locke fails to provide a stable foundation for our duties; he argues that we should 
think of our duties as grounded in relations of fitness that hold between ourselves and 
certain modes of conduct. Clarke develops the side of Locke that stresses morals as a 
demonstrative science, while excising this claim from the empiricist context in which 
Locke makes this point.22 Shaftesbury balks at the idea that ethics is a demonstrative 
science while taking issue with Locke’s focus on sanctions as largely external. Still, 
Shaftesbury sees in Locke a model for how we can understand our relation to the 
authority of moral duty, viz. reflection. Human beings possess a capacity that connects us 
to our nature and provides us with information about how to act.  
 Locke provides figures writing in the 18th century with an attractive program to 
undertake, one that shaped the direction of moral philosophy in the 18th century. There is 
a further a tension that develops in the Lockean program. For Locke, the duties that we 
have to others are grounded in our desire for society. Sociability goes beyond entering 
into agreements with others and maintaining fidelity to them; it also includes partaking in 
certain emotions that bond us to others (benevolence, compassion, love). These bonds are 
                                                        
22 I have not included Clarke in the dissertation, though he exercised enormous influence over 
Butler. For more on Clarke as an ethical thinker, see: Henry Sidgwick’s Outline of the History of 
Ethics for English Readers (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1886), 179-83; J. B. Schneewind, The 
Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy, 310-22; Erin Kelly, “Moral 
Agency and Free Choice: Clarke’s Unlikely Success against Hume,” Archiv fur Geschichte der 
Philosophie 84.3 (2002): 297–318; Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and 
Critical Study, Vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 372-98.  
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strongest between family, friends, and lovers. If we take seriously that these emotions 
provide us with guidance about how to conduct ourselves, our time will be spent 
nurturing these relationships. What is problematic about this result? When Locke talks 
about our duties to others, he means not only our family but also our compatriots. It 
seems obvious that we should assign greater weight to those duties that concern our 
narrow circle, but doing leads to bias and faction. The result is that people privilege the 
good of some over others, even to the extent that they entertain malice against those 
outside their circle, which gives rise to violence.  
 How do we weigh our duties to our near and dear against those we owe to people 
generally? And how do we ground the idea that we are justified in focusing our energy 
primarily on those with whom we are most acquainted? And how can we answer these 
questions and provide support for our moral attitudes within the context of a Lockean 
moral science that treats ethics as based in a view of human beings as sensible, social, 
and rational? Locke does not provide us with the resources to address these issues, but 
those following in his wake – including those discussed in this dissertation – try their 
hand at these matters. While the following narrative overlooks various topics, it also gets 
at those fundamental questions that concern many writers in the period; questions that 
continue to exercise the interest of researchers in ethics and moral psychology. Issues 
about love, empathy, partiality, etc. are viewed as central moral concepts in a way they 
were not twenty to thirty years ago. It is with Locke that these discussions begin.  
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The Scholarly Context  
 This dissertation covers some much-studied figures in the history of ethics – 
Locke, Hume, and Smith – others are recognizable but less discussed – Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, Butler – and still others often overlooked – Cockburn and Gay. Were the 
dissertation longer, I would have covered the influence of Pufendorf, the legacy of 
Cambridge Platonism, alongside the writings of Damaris Masham, Mandeville, 
Carmichael, and Lord Kames. My dissertation stands in a tradition of writings on the 
British Moralist tradition, and would not exist without the work of Stephen Darwall, 
Knud Haakonssen, Isabel Rivers, J.B. Schneewind, Michael Gill, Terence Irwin, Colin 
Heydt, Aaron Garrett, and Christian Maurer.23 In this section, I consider how the work of 
these scholars shaped the dissertation, and how it complements the scholarship on the 
British Moralists.  
 The idea of the “British Moralists” as a tradition came from L.A. Selby-Bigge’s 
1897 edited publication, British Moralists, which featured readings by Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, Butler, Smith, and Jeremy Bentham in volume 1 and, in volume 2, Samuel 
                                                        
23 Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal Ought: 1640–1740 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press 1995); Knud Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press 1996); J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A 
History of Modern Moral Philosophy; Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, 2 vols. (New 
York: Cambridge University Press 1991, 2000); Michael B. Gill, The British Moralists on Human 
Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Terence 
Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study, Vol. II; Colin Heydt, 
Moral Philosophy in Eighteenth-Century Britain: God, Self, and Other (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2018). Christian Maurer has also done some suburb work on the British 
Moralists: Self-love, Egoism and the Selfish Hypothesis: Key Debates from Eighteenth-Century 
British Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019).  
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Clarke, John Balguy, Richard Price.24 Selby-Bigge grouped these thinkers on the basis of 
their allegiance to particular “schools” of thought – the sentimentalists in the first 
volume, the intellectualists in the second. He distinguishes these figures based on their 
moral epistemology: the “‘intellectual’ and ‘sentimental’ schools...two lanes of thought in 
this period…they are primarily distinguished by their adoption of reason and feeling 
respectively as the faculty which perceives moral distinctions, a faculty declared in each 
case to be peculiar and not identifiable with ordinary reason or ordinary feeling.”25  
 When D.D. Raphael produced a second edition of The British Moralists in 1969 
(the edition of which most of us are familiar) he rejected Selby-Bigge’s classification, 
saying that “the dichotomy [between the intellectualists and sentimentalists] has only a 
limited application and is not necessarily more significant than two or three other 
possible methods of classification.”26 Raphael chose instead to classify the moralists 
chronologically, starting with the publication of Hobbes’ The Elements of Law, Natural 
and Poltic (1650), and ending with Jeremy Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles 
                                                        
24 Important here are William Whewell’s Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (1862) and 
Henry Sidgwick’s Outline of the History of Ethics for English Readers (1886). Selby-Bigge also 
included John Brown, John Clarke, Ralph Cudworth, John Gay, Thomas Hobbes, Lord Kames, 
Locke, Mandeville, William Paley, and William Wollaston in the “Appendix” as background 
reading. Selby-Bigge also contrasts the moralist with the “satirist” (Lewis Amherst Selby-
Bigge, British Moralists, being Selections from Writers principally of the Eighteenth Century, ed. 
with Introduction and analytical Index by L.A. Shelby-Bigge in two volumes (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1897, xi-xii). As he points out, “When the moralist says that men ought to regulate their 
conduct on certain principles and ought to cultivate certain motives in preference to others, the 
satirist tests the possibility of these principles, by asking whether in fact men do usually or ever 
act on them: he does not ask how far men recognize them as ideals or standards of conduct.” He 
continues, “the whole force of satire, as distinguished from cynicism, is the force of contrast—
between profession and practice, between reality and sham; and the denunciation of the sham is 
by implication the recognition of the reality” (xi-xii)  
25 Selby-Bigge, The British Moralists, xxviii.  
26 D.D. Raphael, The British Moralists 1650-1800, selected and edited with comparative notes 
and analytical index (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), vi.  
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of Morals and Legislation (1789).27 Raphael treated the chronological manner of 
categorization as neutral to the matter of philosophical content, which he saw as an 
improvement over the Selby-Bigge edition.28 Raphael’s decision to begin the narrative of 
The British Moralists with Hobbes’s Elements is in line with Whewell and Sidgwick, 
who argue that modern ethics is largely a response to Hobbes.29  
 Terence Irwin follows Raphael in arguing that Selby-Bigge’s application of 
sentimentalist and intellectualist are vague.30 Irwin suggests returning to Whewell’s 
distinction between dependent and independent morality, which denotes both 
metaphysical and normative elements.31 A morality is independent insofar as its content 
is independent of human nature or will and its authority is not based in its fulfilling any 
of our desires.32 A dependent morality is one whose content is based in human nature and 
whose authority is based in our desires, preferences, or will.33 Irwin claims that 
sentimentalism maps onto dependent morality and rationalism onto independent 
morality.34 He shifts questions about sentimentalism and rationalism in the British 
                                                        
27 Raphael, The British Moralists, v.  
28 Raphael, The British Moralists, vii. 
29 Irwin, The Development of Ethics, vol. 2, 203-5. Cf. Darwall, The British Moralists, 12-15; 
John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 
2007), 23-102. 
30 Irwin, The Development of Ethics, 204.  
31 Irwin, The Development of Ethics, 206-7.  
32 Darwall refers to the normative component of independent morality as “externalism” (The 
British Moralists, 9-12). He sees normative externalism as independent from what we might refer 
to as moral realism. While he recognizes that realism was alive and well amongst the British 
moralists he doubts the same for externalism. 
33 For more on this point, see my discussion of Darwall below.  
34 Irwin, The Development of Ethics, 206. Irwin is interested in the metaphysical component of 
dependent morality – a view he refers to as naturalism –as the successor to Aristotelianism.  
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Moralist tradition away from moral epistemology to moral metaphysics and issues about 
normativity, where these concepts continue to play a role in contemporary ethics. 
 With Selby-Bigge, Raphael, and Irwin, the focus is on topics in what Colin Heydt 
calls the “theory of morals,” which he opposes to “practical ethics,” or questions about 
“what we ought to do and be.”35 For Heydt, scholars give undue weight to theoretical 
disagreements between figures in the British Moralist tradition and overlook the equally 
practical and edificatory orientation of their writings. I align myself with Heydt, 
alongside Haakonssen and Rivers, as someone being principally concerned with practical 
ethics, although I make note of scholars like Gill and Maurer later in this section, whose 
work has greatly informed my own. Before doing so, however, it is important to say a bit 
more about practical ethics, its roots in the modern period, and the place of this 
dissertation in the scholarship on this tradition. Modern practical ethics has its roots in 
natural law and in also Latitudinarianism and non-conformist Protestantism.  
 Isabel Rivers examines the religious roots of 17th and 18th century ethics in her 
work, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment. In volume one, Rivers discusses the controversy 
between the latitudinarian and non-conformist traditions of Protestantism. The former 
plays a vital role in the British Moralist tradition, insofar as its central figures were the 
Cambridge Platonists. These figures rejected the Calvinist narrative of human depravity, 
and held fast to the idea that humans were created in the image of God, who gave us the 
tools of reason and conscience to access the precepts of moral conduct. Many took as 
central Baron Herbert of Cherbury’s claim, “Tota fere Ethica est Notitia communis” –
                                                        
35 Heydt, Moral Philosophy in the Eighteenth-Century, 3. 
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morality is a collection of natural precepts, discoverable by reason and reinforced by 
conscience.36 As Rivers notes, to those in this tradition, “man is by nature sociable and 
disposed to act well; sin is an unnatural deviation from this disposition; man naturally 
pursues happiness, though he often miscalculates the method of attaining it; happiness is 
achieved through holiness, and understood properly is in fact that same thing.”37  
 The other way in which the latitudinarian tradition exercised influence over the 
British Moralists is through their chosen manner of writing: the sermon. While few of the 
British Moralists I treat in the dissertation published sermons, their works are edificatory 
in nature. Rivers stresses that central to a successful sermon is the idea that one’s interest, 
happiness, and natural sociability are connected with one another, such that if one wishes 
to fulfill any one of these ends, one must aim at the others as well. The latitudinarians and 
non-conformists were interested in shaping the will and affections to help us achieve 
virtue and salvation.38 Rivers also sees these themes in the work of Isaac Watts and Philip 
Doddridge, whose “affectionate religion” plumbed the depths of human nature in order to 
understand how the heart and passions, as opposed to reason, could be the key to leading 
the truly religious life.39 For Rivers, the dialectic between sociability, reason, and the 
passions in 17th century religious circles lays the groundwork for 18th century debates 
about the “ethics of sentiment” and the rationalism of Price and others.40 
                                                        
36 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, Vol. 1, 61. 
37 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, Vol. 1, 77. 
38 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, Vol. 1, 145; 148; 150. 
39 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, Vol. 1, 168. 
40 Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, Vol. 2, 1.  
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 The topics of sentiment and self-love play a significant role in the work of 
Michael Gill and Christian Maurer. Gill’s The British Moralists on Human Nature and 
the Birth of Secular Ethics centers on what he calls the “Human Nature Question”: “[are] 
human beings naturally good or evil? Are we naturally drawn to virtue or vice? Is it 
natural for us to do the right thing, or must we resist something in our nature in order to 
do what is right?”41 He uses this question as a starting point to examine the writings of 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume. While each of these figures answer in the affirmative 
to the human nature question, Gill is careful to track the nuances of each of their views. 
Gill begin his work with the Cambridge Platonist reaction to Calvinism, which is 
significant as the Platonists are often overlooked in the history of modern ethics. Darwall 
also considers the work of Ralph Cudworth, though only in the context of hegemonikon 
as a precursor to Butler’s conscience, which prefigures Kantian autonomy.42 Schneewind 
discusses the Cambridge Platonists in the context of perfectionism, a tradition leading to 
Leibniz that he sees as distinct from the British Moralists.43  
 Christian Maurer begins at a similar place as Gill with his book, Self-love, Egoism 
and the Selfish Hypothesis: Key Debates from Eighteenth-Century British Moral 
Philosophy.44 Maurer considers the extent to which human nature is good, though more 
than Gill, Maurer is interested in the empirical question of what motivates human action. 
                                                        
41 Gill, British Moralists, 1. 
42 Darwall, British Moralists, 103-148. 
43 See: Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy, vii-viii. 
44 Maurer, Self-love, Egoism and the Selfish Hypothesis. See: Christian Maurer, “Self–interest and 
Sociability,” The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, ed. James A. 
Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 291–314; Christian Maurer, Self–Love, Egoism 
and the Selfish Hypothesis: Key Debates From Eighteenth-Century British Moral Philosophy 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019). 
  
21 
This focus on human motivation leads Maurer to investigate the phenomenon of self-love 
in greater detail than does Gill, which allows him to discuss Mandeville, Butler, and 
Campbell, alongside Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume. Maurer’s focus on the concept 
of self-love, and the role it plays in broader ethical and political discussions during the 
18th century, leads us to have a better understanding as to why certain philosophers 
answer the human nature question in the manner that they do. Maurer’s discussions of the 
passions and moral self-cultivation are first-rate, and my treatment of Butler has 
benefited from Maurer’s analysis of his psychology. I have also learned a great deal 
about the 18th century reception of Stoicism from Maurer’s writings. This influence can 
be seen especially in how I frame Shaftesbury’s and Smith’s writings.  
 My dissertation is close in spirit to the projects of Maurer and Gill. Both seek to 
understand the British Moralists tradition by focusing on a particular issue of 
philosophical concern – the extent to which humans are naturally disposed to virtue and 
the nature of human motivation – that was salient for these figures. I merge the 
contextualism of Maurer with the more philosophical approach of Gill, and in some 
ways, Darwall. Maurer and Gill show in their works that it is possible to frame a 
discussion of this tradition around a concept or question while still doing justice to the 
intricacies of the historical period. The principal issue I have with Darwall’s and 
Schneewind’s writings is their backwards looking-approach to modern moral philosophy. 
While we can learn much about Kant’s ethics by placing him in a wider 18th century 
context that includes Hume and Hutcheson as much as it does Christian Wolff, to write a 
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philosophical history of the British Moralist tradition with this aim in mind is to read the 
tradition teleologically.  I seek to avoid this tendency in my own work.  
 The other root of modern practical ethics is the natural law theory. Knud 
Haakonssen and Colin Heydt both see natural law as the assumed backdrop for moral 
theory outside of Cambridge, where Platonism held its sway. Haakonssen argues that the 
work of figures like Pufendorf gave the British Moralists the recourses to combine two 
different ideas. First, the idea that Newton provides a workable scientific model that can 
be applied to morals with the end of building a moral science; and second, the concern 
with practical ethics, or the norms that govern our interactions with God, with others, and 
with ourselves.45 Natural law provides us with a model for a comprehensive moral theory 
and of an account of moral obligation. Newtonian moral science, with the help of history, 
gives us an idea of how the content of these duties can be grasped and how they change 
over time.46 Haakonssen argues that a tension develops between the more historical 
account of the content of morality and the more rigid structure of natural law, particularly 
with the concept of rights. He argues that this tension propels the development of moral 
thought and conjectural history in the period.  
 Colin Heydt digs deeper into the topic of practical ethics in his work, Moral 
Philosophy in Eighteenth-century Britain. Heydt focuses on issues like marriage, rights, 
slavery, etc. in the 18th century, and how views about these matters changed alongside 
ethics curriculum in the universities. He uses the 18th century reception of Pufendorf’s De 
Officio in the English and Scottish university system as his starting point to discuss 
                                                        
45 Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 5. 
46 Haakonssen, Natural Law and Moral Philosophy, 7. 
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shifting attitudes about our duties to God, to ourselves, and to others. Our duties to God 
concern natural theology, while the others are divided into ethics (duties to ourselves), 
private jurisprudence (duties to others qua human being), economic jurisprudence (duties 
to others qua family), and political jurisprudence (duties to others qua state).47 This 
schema produces a set of non-overlapping duties and a comprehensive moral theory. The 
content of these duties can be encompassed in the dictums to know and to worship God; 
to preserve and to cultivate ourselves; to not harm others and to be sociable.  
 These thoughts about practical ethics are made systematic by Pufendorf’s Officio, 
which Heydt argues becomes the basis of university-level moral education in Britain. In 
Scotland, he notes, the first chairs of moral philosophy at the University of Edinburgh all 
lectured on Pufendorf – this influence is seen in the teachings of Carmichael and 
Hutcheson.48 Heydt claims that there are similar stories to be told in Aberdeen and 
Glasgow, though the account is more complicated in the case of Cambridge and Oxford. 
Regardless, once Pufendorf’s dominance in the wider university curriculum is recognized 
and the account of ethics in the Officio is treated as largely correct, it is easy to see how 
Pufendorfian natural law became the conventional morality.49 Central to this 
conventional moral theory are questions about how to conceive of our private 
jurisprudential duties (those regarding fellow humans), or how to weigh our ethical duties 
(those regarding ourselves) with our economic or political jurisprudential duties (those 
                                                        
47 Heydt, Moral Philosophy in the Eighteenth-Century, 3. 
48 Heydt, Moral Philosophy in the Eighteenth-Century, 5-12. 
49 Heydt, Moral Philosophy in the Eighteenth-Century, 15. 
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regarding the family or state). Questions about what to do and what to be come to the 
forefront during this period, while moral theory falls to the background. 
 I share Heydt’s approach to the British Moralists, focusing more on the content of 
morality than on matters having to do with autonomy, moral metaphysics, or the 
quandaries of self-love. While Heydt’s discussions of our duties to God and to ourselves 
are significant, I focus instead on our duties to others. Heydt treats questions related to 
marriage and law, the latter of which is connected to conversations about the shifting 
conception of law during this time. These questions are surely of central importance to 
philosophers in the 17th and 18th century but they are not the whole story when it comes 
to understanding the nature and scope of our duties to others. Unlike duties to ourselves 
or to God, our duties to others are fragmented. We can understand and worship God at 
once; we can preserve ourselves and cultivate our talents. But we cannot attend to private, 
economic, and political jurisprudential duties all without conflict. After all, our duties to 
our family, to strangers, and especially to the state may potentially, or even often, be at 
odds with one another and call out for our exercising practical judgement.  
 It is the conflict between these duties to others, and the subsequent weighing of 
these duties, that I am focused on in this dissertation. I am interested in how the British 
Moralists thought of the relation between our partial duties and our impartial ones. Over 
the 18th century, these duties were conceived of less as a part of a larger system of natural 
law, and more as a series of duties being grounded in different aspects of our nature. 
Because of this shift, the idea of there being a conflict between duties became more 
plausible as it became difficult to maintain that they were harmoniously coincident with 
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one another. Skepticism about the harmony of our duties was made all the clearer by the 
political conflict experienced by many of the figures featured here. It is this journey 
towards the realization that those duties central to our lives conflict with one another that 
I track over the course of this dissertation. That is, the attempt of the British Moralists to 
come to terms with the idea that it might not all work out in the realm of morality.  
 
Looking Forward 
 In Chapter 1, I argue that the problem of partiality arose in the wake of Locke’s 
call for a moral science. I go on to consider the work of Catharine Trotter Cockburn and 
Anthony Ashley Cooper (the Third Earl of Shaftesbury). Both thinkers share Locke’s 
commitment to a human nature based ethics. Shaftesbury’s claim that morality is 
anchored in our sociable sentiments is of particular importance here. He recognizes our 
sentiments are inconsistently felt – we are more closely bound to our loved ones than we 
are to our neighbors and compatriots. Our sentiments are therefore apt to bolster 
factionalist tendencies. After Shaftesbury, the challenge is to construct a model of 
impartiality within the broader context of a Lockean moral science. Meeting this 
challenge means answering how agents can attain impartiality in deliberation and how 
they come to see norms of impartiality as genuinely authoritative. 
 I examine two models of impartiality. In Chapter 2, I consider the view set forth 
by Gay and Hume, according to which impartiality consists in using an externally 
justified principle to guide one’s deliberation and conduct. I argue that the ideal Gay and 
Hume choose is usefulness. On this view, being impartial consists in giving 
considerations of utility overriding weight in moral matters. To ensure that this model is 
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workable, they each provide accounts of how an agent comes to see utility as 
authoritative: Gay relies on association, while Hume expands the account to include pride 
and what he calls the delicacy of taste. In Chapter 3, I examine the model of impartiality 
defended by Butler and Smith, according to which impartiality means using heuristics 
like conscience or the impartial spectator to reflect on the aims of our sentiments and to 
direct our conduct in light of these aims. For them, this process does not entail using 
principles to correct our sentiments; our guide to moral conduct are these sentiments, 
which are reliable provided that we shield ourselves from self-deception. 
 These two models of impartiality force us to confront the tension between the 
normative significance of our special relationships and our concerns about parochialism, 
faction, and moral disagreement. By examining how these models interact with one 
another, we gain a better understanding of what commitments are at stake on either side 
of this tension and learn how to better manage it in practice. I end the dissertation by 
arguing that Butler and Smith provide the more workable theory of impartiality, and that 
we should begin here in thinking about partiality. The problem of partiality became less 
of a focus in the 19th century, with the influx of skepticism about the Lockean moral 
science. For Reid, Bentham, and Kant, reason discovers or shapes the contours of 
morality, and the sentiments are extraneous to the content of morality. Developments in 
moral psychology have led philosophers to rediscover the British Moralist tradition and 
the tides have begun to turn. The problem of partiality has come back into view.   
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LOCKEAN MORAL SCIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF PARTIALITY 
 
 In the introduction, I outlined the problem of partiality. In this chapter, I examine 
the problem as it first emerged, in Locke’s 18th century reception in Britain. There are 
two Lockean commitments shared by the figures discussed in this dissertation: first, the 
aim of morality is to coordinate disparate sets of interests for the purposes of promoting 
happiness; second, the content of morality is discovered by a science of human nature. 
These views do appear in the work of some natural lawyers (Pufendorf, in particular); 
however, Locke was the first to combine them with a scientific account of human nature, 
thereby securing the promise of a moral science. 
 In this chapter, I explore the work of Cockburn, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson. For 
Cockburn, we know our moral duty by reflecting on our nature, but we require sanctions 
to counteract our selfish and factionalist tendencies. Shaftesbury is more optimistic, 
claiming that we cultivate an impartial love for the good of all by way of an aesthetic 
appreciation of nature. Shaftesbury does indicate throughout his work that the love that 
humans are likely to feel is partial. But herein lies a problem. If virtue consists in the 
experience of love, morality will be fundamentally partial, which will undermine the aim 
of coordinating our lives together. However, if there is to be a more universal species of 
love, Shaftesbury has to account for both its existence and its desirability. 
 For Hutcheson, we are concerned for the general happiness, but it exercises little 
influence over us.50 Unlike Shaftesbury, Hutcheson claims there is little room for 
                                                        
50 Francis Hutcheson, “[we] desire the happiness of any known Sensitive Nature…were there no 
Oppositions of Interest…and sufficient Power, we would confer upon every Being the highest 
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universal love to trump these “Oppositions of Interest.” He instead relies on compassion, 
gratitude, and honor, the former two being  “particular benevolence,” or motives that 
impel us to act for the good of particular individuals or groups.51 These motives are 
responsible for moral conduct but they are also partial. Thought we may desire to base 
ethics in our sociable sentiments, these sentiments reinforce factionalist tendencies that 
undermine our moral aims. That said, how can we find a place for partiality that is 
supportive of morality while correcting for its pernicious outcomes? This is the problem 
of partiality.  
 The chapter is divided into five sections. First, I discuss the outline of Locke’s 
moral theory. Second, I examine Cockburn’s defense and extension of Locke’s ethics. 
Third, I explore Shaftesbury’s account of moral virtue as love, directed at the system of 
nature. I show how his position gives rise to a conflict between two different standpoints 
on human nature. Fourth, I explore how Hutcheson’s defense of Shaftesbury codifies the 
problem of partiality in the British moralist tradition. I end the chapter by considering 
how the extent to which the problem of partiality changed how 18th century moralists 
looked at the aim of moral theory. 
John Locke and the Birth of Modern Moral Philosophy 
 John Locke’s (1632-1704) empiricism is based in his views about the limits of 
knowledge. He notes in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689): “he that 
knows any thing, knows this in the first place, that he need not seek long for Instances of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Happiness which it could receive “Illustrations on the Moral Sense,” An Essay on the Nature and 
Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense, ed. Aaron Garrett 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2002), 188. 
51 Hutcheson, “An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections,” Essay, 32-3.  
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his Ignorance. The meanest and most obvious Things that come in our way, have dark 
sides, that the quickest Sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest, and most enlarged 
Understandings of thinking Men find themselves puzzled, and at a loss, in every Particle 
of Matter.”52 While our attempts to grasp truths about the natural world are futile, we can 
attain knowledge about both God and ourselves. For Locke, this knowledge reveals to us 
the proper vocation of reason and of inquiry:  
 
 
 “Since our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabrick and real 
 Essences of Bodies; but yet plainly discover to us the Being of GOD, and the 
 Knowledge of ourselves, enough to lead us into a full and clear discovery of our 
 Duty...‘tis rational to conclude, that our proper Imployment lies in those Enquires, 
 and in that sort of Knowledge which is most suited to our natural Capacities, and 
 carries in it our greatest interest, i.e. the Condition of our eternal Estate. Hence I 
 think I may conclude that Morality is the proper Science, and Business of 
 Mankind in general.”53 
 Locke’s moral theory is natural law-based.54 Human beings require rules to steer 
clear from vice. In his earliest writings, Two Tracts on Government (1660), Locke notes, 
                                                        
52 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), IV.iii.22.  
53 Locke, Essay, IV.xii.2. See: Patricia Sheridan, Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed (New York: 
Continuum, 2010), 2-4; John Colman, John Locke’s Moral Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1983), 76-106; Timothy Stanton, “Locke and His Influence,” The Oxford 
Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, ed. James A. Harris (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 25-27.  
54 Traditionally, Locke is seen as a voluntarist about the content of morality and a hedonist about 
moral motivation. For this view, see: Colman, Locke’s Moral Philosophy; Stephen Darwall, The 
British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640-1740 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995); J.B. Schneewind, “Locke’s Moral Philosophy,” Cambridge Companion to Locke, ed. Vere 
Chappell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 199-225. Others have stressed that the 
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“if private men’s judgments were the moulds wherein laws were to be cast ‘tis a question 
whether we should have any at all.”55 He claims that there is no necessary connection 
between the dictates of conscience says and what God demands of us.56 Virtue means 
acting on rules “discernible by the light of nature and indicat[e] what is and what is not in 
conformity with rational nature.”57 There are three aspects to these laws: “[first], it is the 
decree of a superior will, wherein the formal cause of a law appears to 
consist…Secondly, it lays down what is and what is not to be done, which is the proper 
function of a law. Thirdly, it binds men, for it contains in itself all that is requisite to 
create an obligation.”58 Laws are then a) issued from an authority, b) possess specifiable 
content, and c) have sanctions attached to instances of non-compliance.  
 For Locke, “Actions are considered, as Good, Bad, or Indifferent, and in this 
respect, they are Relative, it being their Conformity to, or Disagreement with some Rule, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
distinction often made between Locke’s accounts of moral content and moral motivation is too 
strong. For them, our pleasures, pains, and natural sentiments help guide us to moral ends by 
serving as an indication of what God demands of us. See: Patricia Sheridan, “Pirates, Kings, and 
Reasons to Act: Moral Motivation and the Role of Sanctions in Locke’s Moral Theory,” 
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37.1 (Mar., 2007): 35-48; Patricia Sheridan, “Locke’s 
Latitudinarian Sympathies: An exploration of sentiment in Locke’s Moral Theory,” Locke Studies 
15 (2015): 131-162; Elliot Rossiter, “Hedonism and Natural Law in Locke’s Moral Philosophy,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 54.2 (Apr., 2016): 203-225. For alternate interpretations, 
see: Phillip Mitsis, “Locke on Pleasure, Law, and Moral Motivation,” Moral Motivation: A 
History, ed. Iakovos Vasiliou (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 153-178; Andrew 
Israelsen, “God, Mixed Modes, and Natural Law: An Intellectualist Interpretation of Locke’s 
Moral Philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21.6 (2013): 1111-1132. A 
reading of Locke I have yet to reckon with is given in Sorana Corneanu, Boyle, Locke, and the 
Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2011). 
55 John Locke, “First Tract on Government,” Political Essays, ed. Mark Goldie (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 21. Cf. John Locke, “Essays on the Law of Nature,” Political 
Essays, 108-110. While scholars raise questions about the consistency between Locke’s early and 
later writings on ethics, it can be assumed that the “Essays on the Law of Nature” and the “Two 
Tracts” espouse relevantly similar views. 
56 See: Coleman, Locke’s Moral Philosophy, 9-28.  
57 Locke, “Essays,” 82.  
58 Locke, “Essays,” 83.  
  
31 
that makes the action to be regular or irregular, Good or Bad.”59 Since an action is bad 
only on the basis of its non-conformity with natural law, an action is only bad if God, the 
author of natural law, as such. That said, God does not arbitrarily determine the content 
of the moral law. God made happiness the “great end” of humans and the moral law is 
framed with this end in mind.60 As Locke notes, God “has made man such that these 
duties of his necessarily follow from his very nature.”61 God’s crafting of law is 
constrained by human nature. Locke’s view is consistent with others in the natural law 
tradition; he argues that we access the law by reflecting on what is required of us to 
achieve happiness in society. God does not imprint the moral law on our souls – he 
instead gives us the tools to access this law. 
 A central aspect of Locke’s moral theory in his account of the nature of moral 
ideas.62 He refers to moral ideas as “mixed modes,” which are a species of “modes,” or 
ideas of features that inhere in substances.63 A simple mode is a complex idea whose 
constituent parts are variations on a single idea, while a mixed mode is a complex idea 
                                                        
59 Locke, Essay II.xxviii.15. Cf. “Essays,” 88. 
60 Locke, Essay II.xxi.68. Cf. “Essays,” 106; “Second Tract,” 63.  
61 Locke, “Essays,” 126. Cf. Locke, Essay II.xxi.49.  
62 See: Steven Forde, “‘Mixed Modes’ in John Locke’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” Review 
of Politics 73 (2011): 111-148. Forde argues that Locke’s use of “modes” has its basis in Robert 
Boyle and Samuel Pufendorf. Of particular importance is Pufendorf, who considered moral ideas 
to be “certain Modes superadded to natural Things and Motions by understanding Beings, chiefly 
for the guiding and tempering the Freedom of voluntary actions, and for the procuring of a decent 
Regularity in the Method of Life” [Samuel Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, ed. Mr. 
Carew (London, 1729), 3]. Locke had a deep respect for Pufendorf’s works, going so far to 
recommend On the Whole Duty of Man and Of Law of the Nature and Nations alongside Cicero’s 
Offices to an aspiring pupil interested in ethics and civil law. See: Locke, Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education and of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Ruth W. Grant and Nathan 
Tarcov (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1996), 139.  
63 Locke, Essay III.xiii.1-6 
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whose constituent parts include distinct simple ideas.64 Mixed modes draw on different 
experiential sources.65 Take “government,” which is composed of many simpler ideas 
(laws, offices, privileges, etc.) combined to form different types of government (republic, 
monarchy, democracy, etc.). Experience does not necessitate any one combination of the 
ideas, distinguishing mixed modes from ideas of substances.66 Consider “sacrilege”: there 
is nothing about burning a Bible that makes it “sacrilege.”67 What makes an action 
sacrilege has nothing to do with the facts about the case – that there’s a fire, that I started 
the fire, that I’ve deliberately thrown a book in the fire, that this book happens to be a 
Bible, etc. – but with my interests as they relate to the Bible. These interests, for Locke, 
determine my taking the book burning to be sacrilege. 
It may seem counterproductive to base an ethical theory on the claim that moral 
ideas are fabrications; however, there are two advantages to this view according to 
Locke. First, it is metaphysically parsimonious: if one explains how moral ideas arise 
from our ordering of experience through language and thought there is no need to assume 
the innateness of moral ideas.68 Locke can explain the moral diversity in the world 
without having to establishing a singular definition of murder and showing how all other 
manners of defining murder are mistaken.69 Second, treating moral ideas as mixed modes 
                                                        
64 Locke, Essay III.xxii.2. 
65 Locke, Essay III.xxii.1-2. 
66 Locke, Essay II.xxiii.1-3. 
67 Locke, Essay III.v.5. He also uses the examples of adultery (III.v.3) and stabbing (III.v.2). 
68 Locke, Essay I.iii. 
69 Locke is fascinated by moral diversity and the problem it presents for constructing a moral 
science: “He that will carefully peruse the History of Mankind, and look abroad into the several 
Tribes of Men…will be able to satisfy himself, That there is scarce that Principle of Morality to 
be named, or Rule of Vertue to be thought on (those only excepted that are absolutely necessary 
to hold Society together, which commonly too are neglected betwixt distinct Societies) which is 
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offers a ready-made response to any concerns about the source of moral knowledge. If 
we are responsible for the production of moral ideas, we have a maker’s knowledge of 
morality, which allows ethics to become a demonstrative science.70  
Importantly, treating moral ideas as mixed modes only entails relativism about 
moral ideas, which is to say that people will have different ideas about what theft or 
murder entails. Divergence in the use of concepts does not imply a difference in moral 
standards, or in considered judgments. Take the concept of theft: a story about its 
cognitive genesis in people’s minds does not tell us anything about whether it is wrong to 
steal in a particular instance. As Locke points out, we can define stealing as “the taking 
from another what is his, without his knowledge or Allowance” but the fact that some 
action is an instance of stealing does not settle its wrongness: “the private taking away his 
Sword from a Madman, to prevent his doing Mischief, though it be properly denominated 
Stealing…yet when compared to the Law of God…it is no Sin or Transgression, though 
the Name Stealing ordinarily carries such an intimation with it.”71 To determine the 
wrongness of an action, we require some standard that is external to the action.  
 For Locke, natural law plays the role of regulating the application of our moral 
ideas. Laws involve sanctions, since “law is to no purpose without punishment.”72 A rule 
is a law only if someone can recognize that noncompliance will be punished; Locke 
                                                                                                                                                                     
not, somewhere or other, slighted and condemned by the general Fashion of whole Societies of 
Men, governed by practical Opinions, and Rules of living quite opposite to others” (Essay 
I.iii.10). Cf. “Essays,” 120-127. See: Daniel Carey, Locke, Shaftsbury, and Hutcheson: 
Contesting Diversity in the Enlightenment and Beyond (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), 14-68. 
70 Locke, Essay IV.iii.18-23. Cf. Essay IV.xii.8. See: Sheridan, Locke: A Guide to the Perplexed, 
85-90; Israelsen, “God, Mixed Modes, and Natural Law.”  
71 Locke, Essay II.xxviii.16. 
72 Locke, “Essays,” 113.  
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identifies three such sanctions: civil, social, and divine.73 Civil punishments follow from 
the violation of laws laid down by the magistrate; shame follows from the violation of 
social laws, while hellfire awaits those who run afoul of divine law. Because divine 
sanctions are greater than civil law or the “law of opinion,” divine law is “the only true 
touchstone of moral Rectitude.”74 Divine law then ground moral obligation. Civic laws 
and social norms have a place in our lives but only insofar as they hold court over their 
relevant sphere of influence and see their authority as constrained by God.75   
 For Locke, any rational person will recognize that “the observance of this law [of 
nature] gives rise to peace, harmonious relations, friendship, freedom from punishment, 
security, possession of our property, and – to sum it all up in one word – happiness.”76 
However, this recognition will not often translate into reliable compliance with the moral 
law. Central to Locke’s view of moral motivation is his account of “uneasiness.”77 
Though the wise person recognizes that a virtuous life is the best one, some uneasiness 
regarding the noncompliance with God’s dictates is required for us to act well. The 
ultimate degree of uneasiness is the fear of eternal damnation; Locke goes so far as to say 
that without eternal damnation there would be no stable incentive to be good.78 He does 
admit that the “law of opinion,” which its associated praise and blame, is often produces 
                                                        
73 Locke, “Essays,” 106.  
74 Locke, Essay II.xxviii.8.  
75 Locke, “Second Tract,” 66-67; “Essays,” 117.  
76 Locke, Essay I.iii.6; “Ethica A,” Political Essays, 318-19; “Ethica B,” Political Essays, 319-20.  
77 As Locke notes: “Good and Evil, present and absent, ‘tis true, work upon the mind: But that 
which immediately determines the Will, from time to time, to every voluntary Action, is the 
uneasiness of desire, fixed on some absent good, either negative, as indolency to one in pain; or 
positive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneasiness, that determines the Will to the 
successive voluntary actions” (Essay II.xxi.33).  
78 Locke, Essay II.xxi.55.  
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enough uneasiness to get us to act correctly.79 Locke thinks we are obligated, to cultivate 
a fear of damnation and the desire to be thought well of by others.80 Due to the 
postlapsarian state of human beings, these sources of uneasiness may not be sufficient to 
ensure moral conduct, but it is our best hope. 
 Locke leaves us with a tension between the law-like structure of morality and the 
happenstance nature of moral ideas. Because of the contingency involved in the 
construction of mixed modes and the constraint that morality be law-like, Locke looks 
beyond human nature to ground his moral theory. Regardless of how we choose to 
interpret Locke, the philosophers who followed immediately in his wake put greater stock 
in his empiricism than in his quasi-voluntarism. These figures found in Locke’s work the 
possibility of constructing a moral science that treats our nature as sensitive, rational, and 
sociable. I turn now to Cockburn.  
 
Revising Locke: Catharine Trotter Cockburn 
In 1702, Catharine Trotter Cockburn published A Defence of Mr. Locke’s ‘Essay 
of Human Understanding’, wherein its Principles, with reference to Morality, Revealed 
Religion, and the Immortality of the Soul, are considered and justified: In answer to some 
Remarks on that Essay (1702). The remarks to which Cockburn is responding are three 
pamphlets, published between 1697 and 1699. The author of these works argues that 
Locke’s empiricism cannot account for the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, 
and the immutability of moral distinctions. After reading Cockburn’s “Defence,” Locke 
wrote to her, saying: “Give me leave…to assure you that as the rest of the world take 
                                                        
79 Locke, Essay II.xxviii.II.  
80 Locke, Essay II.xxi.53. 
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notice of the strength and clearness of your reasoning, so I cannot but be extremely 
sensible, that it was employed in my defence. You have herein not only vanquished my 
adversary, but reduced me also absolutely under your power.”81 Locke’s approval of 
Cockburn’s treatment of the Essay, and endorsement of her response to the pamphlets, is 
evidence that she is a key source for the 18th century reception of Locke.82 
            The first criticism to which Cockburn responds is that Locke’s empiricism cannot 
account for the immutability of moral ideas because all ideas are based in experience, and 
we possess no sensuous faculty that can draw the distinction between virtues and vices.83 
However, Cockburn responds, Locke maintains that moral ideas are not given directly in 
experience but are the result of reflection on human beings and their interests.84 Moral 
ideas seem to be simple because they are often employed without reflection. However, 
the fact that we apply a particular concept quickly has more to do with our moral 
competency than with the origin of the concept itself. As Cockburn points out, “if he 
[pamphlet author] means, that without respect to men, or to society, though mankind has 
never been, or never been designed, justice, gratitude, fidelity, &c. had been good, and 
                                                        
81 John Locke, Selected Correspondence, ed. Mark Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), Letter 3234.   
82 For more on Cockburn’s life, see: Martha Brandt Bolton, “Some Aspects of the Philosophical 
Work of Catharine Trotter,” Hypatia’s Daughters: Fifteen Hundred Years of Women 
Philosophers, ed. Linda Lopez McAlister (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 139-64; 
Anne Kelley, Catharine Trotter Cockburn: An Early Modern Writer in the Vangaurd of 
Feminism (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2002). For her relation to Locke, see: Jane Duran, “Early 
English Empiricism and the Work of Catharine Trotter Cockburn,” Metaphilosophy 44.4 (2013): 
485–495; Jessica Gordon Roth, “Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s Defence of Locke,” The Monist 
98.1 (2015): 64–76; Patricia Sheridan, “Reflection, Nature, and Moral Law: The extent of 
Catharine Trotter Cockburn’s Lockeanism in her Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay,” Hypatia 22.3 
(2007): 133–151. 
83 Catharine Trotter Cockburn, “A Defence,” Philosophical Writings, ed. Patricia Sheridan (New 
York: Broadview, 2006), 40. 
84 Cockburn, “A Defence,” 41.  
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their contraries evil; I confess myself incapable of having a notion of these virtues 
abstract from any subject to conceive.”85  
Even if moral ideas are complex, there is a lingering problem with the Lockean 
framework: its voluntarism. Locke conceives of natural law as consisting of a set of 
dictates that govern one’s relation to oneself, to society, and to God; while the law’s 
content is distinct, God is the ground of our moral obligations. As the pamphlet author 
points out: “if good and evil, virtue and vice, are not such in their own nature, they must 
be so from the arbitrary will of God; and all things are indifferent, till he declare this, or 
that, to be sin, according to his pleasure.”86 Cockburn argues this interpretation is 
mistaken, noting that the content of virtue depends on human nature: “God, having made 
man such a creature as he is, it is impossible, that good and evil should change their 
respect to him, as that pleasure can be pain, and pain pleasure, which no one in his 
senses will affirm.”87 She continues, “all moral good consis[ts] in doing, willing, or 
choosing, for oneself or others, whatever is the natural good; and all moral evil, in doing, 
willing, or choosing whatever is a natural evil, to oneself or others.”88 Since moral good 
consists in performing actions that conduce to natural good, God cannot dictate the 
content of morality without also changing our nature.89  
                                                        
85 Cockburn, “A Defence,” 42.  
86 Cockburn, “A Defence,” 43. 
87 Cockburn, “A Defence,” 43. 
88 Cockburn, “A Defence,” 43.  
89 As Cockburn notes, “if the law of nature is the product of human nature itself (as the great 
Grotius speaks) it must subsist as long as human nature; nor will this foundation make it the less 
sacred, since it cannot be doubted, that it is originally the will of God, whilst we own him the 
author of that nature, of which this law is a consequence” (Cockburn, “A Defence,” 44). 
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But, the pamphlet author objects: Locke bases obligation “upon future 
punishments and rewards, and upon the arbitrary will of the law-giver.”90  The author 
claims that, for Locke, the obligation to act morally is dependent on external sanctions. 
The author’s claim is that a) Lockean obligation is hedonistic, and so b) one has an 
obligation to act in a way that secures pleasure and guards against pain; c) God is the 
ultimate source of pleasure and pain, so d) we are obligated to act in accordance with his 
will. However, Cockburn argues, the author fails to recognize the distinction between the 
nature of the law and the force of the law: 
 
“Locke says, that the will of God, rewards and punishment, can only give morality 
the force of a law; that does not make them the first grounds of good and evil, 
since…to know what the will of God is (antecedently to revelation) we must 
know what is good by the conformity it has to our nature, by which we come to 
know the nature of God, which therefore may be to him the first ground or rule of 
good; through the will of God, &c. can only enforce it as a law.”91 
 
For Cockburn, the author conflates the fact that rewards and punishments provide a 
necessary motivation for agents to act morally with the claim that these sanctions are the 
source of our obligation to comply with natural law. Although human beings may 
sometimes require the threat of eternal damnation to act morally, what it means to act 
morally is determined by human nature and not by these sanctions.92 
                                                        
90 Cockburn, “A Defence,” 46. 
91 Cockburn, “A Defence,” 47.  
92 In a later edition of “A Defence,” Cockburn added the following footnote: “Some, who had 
lately read this defence, have thought that the author’s sentiments, on the grounds of moral 
obligation, were different when this were written. The grounds of moral obligation are not here 
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  It is here that Cockburn introduces the language of “fittingness,” commonly 
identified with Samuel Clarke (1675-1729).93 For Clarke, we bear certain relations to 
ourselves, to others, and to God. Each agent is obligated to act in a way that is “fitting” 
with these relations: being pious, righteous, and sober (i.e., proper recognition of one’s 
relation to God, to others, and to oneself).94 These fittingness conditions, which 
determine the content of morality, are independent of God’s will; our obligation is 
“antecedent to all Consideration of any particular private and personal Reward or 
Punishment.”95  We are obligated to honor God because our relation to him is as his 
inferior; we have duties of equity to our fellows because of our equal standing with 
them.96 Cockburn conceives of each of us as a part of “a system of social beings, that is, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
discussed at all; the notion of founding morality upon an arbitrary will is carefully rejected; and 
the nature of God, or the divine understanding, and the new nature of man, all along supposed to 
be the true grounds of it…the author still agrees to that proposition; for strictly and properly 
speaking a law implies authority and sanctions; and though we say law of reason, and the law of 
nature, this is in a less proper sense, importing, that they are as effectual grounds of obligation, as 
if they were real laws, but they oblige us not as dependent, but as reasonable beings; in the same 
manner as the Supreme Being, who is subject to no laws, and accountable to non, obliges himself 
to do always what he perceives to be right and fit to be done.” (“A Defence,” 46-47n). 
93 For a treatment of Clarke’s ethics, see: Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A Historical 
and Critical Study Volume II: From Suarez to Rousseau (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 372-398; Remy Debes, “Moral Rationalism and Moral Realism,” Routledge Companion to 
18th Century Philosophy, ed. Aaron Garrett (New York: Routledge, 2014), 500-534. 
94 Samuel Clarke, “A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, 
and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation,” The Works of Samuel Clarke, ed. 
Benjamin Hoadly (London: Thoemmes Press, 2002), 2.618. 
95 Clarke, “A Discourse,” 2.627.  
96 For Clarke’s discussions of equity, see: “A Discourse,” 2.620-2.641.  
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beings fitted to live together, to have mutual dependence.”97 To act in a “fitting” manner 
is, for her, to act in a way that promotes the flourishing of this system.98  
 Cockburn maintains that the fact that certain conduct is fitting to our nature is 
sufficient to ground an obligation to act morally. One might say that the fact that some 
act is fitting cannot obligate us to act, because facts about fitness do not motivate us to act 
in any manner. When it comes to motivation, Cockburn argues that the fear of damnation 
provides one with the motivation to act morally: “future rewards and punishments…[are] 
considerations of great importance, and highly necessary to keep the generality of 
mankind to the practice of virtue.”99 External sanction provides natural law with its 
necessary force.100 Still, Cockburn’s places an emphasis on our possession of 
disinterested benevolence and on the “self-approving joy” that naturally flows from our 
acting in a way that is fitting with our nature.  
                                                        
97 Cockburn, “Remarks upon the Principles and Reasonings of Dr. Rutherforth’s ‘Essay on the 
Nature and Obligations of Virtue’: In vindication of the contrary principles and reasonings, 
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99 Cockburn, “Remarks upon the Principles,” 178. 
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and conscience or the moral sense…have in themselves an obligatory power, yet it must be 
allowed, and they as earnestly maintain, that the will of God, with the sanctions of his laws, can 
only enforce this obligation so as to extend to all times and all cases” (“Remarks upon some 
Writers,” 109).  For Locke, a moral law possesses three features, “[first], it is the decree of a 
superior will, wherein the formal cause of a law appears to consist…Secondly, it lays down what 
is and what is not to be done, which is the proper function of a law. Thirdly, it binds men, for it 
contains in itself all that is requisite to create an obligation.” (“Essays,” 83).  
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 Cockburn does not discuss benevolence in A Defence, though it looms large in her 
later writings. In Remarks upon some Writers in the Controversy concerning the 
Foundation of Moral Virtue and Moral Obligation; particularly the Translator of 
Archbishop King’s ‘Origin of Evil’ (1743), she claims that John Gay, “argues very justly 
against Mr. Hutcheson...that…[there] is no proof, that the moral sense and public 
affections (in his language) are mere instincts implanted in us, since they are all 
resolvable into reason, and are undeniably cultivated and improved, by making a right 
use of our faculties.”101 Like Gay, Cockburn claims that human beings are benevolent 
and that they become this way through a process of moral development:  
 
 
“Mankind is a system of creatures, that continually need one another’s assistance, 
without which they could not long subsist. It is therefore necessary, that 
everyone…should contribute his part towards the good and preservation of the 
whole, and avoid whatever is detrimental to it. For this end, they are made 
capable of acquiring social or benevolent affections (probably have the seeds of 
them implanted in their nature) with a moral sense or conscience, that approves of 
virtuous actions, and disapproves the contrary.”102  
 
It is unclear how to interpret Cockburn’s parenthetical comment, as she suggests that 
benevolence is not innate but its “seeds” are. Regardless, benevolence “guide[s]” 
individuals “to virtuous practice.”103 Most do not conduct themselves on the basis of 
reflections about “the relations and fitness of things,” but are instead led to act morally by 
                                                        
101 Cockburn, “Remarks upon some Writers,” 113. I return to John Gay in the next chapter. 
102 Cockburn, “Remarks upon some Writers,” 114.  
103 Cockburn, “Remarks upon the Principles,” 152. 
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their sentiments, chief among them being benevolence.104 Insofar as Cockburn conceives 
of a moral agent as someone who works to promote the good of humanity, it is easy to 
see why a benevolent disposition is crucial to attaining this goal. Still, this is not the end 
of the story. For Cockburn, reflective approval has a role to play here as well.   
 According to Cockburn, nothing is more “insupportable than to stand condemned 
in our own judgments; or more delightful, than the approbation of our own minds.”105 
She often returns to the idea that the pain we often feel after acting immorally comes 
from our awareness that we have failed to live up to our obligations: “the uneasiness we 
feel upon the practice of anything contrary to what moral sense approves, is a 
consequence of the obligation, not the foundation of it…self-condemnation manifestly 
presuppose[es] some obligation.”106 The awareness that we should act in a way consistent 
with conscience distances ourselves from our tendencies to act immorally or from base 
motives, like a concern for receiving rewards or avoiding punishments. Failing to 
recognize the way in which we hold ourselves to standards is the chief problem that 
Cockburn identifies with her hedonist contemporaries.107 As she points out, “I do not 
know what notions the partisans of that doctrine can have of virtue and moral goodness, 
whilst they talk of it as nothing but a regard of interest?”108  
                                                        
104 Cockburn, “Remarks upon the Principles,” 152. 
105 Cockburn, “A Defence,” 77. 
106 Cockburn, “Remarks upon some Writers,” 109. 
107 Cockburn, “Remarks upon some Writers,” 116-118.  
108 Cockburn, “Remarks upon some Writers,” 136. 
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 Cockburn’s defense of Locke repackages his ideas in three ways.109 First, Locke 
suggests that the content of morality is derived from human nature but Cockburn makes 
this view a cornerstone of her thought. Second, Cockburn argues that to act morally is to 
promote the good of other human beings. There is evidence that Locke thought similarly 
about the aim of morality, but he does not lay much emphasis on this point. Third, 
Cockburn gestures at self-approval as a basis for moral motivation, though she maintains 
that most of us require the promise of reward or the threat of punishment to act morally. 
Cockburn shifts Lockean ethics away from its law-like roots. This turn away from 
legalism is completed by Locke’s student: Shaftesbury.  
 
Shaftesbury’s Two Standpoints on Human Nature 
 Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury’s (1671-1713) 
Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times (1711) was, other than Locke’s 
Two Treatises of Government (1689), the most reprinted text in the 18th century.110 
                                                        
109 In “Reflection, Nature, and Moral Law,” Sheridan argues that while Cockburn attributes the 
position she presents in “A Defence” to Locke, there are “obstacles to this attribution. However 
far Cockburn succeeds in grounding natural law in ‘the nature of God and Man,’ her approach to 
the matter differed from Locke in its degree of anthropocentrism” (134). For Sheridan, “Locke’s 
views on morality seem to vacillate between the conventionalism of his theory of mixed modes 
and a more robust theistic realism” (139). Cockburn claims that “theology cannot furnish an 
independent ground for moral knowledge. Rather, the moral character of God must be ascertained 
from reflection upon our own nature, and human nature must therefore be treated as a standard 
unto itself in any philosophical explanation of moral knowledge” (141). In this way, Sheridan 
maintains that Cockburn develops a distinctly “anthropomorphic” ethics which distances her from 
Locke. Interpreting Locke’s ethics is tricky business (see n.7 above); there are scholars who have 
stressed this “anthropomorphic” side of Locke’s work, including Rossiter, in “Hedonism and 
Natural Law,” and Sheridan herself, in “Locke’s Latitudinarian Sympathies.” Nevertheless, I 
agree that a tension exists in Locke between his theistic rationalism and his human-nature based 
empiricism. By emphasizing the latter in “A Defence,” Cockburn paves the way for a reading of 
Locke that exercised a great deal of influence in the 18th century. 
110 Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, 
Opinions, and Times, vol. I-III, ed. Douglas den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), vii.  
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Shaftesbury’s connection to Locke was substantial, as Locke was a close friend of the 
First Earl of Shaftesbury (1621-1683). Locke was also the family physician, and helped 
oversee the health and education of the First Earl’s son, the Second Earl (1652-1699), 
who suffered from a degenerative disease and was unable to be an active participant in 
politics. Because of the Second Earl’s health, the Third Earl was raised in the First Earl’s 
household from a very young age, and the curriculum of his education was written by 
Locke, as modeled on his experiences with the Second Earl. Although Locke left the 
family to travel on the European continent in 1674, he left an indelible mark on the Third 
Earl, who spent time with Locke as a young man in Holland, and with whom the Third 
Earl would continue to visit and correspond until his death.111  
 Throughout his work, Shaftesbury takes aim at the idea that eternal rewards and 
punishments are necessary to secure moral motivation:112  
 
                                                        
111 Shaftesbury spent time in Holland with Locke, and was made familiar with the members of 
Locke’s philosophical circle there, which consisted of Jean Le Clerc, Pierre Bayle, and Philip 
Van Limborch. Shortly after Locke’s death, Shaftesbury wrote to Le Clerc that he attributed to 
Locke “the absolute direction of my education, and to whom next my immediate parents, as I 
must own the greatest obligation, so I have ever preserved he highest gratitude and duty” 
[Shaftesbury, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen, ed. Benjamin Rand 
(New York: Macmillan co., 1900), 332]. Shaftesbury’s relationship with Locke’s thought was 
conflicted. In a letter to Michael Ainsworth, Shaftesbury noted that Locke had “struck at all the 
fundamentals, threw order and virtue out of the world” (Life, 419). And yet Shaftesbury also 
claimed that he respected Locke’s work “on government, policy, trade, coin, education, 
toleration” (Life, 404). For more on the relationship between Locke and Shaftesbury, see: Carey, 
Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, 98-105.  
112 For more on the role of moral motivation in Shaftesbury, see: Stanley Grean, Shaftesbury’s 
Philosophy of Religion and Ethics: A Study in Enthusiasm (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 
1967), 229-245; Gregory W. Trianosky, “On the Obligation to be Virtuous: Shaftesbury and the 
Question, Why be Moral?” Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978): 289–300; Stephen 
Darwall, The British Moralists, 176-206; Michael B. Gill, “Shaftesbury’s Two Accounts of the 
Reason to be Virtuous,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 38.4 (2000): 529-548; Simon Grote 
“Shaftesbury’s Egoistic Hedonism” Aufklärung 22 (2010): 135–49. 
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 “Thus a Person loving Life for Life’s sake, and Virtue not at all, may by the 
 Promise or Hope of Life, and Fear of Death, or other Evil, be induc’d to practice 
 Virtue, and even endeavor to be truly virtuous. Yet neither is this very Endeavor 
 to be esteem’d a Virtue: For tho he may intend to be virtuous, he is not become 
 so, for having only intended, or aim’d at it, thro’ love of the Reward. But as soon 
 as he is come to have  such Good for its own sake, as good and amiable in itself; 
 then is he in some degree good and virtuous, and not till then.”113  
In her remarks on Thomas Rutherford, Cockburn implores the reader to not confuse her 
view, which holds that there is an obligation to act morally separate from considerations 
of reward and punishment, with “the author of the Characterisiticks [who] expresses 
against any regard to future retributions.”114 She continues, “nobody, I am persuaded, can 
have a deeper sense, than I have, of God’s goodness and condescension in assisting our 
weaknesses by such assurances, and appointing, for our imperfect performances, the 
reward of an exceeding weight of glory.”115 In a letter to her niece, Cockburn even takes 
aim at Shaftesbury, despite his ties to Locke. In her view, Shaftesbury naively thinks that 
human beings do not require religion to be moral: “instead of that, he proposed to bring 
the bulk of mankind to a love of virtue for its beauty, and excellencies, and to give them 
all his refined taste; he might as well…have proposed to make them all lords.”116 
                                                        
113 Shaftesbury, “An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit,” Characteristicks, 38.  
114 Cockburn, “Remarks upon the Principles,” 218. 
115 Cockburn, “Remarks upon the Principles,” 218. 
116 Cockburn, “Ms. Cockburn to her Niece [Anne Hepburn], 12 June 1744,” Philosophical 
Writings, 233. Cockburn’s comment that Shaftesbury “proposed to make [men] all lords,” is 
important, and will come up in my discussion of Adam Smith. Smith claims that “polite dignity is 
the character that he [Shaftesbury] aimed at, and this seems to be best supported by a grand and 
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 Shaftesbury’s relationship with Christianity is ambiguous. In his earliest writing, a 
Preface to Benjamin Whichcote’s (1609-1683) sermons, Shaftesbury distinguishes the 
spirit of Christianity from its political manifestations, choosing instead to identify it with 
piety.117 A properly religious attitude is, for him, natural affection directed at the good of 
humanity and the adoration of God. Shaftesbury is confounded that someone can believe 
in a Supreme Being who entreats us to “act after His example” and yet maintain that 
carrying out this purpose produces no pleasure, sense of beauty, or contentment in us.118 
Other sects worry that by placing too much stress on our natural affections, “the apparent 
Need of Sacred Revelation…[is] taken away.119 So, Shaftesbury, points out: “they were 
forced, in a Manner, to wound VERTUE, and give way to the Imputation of 
being Mercenary, and of Acting in a slavish Spirit, in Ways of Religion, rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                     
pompous diction that was the Stile he made choise of. This he carried so far from being grand, his 
stile is as pompous as in the most sublime subjects” [Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, ed. 
J.C. Bryce (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1983), i.146]. Ryan Hanley infers that “Shaftesbury is 
thus condemned by Smith for his penchant for both abstract moral theorizing characteristic of the 
moderns, and then also for his embrace of the convoluted prose style associated with that 
approach” [“Style and Sentiment: Smith and Swift,” Adam Smith Review 4 (2008), 93.]. For a 
response to Hanley, see: Douglas J Den Uyl, “Das Shaftesbury Problem,” Adam Smith Review 6 
(2011): 209-223, along with Hanley’s rebuttal, “Response to Douglas J Den Uyl’s ‘Das 
Shaftesbury Problem’,” Adam Smith Review 6, 228-232.  
117 Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, “Preface,” Select Sermons of Dr. 
Whichcot, in Two Parts, ed. Shaftesbury (London: Awnsham and John Churchill, 1698). For 
more on Whichcote, see: J.B. Schneewind, "Voluntarism and the Foundations of Ethics," 
Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 70.2 (1996): 25-41; 
Michael B. Gill, “The Religious Rationalism of Benjamin Whichcote,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 27.2 (1999): 271-300; Aaron Garrett, “Seventeenth Century Moral Philosophy: Self-
Help, Self-Knowledge, and the Devil’s Mountain,” 
The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 229-279. 
118 Shaftesbury, “Preface,” x. 
119 Shaftesbury, “Preface,” xi. 
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admit a sort of Rival (in their Sense) to the Faith of Divine Revelation.”120 In both cases, 
he argues that the viability of true religion, founded is love, is threatened.  
 It is important to consider Shaftesbury’s decision to publish the sermons, and their 
connection with his larger project. Towards the end of the Preface, Shaftesbury quotes 
from Whichcote:  
 
 “Whatsoever (says he) some have said; Man's Nature is not so untoward a Thing 
 (unless it be abused) but that there is a secret Sympathy in Human Nature, with 
 Vertue and Honesty; which gives a Man an Interest even in bad Men.—God, in 
 infinite Wisdom, has so contrived; that, if an Intellectual Being sink it self into 
 Sensuality, or any way defile, and pollute it self; then, Miseries and Torments 
 should befall it, in this State—VERTUE, and VICE (says he) are the 
 Foundations of  Peace and Happiness, or Sorrow and Misery.— There is inherent 
 Punishment belonging to all Vice; and no Power can divide or separate them. 
 For, tho' God  should not, in a positive Way, inflict Punishment; or any 
 Instrument of God punish a Sinner;  yet, he would punish Himself; his Misery 
 and Unhappiness would arise from Himself.”121 
 
This defense of “Natural Goodness” makes Whichcote a “truly Christian philosopher” in 
Shaftesbury’s eyes.122 Since all human beings possess this “seed” of humanity, 
Shaftesbury requires a story about how we can foster natural goodness in human beings. 
The sermons of Whichcote succeed in one respect: they put an exemplary person on 
                                                        
120 Shaftesbury, “Preface,” xi. 
121 Shaftesbury, “Preface,” xiii. 
122 Shaftesbury, “Preface,” xiii. 
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display and, by doing so, stir the audience’s humane feelings. While Whichcote used the 
language of the “University,” Shaftesbury makes use of “the Conversation of the 
fashionable world.”123 In his essay “Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author,” he distinguishes 
his preferred manner of presentation with three “impolite” styles of writing: memoirs, 
religious confessionals, and philosophical treatises.124 For Shaftesbury, memoirs are 
dishonest, religious confessionals are poorly written, and treatises are unconcerned with 
the moral cultivation of their readers.125 He believes each of these literary forms to be 
insufficiently reflective.126 Shaftesbury instead implores the author to instead “write with 
a mirror,” or engage in dialogue with oneself and the audience; by doing so, he claims 
that those humane components of our nature will be made to shine.127  
Love, Enthusiasm, and ‘The Moralists’ 
 Shaftesbury does not make use of the dialogic form in most of his writings; the 
essay for which he is most remembered, “An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit,” is a 
                                                        
123 Shaftesbury, “Preface,” xv. 
124 The language of “impolite” styles of writing comes from Michael B. Gill, “Shaftesbury on 
Politeness, Honesty, and the Reason to be Moral,” New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his 
World and Today, ed. Patrick Müller (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014), 167-184.  
125 Shaftesbury, “Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author,” Characteristicks, vol. 1, 97-106. 
126 Shaftesbury, “Soliloquy,” 100, 106-107. 
127 Shaftesbury illustrates this process as follows, “We might here, therefore, as in a Looking-
Glass, discover our-selves, and see our minutest Features nicely delineated, and suted to our own 
Apprehension and Cognizance. No-one who was ever so little a-while an Inspector, cou’d fail of 
becoming acquainted with his own Heart. And, what was of singular note in these magical 
Glasses, it wou’d happen, that be a constant and long Inspection, the Partys accustom’d to the 
Pratice, wou’d acquire a peculiar speculative Habit; so as virtually to carry about with ’em a sort 
of Pocket-Mirrour, always ready, and in use. In this, there were Two Faces which wou’d naturally 
present themelves to our viuew: One of them, like the commanding Genius, the Leaer and Chief 
above-mention’d; the other like the rude, undisciplin’d and headstrong Creature, whom we our-
selves in our natural Capacity most exactly resembled. Whatever we were employ’d in, whatever 
we set about; if once we had acquired the habit of this Mirrour; we shou’d, by virtue of the 
double Reflection, distinguish our-selves into two different Partys. And in this Dramatick 
Method, the Work of Self-Inspection wou’d proceed with admirable Success” (“Soliloquy,” 122). 
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treatise. Still, the piece that occupies a central place in the Charateristicks, “The 
Moralists; a Philosophical Rhapsody, is a dialogue”128 In the work, we are presented with 
Theocles, a man who reveres the system of nature and its author and the natural goodness 
of human beings. He is tasked with convincing Philocles, a good man who possesses little 
faith in others, of the viability of a virtuous life, based in universal love. This account of 
virtue as love gives rise to a tension in Shaftesbury’s ethics between two perspectives: 
that of human beings, and that of the universe.129  
 “The Moralists” begins with Philocles writing to his friend Palemon. Philocles’ is 
concerned that Palemon’s views on human nature have been warped by his study of 
speculative subjects. Palemon laments the state of human beings: “Hapless Nature, thus 
to have err’d in they chief Workmanship! —When sprang this fatal Weakness? What 
Chance or Destiny shall we accuse?”130 Yet, he is poetic in his reverence for nature: “The 
Verdue of the Field, the distant Prospects, the gilded Horizon, and purple Sky, form’d by 
                                                        
128 For more on the form of the dialogue itself, see: Michael Prince, Philosophical Dialogue in the 
British Enlightenment: Theology, Aesthetics and the Novel (Cambridge, 1996), 47-73; Shayda 
Hoover, “‘Voices and Accents’: Enthusiastic Characterization in Shaftesbury’s The Moralists,” 
Eighteenth Century Life 37 (2013), 72-96. For more on Shaftesbury’s use of dialogue, see: See: 
Cassirer, Platonic Renaissance, 157-202; Grean, Shaftesbury’s Philosophy; Michael B. Gill, The 
British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Patrick Müller, “Dwell with honesty & beauty & order’: The Paradox of 
Theodicy in Shaftesbury’s Thought,” Aufklärung 22 (2010): 201–231; Shayda Hoover, “’Voices 
and Accents’”; Michael B. Gill, “Love of humanity in Shaftesbury’s Moralists,” British Journal 
for the History of Philosophy 24.6 (2016): 1117-35. 
129 A similar tension in Shaftesbury’s thought is explored by Müller, “honest & beauty & order”; 
Gill, “Love of Humanity”; Joseph Chavez, “Philosophy and Politeness, Moral Autonomy and 
Malleability in Shaftesbury’s Characteristics,” Theory and Practice in the Eighteenth Century: 
Writing between Philosophy and Literature, ed. Alexander Dick and Christina Lupton (London: 
Pickering and Chatto, 2008), 51–68. 
130 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 109. 
  
50 
a setting Sun, had Charms in abudance.”131 Philocles finds a tension in the admiration 
that Palemon expresses for nature and the pessimism he expresses about human beings:  
 
 “For now you began to talk with much Satisfaction of natural Things, and of all 
 Orders of Beautys, MAN only excepted. Never did I hear a finer Description than 
 you have made of the Order of the heavenly Luminarys, the Circle of the Planets, 
 and their attendant Satellites. And you, who wou’d allow nothing to those fair 
 earthly Luminarys in the Circles which just now we mov’d in.”132    
Philocles then accuses Palemon of being a “Man-hater.”133 Next to those perfections of 
the universe, Palemon sees nothing of worth in human beings; and yet, as Philocles notes, 
human beings are a part of this nature that Palemon is so quick to admire. He locates 
Palemon’s problem in his penchant for extremes and his adversity to doubt: “there is a 
certain way of Questioning and Doubting, which no-way suites the Genius of our Age. 
Men love to take party instantly. They can’t bear being kept in suspense. The 
Examination torments ‘em. They want to be rid of it, upon the easiest terms.”134 The 
desire for solutions lead people to embrace simplistic views that promise access to the 
secrets of nature: “Every Sect has a Recipe. When you know it, you are Master of Nature; 
you solve all her Phaenomena: you see all her Designs, and can account for all her 
Operations…at least one wou’d imagine the Partizans of each modern Sect had this 
                                                        
131 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 110. 
132 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 112. 
133 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 112. 
134 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 107. 
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Conceit.”135 Philocles suggests that Palemon take a note from the skeptical school, which 
stresses the importance of doubt and dialogue, and rejects dogmatism.  
 Philocles suggests that Palemon cultivate a “Philosophical Enthusiasm.”136 In “A 
Letter Concerning Enthusiasm,” Shaftesbury discusses the enthusiasm that he considers 
detrimental to philosophy and polite society. Human beings have a tendency to attach 
themselves to ideas. What distinguishes a good expression of this tendency from a bad 
one depends on whether that to which is appealed is either true or false.137 The problem 
comes in distinguishing between truth and falsity. The solution that Shaftesbury offers is 
what he calls the “Test of Ridicule.”138 For any idea we hold, we should be open to 
discussing it with our fellows and even to receiving a polite jabbing from them as well.  
He thinks that if we apply this test, the true will be distinguished from the false, since true 
and beautiful things are not easily ridiculed, while those associated with dogmatism and 
zealotry will be natural objects of ridicule. Here, Shaftesbury draws on the notion of 
“wit” to explicate what it means to engage in this good-natured “raillery.”139 He thinks 
that the only way to contain enthusiasm is to have an open space for dialogue in which 
“We polish one another, and rub off our Corners and rough Sides.”140 
                                                        
135 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 108. 
136 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,”, 119.  
137 Shaftesbury’s treatment of enthusiasm overlaps with that given by Henry More in his 
Enthusiasms Triumphatus; or a Brief Discourse of the Nature, Causes, Kinds, and Cures of 
Enthusiasm (1656), a work of which Shaftesbury was fond. However, More is mainly concerned 
with giving a refutation of false enthusiasm, as opposed to providing the reader with a form of 
enthusiasm to which they ought to aspire. A similar strategy is taken by Locke in Essay IV.xix. 
138 Shaftesbury, “A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm,” Characteristicks, vol. 1, 8.  
139 Shaftesbury, “Enthusiasm,” 13. 
140 Shaftesbury, “Sensus Communis; An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour,” 
Characteristicks, vol. 1, 42. 
  
52 
 Open conversation is important for curing what is most dangerous about the 
vulgar form of enthusiasm: its affective component. Ill-manners and melancholy are 
naturally part of enthusiasm and conversation undercuts these elements by modeling a 
politeness that is indicative of civil friendship. Shaftesbury claims that ridicule cultivates 
a sense of “good humour,” that is crucial for feeling the force of what he calls “true 
Religion.”141 It does this by combatting violent emotions that are impediments to 
recognizing truths about the world. As Shaftesbury points out “we can never be fit to 
contemplate any thing above us, when we are in no condition to look into ourselves, and 
calmly examine the Temper of our own Mind and Passions.”142 This returns us to 
Philocles’ concerns about Palemon, who had become as misanthrope; rigid in his 
principles and unwilling to engage in dialogue with Philocles, resorting instead to a kind 
of “Rant[ing].”143 In “The Moralists,” Philocles outlines the “philosophical enthusiasm” 
that Theocles convinced him to adopt. Central to this enthusiasm is a cheerfulness based 
in an understanding of the system of nature and a friendship with one’s fellow beings.144  
 Philocles sketches the moral system taught to him by Theocles. Virtue is based in 
love, which is modeled on the experience of beauty.145 One begins by appreciating 
objects in their particularity, coming to view them as an expression of a more 
fundamental beauty, where these objects as joined in a harmonious system from which 
                                                        
141 Shaftesbury, “Enthusiasm,” 15. 
142 Shaftesbury, “Enthusiasm,” 21. 
143 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 110. 
144 The topic of cheerfulness in Shaftesbury’s writings remains underexplored. For an 
illuminating discussion of this subject, see: Lydia Amir, Humor and the Good Life in Modern 
Philosophy: Shaftesbury, Hamann, Kierkegaard (Albany, NY: Suny Press), 11-88. 
145 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 120. See: Leslie Brown, “The Idea of Life as a Work of Art in 
Scottish Enlightenment Discourse,” Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 24 (1995): 51–67. 
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their beauty is derived. 146 All the while, one feels a greater appreciation for the system 
and its constituent parts. This process works similarly with love. Love is an emotion 
directed selectively at those closest to us. As we come to understand the manner in which 
all human beings rely on one another, our scope of concern naturally extends beyond our 
own community to “the Good of Mankind.”147 Disinterested love is the motivational 
underpinning of all virtuous conduct, according to Shaftesbury. There is no need for 
external rewards and punishments on this view. For him, one need only have a proper 
comprehension of nature, and one’s place in it, and love will follow. 
 To understand more about what is meant by “love” and how it connects to 
enthusiasm, we need to look a bit later in the dialogue, when Philocles is recounting a 
conversation between himself and Theocles. At this point, Philocles has yet to undergo 
his enthusiastic transition – he is still defending the view that “our real Good is 
PLEASURE.”148 Philocles argues that there is a plurality of goods since there are endless 
sources of pleasure for individuals based on their dispositions. Theocles eventually brings 
Philocles around to the idea that naïve hedonism does not support his pluralism, as there 
is widespread agreement on what people find pleasing; and further, convergence on those 
activities that people find most pleasurable. Theocles, by seeking a truce, presses 
                                                        
146 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 121. 
147 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 121. As we become aware of the natural hierarchy in the system 
of nature, Shaftesbury claims that we begin to perceive the subordination of certain spheres of 
being to others as necessary: “Thus in the several Orders of terrestrial Forms, a Resignation is 
requir’d, a Sacrifice and mutual yielding of Natures one to another. The Vegetables by their 
Death sustain the Animals: and Animal Bodys dissolv’d, enrich the Earth and raise again the 
vegetable World. The numerous Insects are reduc’d by the superior Kinds of Birds and Beasts: 
and these again are check’d by Man; who in his turn submits to other Natures, and resigns his 
Form a Sacrifice in common to the rest of Things…all inferior Natures by subjected to the 
superior Nature of the World!” (“The Moralists,” 121-122).  
148 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 128. 
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Philocles to admit that friendship is most pleasing: “Answer me, PHILOCLES, you who 
are such a Judg of Beauty, and have so good a Taste of Pleasure; is there anything you 
admire, so fair as Friendship, or any thing so charming as a generous Action?”149 While 
he accepts this position, Theocles asks him to imagine “if all Life were in reality but one 
continu’d Friendship, and cou’d be made in such intire Act? Here surely wou’d be that 
fix’d and constant GOOD you sought.”150  
 Philocles refers to Theocles’ proposition as a “Chimera,” saying “I can conceive 
but very faintly how this high Strain of Friendship can be so manag’d as to fill a Life.”151 
For Philocles, an expression of love is always directed at some individual, not at 
humanity as a whole. We also generally experience love, for very few people (e.g., some 
of our family, friends, and partners). And this is no mistake. Love commits us to 
undertaking onerous acts, and the needs of the beloved can only be fulfilled by attending 
to them in their particularity. It is therefore impossible to satisfy the conditions required 
to properly say that one loves everyone. Theocles responds that Philocles’ skepticism 
about the ability to experience universal love derives from a failure to appreciate the 
extent of our capacity to love others, a failure which proceeds from a pessimistic view of 
human nature:   
 
 “Can you then out of Good-breeding merely, and from a Temper natural to you, 
 rejoice  to shew Civility, Courteousness, Obligingness, seek Objects of 
 Compassion, and be pleas’d with every Occurrence where you have power to do 
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150 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 135. 
151 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 135. 
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 some service even to  People unknown?...in the case of Strangers here at home; to 
 help, assist, relieve all  who require it in the most hospitable, kind, and friendly 
 manner?...O PHILOCLES! how little do you know the Extent and Power of 
 Good-nature, and to what an heroic  pitch a Soul may rise, which knows the 
 thorow Force of it; and distributing it rightly, frames in itself-an equal, just, and 
 universal friendship.”152 
  
Theolces denies that it is impossible for human beings to cultivate love for humanity. We 
might be inclined to agree with Philocles that this love is “too metaphysical an Object for 
me,” since “I cou’d love nothing of which I had not some sensible material Image.”153  
The Two Standpoints: Humanity and the Universe 
 At this point, one might just get off the train. If Shaftesbury argues, by way of 
Theocles, that universal love is both the content of virtue and a sufficient motive to act 
morally, then his position is implausible. Even if we accept the former aspect of the view, 
how could such a love be experienced by human beings, who are fickle, partial creatures? 
The tension in Shaftesbury’s writings between the content of virtue and our motivational 
capacities is considered by Michael Gill.154 While I think Gill is right about the tension, I 
do not find it to be the most worrying aspect of Shaftesbury’s view. The implausibility of 
both generating “universal love” by way of contemplating the system of nature and 
                                                        
152 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 137. 
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having this love motivate our conduct is manifest.155 The deeper problem comes when we 
admit the possibility of cultivating universal love. I claim that even if we could develop 
such a love, doing so would be against our better judgment, and would, in fact, 
undermine our aim to base an ethics in our nature as sensitive, rational, and sociable 
beings. 
 One can either interact with humans in their particularity or as constituents of a 
system of nature, one cannot do both simultaneously. For example, when we love our 
friend, we do so in their particularity, which informs how we interact with and do good 
by them. Of course our friend shares much with their fellow beings, and we might appeal 
to this common humanity to chastise another for harming them, but our friend’s status as 
a human being is not often on our minds when considering their value, which outstrips 
these considerations. To view our friend simply as a human being is to treat them from a 
perspective that obscures their particularity. Since love is the basis of virtue for 
Shaftesbury, and the source of moral motivation, to have love for our fellow beings is to 
love them in their universality. When we love our friend virtuously, we recognize their 
also occupying a place in the system of nature. To the extent that I have the proper 
appreciation for this system, I can love my friend as one of its expressions.  
 Consider the following exchange between Philocles and Theocles. Theocles 
claims that the requirement of love be “sensible” is unjustified since Philocles loved 
Palemon prior to meeting him: “I know that you admir’d and lov’d a Friend long ere you 
                                                        
155 One could argue that this tension only arises for Shaftesbury if you assume a broadly Lockean 
account of moral motivation. Perhaps Shaftesbury is a Platonist, whereby the idea of universal 
love is motivating for someone rightly positioned despite never producing a feeling in them. I 
sidestep these concerns by shifting my criticism to Shaftesbury’s account of the content of virtue. 
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knew his Person. Or was it PALEMON’s Character of no force, when it engag’d you in 
that long Correspondence which preceded your late personal Acquaintance?”156 Philocles 
admits that he did in fact love Palemon but “was forc’d to form a kind of material Object, 
and had always such a certain Image of him, ready-drawn, in my Mind, whenever I 
thought of him.”157 For Philocles’ admiration of Palemon’s to rise to the level of love, he 
had to form an image of Palemon to which the admiration was directed. Theocles argues 
that this point can be extended to admirable people in history (e.g., “the People of old 
Rome”) and even mankind.158 One need only form an image of “the Romans” or of 
“humanity” to cultivate this love. But there is a difference between Philocles loving 
Palemon, or the “Roman people,” or humanity.  
 There is still the problem of “forming an image” of humanity. How does Philocles 
suggest we do so? We only form an image of humanity indirectly; we first come to view 
nature as a unified whole; we then recognize that a “principle of union” is responsible for 
the constituent parts of nature hanging together; after which we form an image of this 
unifying principle to which our admiration and love is directed.159 Insofar as human 
beings are components of nature, they are indirect objects of admiration and love. 
Theocles’ choice image for the unifying principle of nature is a divine, benevolent 
being.160 For Shaftesbury, enthusiasm is an ecstatic appreciation of and devotion to an 
object; what makes it “reasonable” is that it proceeds from a proper understanding of its 
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object. If one has the correct understanding of nature (i.e., a teleologically-structured 
system) then one’s ecstatic appreciation of nature is thereby reasonable. This brand of 
enthusiasm is expressed by Theocles throughout “The Moralists,” in his poetic 
descriptions of various aspects of nature.161  
 When one is hiking the White Mountains, it is easy to feel a degree of ecstasy 
directed at nature as a whole. We might even say that one’s ecstatic appreciation for 
nature is praiseworthy, as it leads us to have a better sense of our own dependence and 
encourages modesty and compassion towards other beings. However, this point makes 
less sense when applied to humans. The enthusiasm presented by Theocles proceeds from 
a judgment of nature’s perfection; a similar attitude would be unwarranted in the case of 
human beings, since it is directed at human beings qua constituents of a perfectly ordered 
system of nature. There are two problems, one of which concerns how Shaftesbury views 
the idea of perfection. Postlapsarian human beings are neither perfect nor harmonious – 
to attribute perfection to them is to falsify their nature. Consider the Lockean problem of 
diversity, of which Shaftesbury is equally concerned.162 People are found everywhere to 
hold different beliefs, attitudes, commitments, and these differences bring them into 
conflict with one another. To the extent that we can find ways to help this situation, the 
solutions are hardly perfect and produce something far less than harmony.  
 One option, proposed by Hutcheson, is to argue that the diversity and conflict to 
which human beings are prone is not part of their nature, but external to it in some 
                                                        
161 See also: Patrick Müller, “Dwell with honesty & beauty & order’”; Andrea Gaitti, “Stoic 
Influences on Shaftesbury’s Theory of Beauty,” New Ages, New Opinions, 61–76. 
162 Carey, Locke, Shaftsbury, and Hutcheson. 
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fashion.163 Shaftesbury holds a similar view. Human beings are perfect insofar as they are 
components of a perfect system; they are good to the extent that they work to ensure that 
it remains harmonious. In this way, as Theocles notes, the beauty and good that one 
attributes to trees and oceans is equivalent to the virtue we discuss in moral matters. The 
only difference between trees and human beings is that the we have a choice in how we 
play a part in the system. It is notable that the enthusiasm we get in “The Moralists” 
consists of pronouncements about nature’s beauty. And yet, after one such 
pronouncement, Theocles notes that “we had better leave these unsociable Places, 
whither out Fancy has transported us, and return to our-selves here again, on our more 
conversable Woods, and temperate Climates.”164 This comment signals a potential 
tension between the rapturous appreciation of nature and the demands of sociability.  
 The second problem with viewing one’s fellows a constituents of nature is that 
one attitudes towards them is improperly detached. While a detached attitude may be 
useful for correcting our violent passions and malicious tendencies, it is hardly conducive 
to love or fellow-feeling. Beyond making our friends and family feel unappreciated, this 
austere concern for nature drives a wedge between ourselves and others. Without the 
bond of affection, concerns of polite society begin to appear as little more than a two-
                                                        
163 Francis Hutcheson, “Inaugural Lecture On the Social Nature of Man,” Francis Hutcheson: 
Two Texts on Human Nature, ed. Thomas Mautner (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 141-4 
164 Shaftesbury, “The Moralists,” 219. There’s an interesting exchange between Theocles and 
Philocles about the former talking with wood-nymphs (191-196). Theocles claims that it is 
amongst the wood-nymphs that one comes into contact with the “sovereign Genius” (193), or 
caretaker of the world. While one may be tempted to skip over these sections of the text—they 
are rather tedious, after all—these passages tell us much about the “reasonable enthusiasm” 
Shaftesbury thinks we ought to cultivate. Delving into this topic further would, however, take me 
too far afield of the chapter’s aim.  
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penny stake. The greater distance we put between ourselves and others, the more at home 
we feel in those “unsociable places” of which Theocles speaks. Eventually, we might be 
led into thinking that nature requires us to act in unsociable ways or even to deliberately 
undercut our connections to other people: connections forged by love and friendship 
(more on this in Chapter 3). Being virtuous, in this sense of the term, seems to be at odds 
with Shaftesbury’s intention to provide us with a moral theory based in our nature as 
sociable beings. At best, Shaftesbury leaves us with a fractured identity.  
  For Theocles, possessing “reasonable enthusiasm” gives us “Freedom from our 
Passions and low Interests, that we are reconcil’d to the goodly Order of the Universe; 
that we harmonize with Nature; and live in Friendship both with GOD and MAN.”165 We 
are oriented towards the its conservation and friendship with our fellow beings. However, 
our “Passions and low Interests” (our selfish, self-deceptive, and factionalist tendencies) 
get in the way of our ability to have these natural relations towards others; by developing 
an appreciation of nature’s perfection, we decrease the extent to which these less savory 
motives have sway over our conduct. We can see how Shaftesbury’s view is properly 
distinguished from Locke’s or Cockburn’s. For them, we are naturally possessed of 
selfish, factionalist dispositions that can only be counteracted by way of external rewards 
or punishments, while Shaftesbury claims that virtue requires that one understand nature 
and one’s place in it; the love that proceeds from this understanding will be sufficient for 
us to pursue the happiness of others and to render our character beautiful in their eyes.   
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The Sociable Stoic? 
 There are two pictures of virtue that emerge here: one that is sociable, and 
grounded in a love for our fellow beings; the other, which is more Stoic, and grounded in 
our enthusiastic admiration of nature’s system. Shaftesbury encourages the sociable 
interpretation of virtue throughout his writings. In the “Preface” to Whichcote’s sermons, 
he uses parental affection and the affection that community members have for one 
another to flesh out what it means to be pious.166 Further, in “A Letter Concerning 
Enthusiasm” and “Sensus Communis,” he is concerned with the defense of civil liberty, 
hoping that harmful ideologies (e.g., false religion) will be triumphed over through the 
cultivation of cheerful sociability brought about by the spirit of free and open inquiry.167 
In “An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit,” Shaftesbury uses the terms “Tenderness, 
Love, Sociableness, Compassion” in describing moral attitudes and in the “The 
Moralists,” Theocles uses “friendship” to illustrate the relation that nature obliges us to  
cultivate with those around us.168  
 Still, Shaftesbury’s Stoicism is often lurking behind his pronouncements of 
sociability. Consider the following from Shaftesbury’s “Philosophical Regimen,” where 
he is discussing that in which the highest degree of happiness consists: 
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167 For more on the political aspects and implications of Shaftesbury’s thought, see: Lawrence E. 
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 “[In] liv[ing] disinterested and unconcerned, as being loose from all those ties and 
 little mean regards which make us to depend so much on others…In the whole of 
 life, he who is  secure as to the great events and is concerned but for one thing 
 (which if he will himself he need not miss), he, and he alone, is truly free; and 
 with respect to things within, is becoming beautiful.”169 
 
This theme comes up throughout the “Regimen.” He decries any concern for reputation, 
and stresses that seeking “a character in the world” is contrary to the cultivation of “real 
character”.170 In managing one’s character, Shaftesbury claims that we should pay little 
mind to others: “that the world be either more or less virtuous is nothing to my affection 
or will, and therefore nothing to my good.”171 He notes that if the aim of virtue were to 
impact the good of others, we would be “disturbed and afflicted with ill-success,” 
rendering “virtue its own torment and not its own reward.”172 Shaftesbury claims that we 
have achieved the proper attitude regarding others “when thou no longer seekest for 
anything they seek, when thou no longer want anything from them…it is then only that 
thou canst truly love them, when thou expectest neither thy good nor ill from them.”173 
How do we consider these comments alongside Shaftesbury’s focus on sociability?   
 Passages like the one I have just quoted remind us that Stoicism runs deep in 
Shaftesbury’s thought. Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius are the figures most referenced in 
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the “Regimen.” The Stoics held that one should “act in accordance with one’s nature.”174 
Of course, much turns on how one’s nature is defined. The Stoics conceive of human 
beings as sensitive, social, and rational creatures: our propensity to feel pain allows us to 
successfully move about in the world, our sociability binds us to our fellow creatures 
through affection, and reason allows us to understand our place in the system of nature 
and to guide our conduct in light of what it requires of us.175 The Stoics claim that our 
sociable affections are natural and that they oblige us to act in certain ways, but that they 
should be overridden in the service of pursuing those ends set by nature as a whole.176 
Through reason we gain access to nature’s intentions, but to what extent are our 
premonitions clouded by error?177 How can I know that nature is telling me to suppress 
the affection I have for my child with Tay-Sachs disease, in light of the fact that he will 
surely die and that my emotional energy is best spent elsewhere?  
 The problem of knowing when to follow which aspects of one’s nature is present 
throughout Stoic thought and it plagues Shaftesbury as well.  In the “Regimen,” he 
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defines “natural affection” as that pertaining to a “rational creature, capable of knowing 
nature and of considering the good and interest of the whole.”178 Once one comes to grips 
with the interest of all beings, “all other affections [are] to be subdued” (read: the “other 
affections” being those associated with sociability). Shaftesbury continues, “this is the 
province of the truly wise man…to learn how to submit all of his affections to the rule 
and government of the whole; how to accompany with his whole mind that supreme and 
perfect mind and reason of the universe.”179 By learning to use nature as a guide, one 
separates oneself from the sensitive and sociable parts of one’s nature, and learns to 
embrace that divine aspect of oneself: reason. As Shaftesbury points out: 
 
 “If the interest of nature call, I forsake everything else and follow 
 nature…without complain. In what way, therefore, shall I love my children or 
 relations? As strong and affectionately as is possible…but so as that nature may 
 be accused; so as that, whatever happens, I may still adhere to nature and accept 
 and embrace whatsoever nature send. This is the foundation. This is all. Consider 
 this, and it will be easy to find the true measure of all affection, and what 
 discipline and rules must be  followed…to affect as becomes a rational 
 creature.”180  
 
 
One is obliged to care for and promote the good of one’s children, loved ones, friends, 
colleagues, etc., but only to the extent that nature does not call one to pursue higher aims. 
It is unclear when one is called to forgo these more particular obligations because, as 
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Shaftesbury notes, they are conditioned on the “happiness, perfection, and establishment 
of the whole.”181 Should one promote the good of our relations by minding the stability of 
the whole? Should we “love thy friends, relations, companions, but thy country more”?182 
Or should we love our relations wholeheartedly, only choosing to forgo this love  in 
instances where continuing to do so would lead us to do violence to our nature?183 
 Even in “An Inquiry,” Shaftesbury claims that our different sources of partiality – 
“parental Kindness…Love of Fellowship and Company, Compassions, mutual Succour” 
– are “as proper and natural to him, as it is to any Organ, Part or Member of an Animal-
Body, or mere Vegetable, to work in its known Course, and regular way of Growth.”184 
Still, virtue consists in having “his Inclinations and Affections, his Dispositions of Mind 
and Temper, sutable, and agreeing with the Good of his Kind, or of that System in which 
he is included, and of which he constitutes a PART.”185 While the affections we feel 
towards those closest to us are natural, they are less natural than those we have for 
humanity. Shaftesbury begins “An Inquiry” by giving a teleological account of humans, 
where their various body parts and affections consort for the purposes of achieving some 
higher end.186 Shaftesbury then goes on to examine the ways in which human beings are 
constituents of the human species, the system of the earth, the planetary system, and the 
system of the universe. Our love for our friend and family are important, but their 
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significance is parasitic on the system of nature. It follows that, for Shaftesbury, we 
should only tend to these narrower considerations for the purposes of maintaining the 
stability of the whole, never losing sight of that in which true virtue consists.  
 Shaftesbury leaves us with this tension between the standpoint of humanity, 
which prioritizes the relations of polite society; and the universe, which shifts our focus 
away from these concerns in an attempt to adopt the perspective that God takes on 
creation. While Shaftsbury stakes his concerns with those of the universe, his picture of 
the moral life is often different. Shaftesbury never confronts that tension. Perhaps he 
found the tension irresolvable; that insofar as we are social and rational beings – bonded 
to our fellows through affection, yet driven to look beyond human concerns – we are 
pulled in two directions when considering how best to live. In the subsequent chapters of 
the dissertation, I explore two attempts to solve this tension. Next I examine how the 
tension between the standpoints of humanity and of the universe play out in Hutcheson’s 
writings, and I tie this tension back to my discussion of the problem of partiality. 
 
 
Francis Hutcheson and the Problem of Partiality 
 Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) is the first major figure of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.187 Raised in Ireland, Hutcheson attended the University of Glasgow from 
1711-1716, where he studied theology. After completing his studies, Hutcheson returned 
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to Ireland to found an academy in Dublin. There he became acquainted with Robert 
Molesworth, a close friend and parliamentary ally of Shaftesbury, and the center of the 
Dublin-based philosophical group known as the “Molesworth circle.”188 Through 
Molesworth, Hutcheson came to be acquainted with Shaftesbury’s work. It was also 
during this time, from 1716-1728, that Hutcheson published the two works for which he 
is most remembered, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue 
(1725) and An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with 
Illustration on the Moral Sense (1728). Hutcheson accepted a position as chair of Moral 
Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1729, after the death of Gershom Carmichael 
left the seat vacant. His inaugural address to the university, “On the Social Nature of 
Man” (1730), was a defiant attempt to undercut the conservative Presbyterianism that 
held sway over much of Scotland at the time. As many have noted, Hutcheson’s project is 
Shaftesburian in that he attempts to construct an ethics based in our sociable affections.189 
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Moral Goodness and the Motive(s) to Virtue 
 There is much to say about Hutcheson’s writings. I focus here on how his attempt 
to manage the tension between the standpoints of humanity and the universe give rise to 
the problem of partiality. Hutcheson follows Shaftesbury in holding that “all virtue is 
allowed to consist in affections of love toward the Deity, and our fellow creatures, and in 
action suitable to those affections.”190 For him, the appeal to self-interest in the case of 
virtue is mistaken on two fronts. First, self-interest is insufficient to allow for love: “how 
ridiculous would it be to attempt, by all the rewards or threatenings in the world, to make 
one love a person whom one apprehended to be cruel, selfish, morose or ungrateful.”191 
Second, this view is self-fulfilling. We are partial, fickle creatures; by accepting a theory 
according to which virtue is made possible only through external sanctions, we play into 
these unsavory aspects of our nature.192 Hutcheson begins his advertisement to An 
Inquiry with the following quote from Horace: “For the wolf is wary and dreads the pit, 
the hawk the suspect snare, the pike the covered hook. The good hate vice because they 
love virtue, but you will avoid crime only for fear of punishment. You are prepared to 
commit sacrilege if you believe you can get away with it.”193 
 For Hutcheson, we make attributions of moral goodness on account of our “moral 
sense,” a basic sensory faculty that all human beings possess innately. He compares it to 
our “sense of beauty,” claiming that we are naturally determined to take pleasure in 
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objects that show uniformity amidst variety (i.e., “form”).194 In the same manner, 
Hutcheson argues that we are naturally determined to approve of conduct produced by 
certain motives and to admire the individuals who possess these motives, regardless of 
the impact their actions have on our self-interest.195 Importantly, while the concept of 
moral goodness refers to admirable motives, Hutcheson defines these motives as “some 
Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation.”196 The motive that 
produces an action is not separate but is “some Quality” in it, the possession of which 
renders the action moral. We gain access to the admirability of the motives by attending 
to the actions in which they inhere, which our moral sense allows us to do – without the 
moral sense, we could conceive of the actions as naturally good (i.e., advantageous) but 
not as morally good.197  
 Consider a cash-strapped college student who befriends an older, wealthy 
individual in hopes that the latter will ease some of their financial burdens. Let us say that 
the college student’s plan goes as expected – their company brings new meaning to the 
older individual’s life and the latter, in turn, helps the student pay some of their bills. 
There is natural goodness being produced by this exchange but there is no sense in which 
we view their conduct as admirable. But it is one thing to recognize an action as virtuous  
and another to be motivated to act virtuously. Locke and Cockburn see the gap between 
what makes an action good and what it takes for this judgment to motivate us to act as 
                                                        
194 Francis Hutcheson, “An Inquiry into Virtue or Moral Good,” An Inquiry into the Original of 
our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, ed. Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2008) 
28-9. 
195 Hutcheson “An Inquiry,” 89. 
196 Hutcheson “An Inquiry,” 85. 
197 Hutcheson “An Inquiry,” 89. 
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large. Hutcheson is more optimistic, claiming that admirable motives play a role in us 
promoting happiness, chief among them being honor, shame, benevolence, and piety. 
Because of the number of sources of virtuous at our disposal, Hutcheon does not see the 
gap between our judgments of goodness and our ability to act on them as large 198  
 But the problem comes when we look more closely at Hutcheson’s account. 
Honor and shame are unstable sources of virtue, while the most concrete experiences of 
benevolence (parental affection) are ineliminably exclusive and particular. Neither of 
these motives seem especially well suited to support a motivationally efficacious desire 
for the general happiness. Hutcheson appears to end up in the same place as Shaftesbury, 
having to argue that we possess an unlikely form of love for humanity. Of course, this is 
an even larger problem for Hutcheson, as he cannot appeal to the view that moral ideas 
are intrinsically motivating. To the extent that Hutcheson recognizes this as a problem he 
appeals instead to piety and the importance of the love of God to account for virtuous 
conduct. While he is able to account for the motivational component of virtue, however, 
Hutcheson shifts the focus of concern away from human beings to God and reproduces 
the two-standpoint problem that we initially encountered in Shaftesbury. Before 
discussing piety, it is important to see how Hutcheson comes to rely on these ideas by 
seeing how honor, shame, and benevolence fall short of securing virtue.   
                                                        
198 For more on Hutcheson’s account of moral motivation, see: Darwall, British Moralists, 207-
243, Gill, British Moralists, 141-167, and John D. Bishop, “Moral Motivation and the 
Development of Francis Hutcheson’s Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 57.2 (1996): 
277-295; Simon Grote, “Hutcheson’s Divergence from Shaftesbury,” The Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy 4.2 (2006): 159-172; Dale Dorsey, “Hutcheson’s Deceptive Hedonism,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 48.4 (2010): 445-467.  
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 Hutcheson is ambivalent about honor and shame. He observes that we all “feel the 
Desire of the good Opinions of others, and Aversion to their Censures or 
Condemnation.”199 Our experience of honor and shame is predicated on our possessing a 
moral sense: “Now were there no moral Sense…sub-jected to the uneasiness of Shame; 
or how it could ever happen, that a Man, who is secure from Punishment for any Action, 
should ever be uneasy at its being known to all the World.”200 He concludes that the 
pleasures of honor are selfish but that the idea itself “presupposes a Sense of something 
amiable besides Advantage…a Sense of Excellence in a publick Spirit.”201 Honor or 
shame presuppose some external standard that one is either living up to or failing to 
meet.202 Hutcheson considers the phenomenon of false honor (i.e., merely appearing 
virtuous to others) but stresses that the pleasure received from it is too unstable to be fully 
enjoyed.203 Nevertheless, the desire for honor is not enough to secure approval in the eyes 
of others, though it is crucial for regulating our own conduct in light of the moral sense. 
As Hutcheson notes, “if we do not discern a benevolent Intention in the Application [of 
                                                        
199 Hutcheson, “An Essay,” 78.  
200 Hutcheson “An Inquiry,” 151.  
201 Hutcheson “An Inquiry,” 153. Cf. Francis Hutcheson, Philosophiae Moralis Institutio 
Compendiaria, with A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, ed. Luigi Turco (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2007), 42.  
202 Cf. Locke, Some Thoughts, 37-39. Hutcheson, “An Essay,” 101. Cf. Hutcheson, A Short 
Introduction, 42-43. Here he notes that “there’s a natural sense {of honour and fame}, founded 
indeed upon our moral sense, or presupposing it, but distinct from it and all other senses, seems 
manifest from that natural <motion of the soul that is called shame or> modesty, which discovers 
itself by the very countenance in blushing; which nature has plainly designed as a guardian not 
only to moral virtue, but to all decency in our whole deportment, and a watchful check upon all 
the motions of the lower appetites.” 
203 Hutcheson “An Inquiry,” 156. Cf. Hutcheson, “An Essay,” 126; Hutcheson, A Short 
Introduction, 62. 
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an action]…they shall never meet with those endearing Sentiments of Esteem and Love, 
which our nature determines us to appropriate to Benevolence, or Virtue.”204 
 The moral sense approves of conduct on the basis of it proceeding from admirable 
motives, though the “true spring of virtue” lies in benevolence.205 The most concrete 
form of benevolence is the affection that parents have for their children: “an honest 
Farmer will tell you, that he studies the Preservation and Happiness of his Children, and 
loves them without any design to himself.”206 This form of natural affection is also found 
in familial relations more generally. More important for Hutcheson are what he refers to 
as the “publick affections,” which consist of “a bond of benevolence” that extend beyond 
family life.207 Though he is not clear about the process by which our affections extend 
beyond their natural sphere of influence, Hutcheson thinks it is obvious that we do 
possess a degree of disinterested concern for people, including our “neighbours,” 
“acquaintance[s],” those with whom we are “bound by an intercourse of mutual offices,” 
and even “all our Countrymen.”208 He admits that the further our benevolence extends, 
the less it exercises influence over our minds, but claims that benevolence can 
nevertheless be “extended to Mankind, where there is no interfering Interest, which from 
Self-Love may obstruct it.”209 Our chief duty is to strengthen these bonds of benevolence 
by distancing ourselves from the selfish and factionalist tendencies of our nature.  
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Piety and Love of God 
 Piety helps decrease these unseemly aspects of our nature. Hutcheson does not 
discuss piety in his earlier writings but it crops up in A Short Introduction to Moral 
Philosophy (1747), when he examines our duties to God. Here, Hutcheson notes that 
piety consists in “just opinions…concerning God, and then in…worship suited to 
them.”210 His primary concern is with the affection we are meant to feel on account of 
contemplating God’s “divine Goodness and moral Perfection.”211 The moral sense allows 
us to distinguish that which is good from that which is merely advantageous; however, as 
imperfect creatures, we are unreliable when it comes to guiding our conduct in light of 
what is good.212 In reflecting on our moral sense, we are “lead…[back] to the Deity: as 
they are derived from him, they powerfully draw us back to him again.”213 Hutcheson 
claims there is “a constant endeavor to imitate the Deity, and cultivate in ourselves all 
such affection as make us resemble him; with a steddy purposes of exerting all our 
powers in acting well that part which God and nature has assigned us.”214  
 Let us bring together some of these themes: Hutcheson supposes the existence of 
a perfect Deity who is responsible for all creation. This Deity has placed in us a “moral 
sense,” which allows us to conceive of conduct as not only advantageous and 
disadvantageous but as admirable or deplorable. We recognize the authority of this moral 
sense, as it connects us to the Deity; therefore we seek to guide our conduct in 
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accordance with that of which it approves. Nevertheless, we are aware of our tendency to 
fall short of virtue and feel shame on account of doing so; we wish to be seen as worthy 
in the eyes of our fellows, and so the idea of virtue is never far from our minds. We 
possess the seeds of virtue in the concern that we have for our dependents and our family. 
The challenge we face is expanding this concern beyond its natural limits to comply with 
the approval of the moral sense, experiencing benevolence for our neighbors and even for 
humanity. Hutcheson thinks that the most reliable way of carrying out this task is to 
cultivate our love for the Deity. 
 At this point, we are presented with the tension between the standpoint of 
humanity and that of the universe. By impressing on our minds the Deity’s “perfection of 
wisdom, goodness, and love to his creatures,” we become abler to live up to those 
expectations of virtue. In identifying with that divine aspect of our nature, we come to 
have a “generous contempt of any other thing,” whether it be “bodily pleasures,” the 
search for “speculative knowledge”; “glory”; or anything “related to this mortal state,” 
which is “fleeting, unstable, corruptible.”215 We thereby turn away from the bonds of 
benevolence and begin to view others with a cool, disinterested concern. There are 
definite advantages to extending our affection; we decrease, or eliminate, the extent to 
which the ill-natured passions (e.g., anger, hatred, envy) exercise influence over us; we 
also combat, “Tyranny, Faction, a Neglect of Justice, a Corruption of Manners,” and 
other inconveniences that flow from a false sense of allegiance to party.216 It is one thing 
to possess disinterested concern for humanity, and another to strengthen this concern to 
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such a degree that it becomes our principle of action. By strengthening our general 
benevolence, we thereby threaten to swamp the more humane aspects of our nature. 
 In A Short Introduction, Hutcheson claims that we must not “{from any airy 
views of more heroic extensive offices,} check or weaken the tender natural affections, 
which are great sources of pleasure in life, and of the greatest necessity.”217 By 
identifying with the divine in our nature, we may undermine the integrity of our 
relationships with others.218 Few of us can promote the general good, and are better 
served by “contribut[ing] something toward the advantage of [their] kinsman, [their] 
family, or [their] neighbors” than we are extending our concern beyond its natural 
limits.219 Nevertheless, Hutcheson argues that “we should chiefly fortify the most 
extensive affections, the love of moral excellence, and the steddy purpose of conformity 
to the divine will.”220 And so, in the same paragraph, Hutcheson implores us to both 
attend most closely to the objects of our natural affections and to make sure that we guide 
our actions in light of the divine will: “while these nobler affections have the control of 
all the rest, the strengthening the tender affections in the several narrower attachment of 
life will rather tend to compleat the beauty of a moral character, and the harmony of 
life.”221 Does general benevolence play a role in shaping our conduct, or rather is general 
benevolence best left to the Deity?  
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 Hutcheson does not address these questions. Like Shaftesbury, he leaves us with a 
tension between the standpoints of humanity and that of the universe. Which affections 
should we cultivate to the point that they determine our conduct: those associated with 
our nature as sociable beings, or those tied to the perfection of the Deity? Prioritizing one 
aspect of our nature over the rest will result in us adopting a different practical identity or 
form of life more generally. Nevertheless, Hutcheson tries to establish a moral system 
that makes room for both the sociable and divine parts of our nature. Is it possible to 
accomplish this task? Can we accommodate our concrete and relations in a moral theory 
that aims to correct for selfishness and factionalism, and to coordinate our interests in a 
way that promotes universal happiness? This is the problem of partiality.  
 
Rethinking the Project of Ethics 
 In this chapter, I have traced the development of the problem of partiality from its 
origin in Locke, through the work of Cockburn, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson. I have also 
hoped to add something of import to the scholarship in modern ethics. I have also tried to 
cast light on Cockburn as a transitional figure.222 While she not widely read by her peers, 
Cockburn’s development of Locke’s moral project is the first attempt to make good on 
the moral science that is only gestured at in the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. I have also provided an interpretation of Shaftesbury’s moral theory that 
treats the Characteristicks as a whole, and does not see treat “Inquiry” as the 
Archimedean point of his philosophy (a trend that he would have found troubling).  
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 Beyond making certain interpretive shifts in the scholarly understanding of 
modern moral philosophy, I hoped to have cast light on the problem of partiality as a 
philosophical issue, and not one of merely historical interest. The problem of partiality is 
a product of a shift in how we view the aim of ethics. We are left with the legacy of the 
problem of partiality because we too are largely suspicious of theologically-based natural 
law theories; we balk at casuistry, reject any neat demarcation of the duties of our moral 
lives, and claim that an account of practical judgment is part of any moral theory worth 
its salt. We also claim that virtue requires being moved by the observation that certain 
actions are fitting, or even good, separate from considerations of punishment, divine or 
otherwise. We are still tasked with making good on the Lockean vision. 
 Through the 18th century, the focus of ethics becomes less about enumerating 
duties or laying down principles of action, and more about the cultivation of norms of 
observation and judgment and of the proper arrangement of the affects. For Shaftesbury 
and Hutcheson, once we internalize norms of propriety about seeing, feeling, and 
judging, we begin to appreciate and to be motivated by considerations of virtue. We 
might understand this transition between Locke and Shaftesbury in terms of the collapse 
of natural law and the triumph of virtue ethics. However, this way of interpreting the 
development of British moral philosophy overlooks the disagreements between figures 
like Smith, Hutcheson, and Cockburn. When considering the problem of partiality, 
figures differ about how to do right by our sociable natures while not falling into 
factionalism. In what follows, I revisit the chapter and bring out three elements of my 
discussion of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson that are important for understanding the later 
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chapters: Shaftesbury’s discussion of enthusiasm, his comments on writing ethics, and 
Hutcheson’s focus on perception as a vehicle of virtue. 
 On a standard interpretation of Locke’s moral philosophy, he argues that morality 
has its basis in natural law, the content of which is fixed by the will of God. While all 
human beings recognize their obligation to act in accordance with natural law, their 
motivation to comply with this obligation is largely external, deriving from the threat of 
eternal damnation. Cockburn argues that critics, like the author of the Remarks, who 
interpret Locke in this manner fail to understand his writings – or at least the implication 
of the Lockean moral science. For her, while Locke claims that morality is based in 
natural law, its content is determined by our distinctively human nature. The fact that we 
are rational and social beings fixes certain conduct as key to our happiness. Short of 
altering human nature, God has no hand in creating moral norms, which, for Cockburn, 
consist in duties to promote the good of others. That said, Cockburn maintains that 
external sanctions are necessary to secure our compliance with the moral law, lest our 
selfishness and natural partiality be allowed to dictate our actions.  
 Shaftesbury agrees with Cockburn that morality is based in human nature. For 
him, the proper moral attitude is a “reasonable enthusiasm,” which consists in a universal 
love directed at others and gratitude directed at nature. For him, sanctions are detrimental 
to the cultivation of virtue – love is sufficient to motivate virtuous conduct. But 
Shaftesbury wavers here. We should care for those around us and tend to the duties 
associated with our station; Shaftesbury also claims that we should determine our conduct 
on the basis of nature, acting to support the good of its component parts. The result is a 
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two-standpoint problem. We see this problem come to fruition in Hutcheson’s work. For 
him, to be virtuous is to be motivated by our sociable sentiments. However, these 
sentiments direct us to care for those close to us and to attend to our positional duties, 
which can reinforce factionalist tendencies. Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s attempt to 
correct for our partiality by turning our attention away from workaday sociability, to the 
loftier ends of universal love are deemed unsatisfactory by later figures on two fronts: the 
aim of cultivating this sagely attitude seems an impossible and unworthy goal, and the 
attempt to do so undercuts the project of basing morality in human nature.  
 Before continuing to the next chapter – where I discuss these criticisms in further 
detail and present a proposed solution to the problem of partiality, offered in the work of 
John Gay and David Hume – I will examine the philosophical significance of the 
preceding narrative. Scholars note that there is a shift in how Shaftesbury and Hutcheson 
view ethics, particularly with relation to considerations of autonomy.223 Locke, as we 
have seen, argues that sanctions play a central role in any reasonable account of moral 
obligation. I have argued that we already see this general shift towards internal sources of 
obligation in the writings of Cockburn. Still, it is only in Shaftesbury’s work where we 
get a full-throated repudiation of external sanction as a friend of virtue, and a rejection of 
natural law more generally. Shaftesbury argues that Locke’s moral theory ignores the 
classical Stoic virtues of self-control and self-determination, but his disagreements with 
Locke run much deeper, to the account of human nature and the aim of ethics more 
generally. 
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 Consider how our view of ethics shifts when sanctions no longer play a role in 
moral obligation. For Locke and Cockburn, we lose what is necessary to secure our 
compliance with what is fitting. Instead, we are put in contact with what is fitting, with 
the expectation that some action being fitting is enough for us to both recognize our 
obligation, and for this recognition to give rise to action. We are left without a mediator, 
who guarantees our compliance with virtue on account of making it worth our while. 
Responsibility is thrown back on us, providing the conditions for autonomy but removing 
the certainty of divine sanction. We alter the connection to our duties through this process 
of coming to see ourselves as no longer requiring the censure of others to move us along. 
Virtue is no longer seen as originating outside of us but as being issued from within our 
nature.  
 While Locke and Cockburn see our relations as being governed by non-
overlapping dictates that can be discovered through reason, Shaftesbury leaves us with 
uncertainty. On the one hand, for Shaftesbury, we are individuals, daughters, friends, 
lovers, etc.; on the other hand, we are a part of the system of nature. Our duties with 
regard to other particular individuals are of secondary importance in light of this larger 
allegiance. Certainly, as human beings, we often do right by nature through tending to 
our familial and social relations but this need not be the case, according to Shaftesbury. 
The bonds that we have to others in these contexts can often lead to faction, which can 
threaten the stability of our communities and result in the worst in humanity. For 
Shaftesbury, we must never lose sight of the fact that we are capable of great and 
beautiful things; we should not allow ourselves to be weighed down by narrower 
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concerns. We should keep one foot in the realm of our concrete relations while always 
reaching beyond, in an attempt to become an exemplar of beauty and virtue 
 The result of Shaftesbury’s advice, however, is great psychological tension. We 
are placed in a situation where we are forced to determine which relations to prioritize in 
which contexts, without the help of external standards. Once we no longer have the 
assistance of natural law and are suspicious of the link between sanctions and virtue, we 
are left with our feeble reason and the always unfolding complications of moral life. 
Given the fact that we occupy distinct stations, we have to find some way to conduct 
ourselves. For Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, familial relations, along with those relations 
of love and friendship, are particularly important for understanding virtue; the problem is 
how to square our fidelity to these relations with our obligation to do right by humanity 
and by nature. We might worry that we are left feeling pulled apart by these conflicting 
considerations. Being virtuous no longer requires learning our system of duties and how 
to do right by them in particular situations, or even in reminding ourselves that our future 
happiness depends on us being dutiful. Instead, it seems that virtue consists in being able 
to skillfully navigate this fundamental tension in our moral lives.   
 Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s reaction to this tension shapes how the problem of 
partiality is viewed by subsequent figures. There are two aspects of Shaftesbury’s thought 
that are of particular interest to later figures: his examination of enthusiasm and his views 
on ethical writing. The greatest enemy of virtue, for Shaftesbury, is the enthusiast – one 
who proceeds with self-certainty about their own moral intuitions. Enthusiasm is 
corrosive to sociability; it leads us look inward and deadens responsiveness to the 
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interests and concerns of others. Given the complexities of moral life, enthusiasm is not 
only dangerous but false, for Shaftesbury, since the content of virtue is not determined 
through by books or memorizing doctrine. To counter enthusiasm, we should cultivate an 
attitude of openness which, for Shaftesbury, means being of good humor, which allows 
one to treat one’s views as provisional, and as being forged alongside others who are 
well-natured and sincere about finding a way to live well, together.  
 Part of combatting enthusiasm comes in how we write and talk about ethics, for 
Shaftesbury. He distinguishes polite writing, which concerns virtue and matters of 
sociability, from the impolite writing of treatises, memoirs, and religious confessionals. 
While the latter three each have their faults, Shaftesbury is most concerned about the lack 
of genuine reflection that takes part in these works. We can see this criticism most clearly 
with the treatise. In a treatise on morals – take Pufendorf’s On the Duty of Man and 
Citizen – where the author demonstrates the existence of natural law, illustrates our 
knowledge of its contents, enumerates our moral duties, and categorizes them based of 
their object (whether ourselves, others, or God). We are met with Pufendorf’s positions 
and his arguments for them in this work; we are not presented with the thought process 
that goes into the formation of his views. We are not invited in Man and Citizen to, say, 
think through the permissibility of suicide with Pufendorf. Shaftesbury finds this 
approach to morals problematic, since it invites the reader to become a convert, who then 
takes it as their aim to defend and to further the teachings of the master.  
 Shaftesbury experiments with forms of writing throughout the Characteristicks in 
an attempt to get his audience to think though moral matters alongside him. These 
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experiments are not always successful, as Shaftesbury’s style is often counterproductive, 
pushing the audience away from the discussion as opposed to bringing them into the fold 
(one of the major criticisms lodged at him by Smith).224 Nevertheless, Shaftesbury’s aim 
is to cultivate curiosity, openness, and fidelity to the system of nature. As his focus is on 
this positive project, along with the ground clearing work of showing that human beings 
are capable of more than merely narrow or selfish concerns, Shaftesbury overlooks the 
problematic implications of his moral theory. Chief among these implications is that we 
are left without resources to weigh the duties we have to others – in other words, he 
overlooks the problem of partiality. Still, Shaftesbury’s concerns about enthusiasm and 
ethical writing had lasting influence. The idea that the aim of moral writing should be 
edificatory continued in the British moralist tradition after Shaftesbury. Each of the 
subsequent figures treated in this dissertation seek to maintain this openness while also 
giving us the means to navigate, as opposed to merely revel in, the complexities of moral 
life.  
 With regard to Hutcheson, the aspect of his thought which most finds its home in 
subsequent figures in the British Moralist tradition is his focus on perception as a vehicle 
for virtue. What I mean is the idea that the virtuous person has cultivated a kind of 
responsiveness to different aspects of conduct and character. Hutcheson puts this 
responsiveness in terms of perception, which is illustrated best in his idea of the moral 
sense. With this idea, he is trying to cast Shaftesbury’s ideas in a manner that is 
consistent with the Lockean moral science. Shaftesbury focuses a great deal on the 
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development of character, or certain affective and cognitive dispositions that enable one 
to be in tune with what is required of one by the system of nature. Having a virtuous 
character involves being able to see certain ways of acting as commendable or 
problematic. Hutcheson makes sense of these capacities in the most straightforward way 
possible – by identifying them with a sense on par with sight, thereby giving an account 
of how we can “see” things as virtuous or vicious.   
 Later figures become suspicious about drawing too close a parallel between our 
moral sense and vision, a capacity that seems only tangentially connected to our ability to 
immediately apprehend certain traits or conduct as virtuous or vicious. For Hume, Smith, 
and even Butler, the analogy of taste more accurately captures our experience of moral 
judgment, particularly the idea that being virtuous means being responsive to different 
features of our moral life. When someone acts maliciously to another, we register the 
viciousness of the malice by feeling disgust, or resentment on behalf of the object of 
malice. Figures like Smith argue that our manner of thinking about malice is an 
abstraction from how we register it, affectively speaking. In some ways, this shift away 
from vision to taste is more in line with Shaftesbury’s manner of thinking about moral 
agency. For Shaftesbury, it is crucial that we work to cultivate certain affective 
dispositions so that we can then see the world in the right way. We can see this focus in 
how he treats the phenomenon of enthusiasm, as a set of problematic ways of feeling 
about oneself in relation to others, and even to the world more generally.  
 We are presented with a problem. We are tasked with finding a means to weigh 
our duties towards others that does right by our natural partiality towards our friends, 
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family, loved ones in a manner that does not give way to factionalism. As we no longer 
have the tools of natural law to give us with a series of rules that we can learn to apply in 
particular circumstances, we must turn inward, and generate proper norms for judgment, 
which will require the cultivation of intellectual and affective virtues. The hope is that by 
engendering superior skills of sensitivity and discernment, individuals will be able to 
responsibly navigate the complexities of moral life. How we accomplish this task is a 
matter of great controversy – one that will occupy us for the rest of this dissertation.   
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A TASTE FOR WHAT IS USEFUL: JOHN GAY AND DAVID HUME 
 
 For many British moralists, the aim of moral philosophy is to correct selfishness 
and factionalism. We have seen how this aim comes into conflict with certain aspects of 
human nature. For Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, our commitment to morality is explained 
by the bonds we share with others. However, these bonds are forged from love and 
benevolence, which are inconsistently felt. Though we may entertain a degree of concern 
for individuals neither near nor dear, such concern can hardly rise to the level of love, and 
can have little impact on what we value or the way that we conduct ourselves. 
Shaftesbury’s and Hutcheson’s attempts to circumvent this problem by suggesting we use 
universal love as our moral standard, and that we shape ourselves in light of this standard, 
distances us from that which makes us most human. We are thereby tasked with finding a 
way to do right by our natural partialities in a way that does not give way to factionalism.  
 In this chapter, I examine the work of John Gay and David Hume. Gay claims that 
utility is the correct moral standard, while Hume settles on the broader term, usefulness, 
which refers to an action or trait’s conduciveness to generally agreed upon ends. He 
appeals to usefulness in an attempt to find a broadly consequentialist principle that is both 
impartial and context-dependent, in a manner that is sensitive to the complexities of 
moral life, while also being removed from the hedonic associations of “utility.” Gay and 
Hume then treat the concept of “use” in different ways. For Gay, utility is a deliberative 
principle based in the weighing of pleasures and pains; for Hume, usefulness is a 
justificatory principle that forms the basis of moral conversation. When we speak of 
morals, we refer to conduct and characters as generally beneficial or detrimental to 
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ourselves, others, institutions, etc. In this way, Hume argues, the language of usefulness 
gives us the means to consider how the common good is impacted by the conduct of 
others and ourselves.  
 Importantly, appealing to usefulness does not require subjugating our own 
identity to the collective interest. Hume does not solve the problem of partiality by 
ridding us of our concerns for those near and dear. To do so would be to return us to 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, who require that we cultivate a form of love that, as I argued 
in chapter 1 (and as Hume agrees) is unsustainable. While there are notable differences 
between Hume, Butler, and Smith (see Chapter 3), each wish to do right by 
commonsense morality. Hume is hardly a revisionist. He instead seeks to confront the 
problem of partiality head on, building a moral theory that justifies innocuous partial 
attachments while filtering out those factionalist tendencies inimical to morality. Hume 
thereby presents a compelling account of how we come to see ourselves, our conduct, and 
one another from a shared perspective. 
 But Hume and Gay owe us an account of how we come to see the moral standard 
as authoritative. The mere fact that action or character is approved of or disapproved of 
by others is insufficient to motivate action unless one is already disposed to take these 
judgments seriously. For Gay, association is sufficient to explain this development – we 
associate our good with the good of others and begin to see them as intertwined. The 
account that Hume provides goes beyond association, drawing on the discussions of taste 
and delicacy. He offers a view of moral authority that draws on a broad and sophisticated 
set of cognitive and affective aspects of human beings that goes beyond the merely 
  
88 
passive process of association. In doing so, he presents us with an innovative and 
complete theory of agency that can address the problem of partiality.  
 I have divided the chapter into five parts. First, I examine John Gay’s thought, 
where we are first presented with the principle of utility as the proper moral standard, 
which serves as a bridge from Locke’s to Hume’s work. Second, I discuss Hume’s 
accounts of sympathy, moral language, and utility, which are the basis of his ideas about 
a shared moral perspective, or the common point of view. Third, I discuss Michael Gill’s 
interpretation of Hume as a moral pluralist, which serves as an objection to my reading. 
Fourth, I reconstruct Hume’s reasoning for why we treat the common point of view as 
authoritative, drawing on his ideas about delicacy, taste, and pride. I end by considering a 
criticism of Hume’s proposed solution to the problem of partiality.  
 
Making Good on Locke’s Moral Science 
 Not much is known about John Gay (1699-1745): he served as a fellow at 
Cambridge from 1724-1734 and then as a vicar in Bedfordshire until his death.225 Other 
than the essay, “Preliminary Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue 
or Morality,” which was prefixed to Edmund Law’s translation of William King’s An 
Essay on the Origin of Evil, Gay did not publish anything.226 His essay is an attempt to 
                                                        
225 Johnathan Harris, “Gay, John (1699-1745),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography,  
www.oxforddnb.com.ezproxy.lib.usf.edu/view/article/10474 
226 John Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or 
Morality,” An Essay on the Origin of Evil, William King, trans. and ed. by Edmund Law 
(London: W. Thurlbourn, 1731), xi-xxxiii. Because of the lack of attention paid to Gay in recent 
years, there has been little archival work to determine if the “Preliminary Dissertation” is the only 
work that can be rightfully attributed to Gay. There are two anonymous texts (presumably written 
by the same author) published in the decades after the “Preliminary Dissertation” that bear strong 
thematic resemblance to it. See: “An Introduction towards an Essay on the origin of the Passion 
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clarify the project of Locke’s ethics by expanding on a few of Locke’s key theses.227 The 
result is not what Locke intended – Gay breaks from the natural law tradition by arguing 
that universal happiness is the criterion of virtue, and that agents should use their own 
reason to determine how best to promote the happiness of both themselves and their 
fellows.228  
Fixing a Moral Standard 
 The first task of Gay’s “Preliminary Dissertation” is to establish the criterion of 
virtue. There are two steps to his argument, both of which rely heavily on Locke’s 
discussion of morality in the Essay. Much of what Gay says draws on Locke’s theses 
about moral ideas, moral epistemology, and moral motivation; however, he uses them for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
[1741],” rpt., Maria Heider, Studien über David Hartley, 1705-1757 (Bergische Gladbach, 1913), 
27-42; “An Inquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections [1747]” Four Early 
Works on Motivation, ed. Paul McReynolds (Gainsville: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1969), 
281-476. For more on this, see: David Spadafora, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 140-143.  
227 According to William Paley, Edmund Law is to have said about Gay that “no man knew the 
Bible or the works of Locke better” (William Paley, “A short memoir of the Life of Edmund 
Law,” The Works of William Paley, D.D., vol. 5, ed. Rev. Mr. Stephenson (Cambridge: Hilliard 
and Brown, 1830), 339). 
228 Many scholars find Gay’s essay to be a significant in the history of ethics, but little work has 
been done on it, and this work is cursory. See: J.E. Crimmins, Secular Utilitarianism: Social 
Science and the Critique of Religion in the Thought of Jeremy Bentham (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990), 68-72; Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism, trans. 
Mary Morris (London: Faber & Faber, 1952), 7, 11, 22-23; Colin Heydt, “Utilitarianism before 
Bentham,” Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, ed. Ben Eggleston and Dale E. Miller (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25-30; Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics: A 
Historical and Critical Study. Volume II: From Suarez to Rousseau (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 870-71; Christian Maurer, “Self-Interest and Sociability,” The Oxford 
Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, 304-05. Jerome Schneewind, The 
Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 405-10; Jacqueline Taylor, Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and 
Society in Hume’s Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 63-64. A notable 
exception is Ernest Albee, A History of English Utilitarianism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1901), 
69-83. For more on Gay’s legacy, see my “John Gay and the Birth of Utilitarianism.”  
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the purposes of constructing his own theory. The first step to build this theory comes in 
Gay’s adoption of the Lockean thesis that moral ideas are mixed modes. To say that 
moral ideas (e.g., murder, theft) are mixed modes is to say that they are fabrications of 
the mind. Gay states this position even more clearly than Locke: “the Ideas…about which 
Morality is chiefly conversant viz. that they are all mixed Modes, or compound ideas put 
together, having at first no Archetype or Original existing; and afterwards no other than 
that which exists in other Men’s minds.”229 The artificiality of moral concepts leads to 
confusion and conflict in moral discourse, since people do not agree on how to use 
particular terms. For example, what is seen as “murder” by one may be seen by another 
as an instance of justified killing. In this way, Gay, following Locke, thinks the way we 
talk about morality is not a proper guide for how we ought to conduct ourselves.230  
 What, then, constitutes a proper guide for conduct? To settle on a criterion, Gay 
suggests that we must, first, determine what we are obligated to do as rational beings. 
Following Locke, he assumes a hedonistic account of obligation.231 Gay notes that an 
agent is obligated to perform an action “when there is such a relation between an Agent 
and an action that the Agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that action, then 
                                                        
229 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xii. 
230 I discuss the topic of mixed modes further in Chapter 1, in my examination of Locke.  
231 A related term is “interested obligation.” The language of interested obligation comes from 
Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, ed. Wolfgang 
Leidhold (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2008), 177-8. One may find it suspicious that Gay 
draws on the concept of interested obligation to defend his view that happiness is the criterion of 
virtue. Two things can be said in Gay’s favor. First, his position on the nature of obligation is 
fairly traditional. The idea that there is a distinctly “moral” species of obligation is (to a large 
extent) a later development in the history of moral philosophy. Second, Gay’s general strategy at 
this point of the argument is to provide a framework to arbitrate the disputes between the other 
moralists. By drawing on the concept of interested obligation – as opposed to something more 
metaphysically loaded – he can more easily get everyone on the same page, so to speak.  
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the agent is said to be obliged to do or omit that action.”232 When it comes to the criterion 
of virtue, we are obligated to recognize that criterion which, when we comply, secures 
our happiness. There are three standards, each of which has its own sanctions: societal 
norms (with its sanction of social censure), the laws of government (with its sanction of 
punishment), and divine law (with its sanction of eternal hellfire).233 Since our happiness 
is not completely in the hands of our legislators or fellow humans, Gay thinks the first 
two kinds of sanction fall short of the standard of ensuring our unhappiness if we do not 
act properly. The only power upon which our happiness is completely dependent is God, 
and so complying with divine law will secure the possibility of our happiness.234 
 Because God is the source of moral obligation, his will determines the content of 
morality as well. Gay’s defense of this thesis places him in the voluntarist camp. We are 
left with the question of “what that Will of God…directs me to do?”235 For Gay, God is a 
“being infinitely happy in himself from all eternity…[and] could have no other design in 
creating mankind than their happiness; and therefore he wills their happiness.” 236 
                                                        
232 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xviii. 
233 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xviii. Locke thinks it is actually quite difficult to consider the 
possibility of eternal damnation; however, it would be wise of us to reflect on it when we are 
motivated to act in a vicious manner: “The Rewards and Punishments of another Life, which the 
Almighty has established, as the Enforcements of his Law, are of weight enough to determine the 
Choice, against whatever Pleasure or Pain this Life can shew, when the eternal State is considered 
but in its bare possibility, which no Body can make doubt of…a virtuous Life, with the certain 
expectation of everlasting Bliss, which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the 
fear of that dreadful state of Misery, which ‘tis very possible may overtake the guilty; or at best 
the terrible uncertain hope of Annihilation” (Essay II.xxi).  
234 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxi. 
235 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xix. 
236 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xix. The language of “fitness” comes from Samuel Clarke, 
who argued that an action if right only insofar as it is “fitting.” See Clarke, Discourse Concerning 
the Unalterable Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian 
Religion. 8th ed. (London: James and John Knapton, 1732). Clarke is seen as the arch-moral 
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Because God wills the happiness of his creation, and one is obligated to act in accordance 
with the will of God, it follows that one is obliged to promote the happiness of mankind 
as well. Gay refers to the happiness of mankind as the “criterion of virtue, but once 
removed.”237 While the will of God is the source of obligation, our happiness is the 
criterion for virtuous action. When discharging one’s duty, Gay claims that there is a 
“fitness” between an action and its consequences: “some things and actions are apt to 
produce pleasure, others pain…some are for the good of Mankind, others tend to the 
detriment of it: therefore those are to be chosen which tend to the good of Mankind; the 
others to be avoided.”238 An agent must use her reason to foresee the extent to which her 
action may promote the happiness of others and to act accordingly. 
 Gay encapsulates the criterion of virtue in the following formulation: virtue is 
“conformity to a rule of life, directing the actions of all other creatures with respect to 
each other’s happiness; to which conformity everyone in all cases is obliged.”239 When it 
comes to defining the relevant “rule of life,” God commands us to simply be “a means of 
the happiness of mankind.”240 Gay is not specific about what promoting the happiness of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
rationalist of the early modern period, and is often a target of ridicule by later figures like 
Hutcheson and Hume. Importantly, Gay considered Clarke’s work significant enough to 
incorporate the language of “fittingness” into his ethical theory. Gay’s issue with Clarke is not 
that he defined rightness in terms of fittingness, but that Clarke did not specify what it meant for 
something to be “fitting.” This issue will come up again in the next chapter of the dissertation, 
where I discuss Butler and Smith.  
237 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xix. 
238 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xix-xx. 
239 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xvii.  
240 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xiv. The fact that Gay defines ethical matters in terms of 
other-regarding actions is significant, as it breaks from the natural law conception of morality, 
which carves out a distinct realm of duties to ourselves.  
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mankind entails, though it is revealed by the “relations of things”241 We get in touch with 
what is good for society by “perceive[ing] the inconveniences of some things and actions 
when they happen” or we “forsee[ing] them [the inconveniences] by contemplating the 
nature of the things and actions.”242 Over time we come to appreciate those actions which 
are conducive to happiness. The knowledge we possess here is empirical, which explains 
why Gay eschews specific recommendations as to how to promote happiness. He instead 
provides a structure by which to approach these questions, and is optimistic about our 
foresight about which actions will produce happiness based on our knowledge of human 
nature.243 
Psychological Association and Moral Commitment 
Gay provides us with a moral standard: universal happiness. He then explains how we 
come to view ourselves as obligated to act in accordance with this moral standard. Since 
God’s will is the source of all moral obligation, we might think that human beings act 
benevolently out of recognition that God obligates them to do so.244 But as Gay points 
out, “the generality of Mankind do approve of virtue…without being able to give any 
reason for their approbation; and also, that some pursue it without knowing that it tends 
to their own happiness; nay even when it appears to be inconsistent with and destructive 
                                                        
241 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xix-x. 
242 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xx. 
243 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xx. 
244 For a version of this view, see: George Berkeley, “Passive Obedience; or, the Christian 
Doctrine of Not Resisting the Supreme Power, Proved and Vindicated, Upon the Principles of the 
Law of Nature, in a Discourse Delivered at the College-Chapel,” The Works of George Berkeley, 
D.D. Bishop of Cloyne, vol. 2, ed. Richard Priestly (London: J.F. Dover, 1820), 251-292. For the 
important differences between Berkeley and Gay, see my “John Gay and the Birth of 
Utilitarianism.” Also see: Heydt, “Utilitarianism before Bentham”; Albee, A History. 
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of their happiness.”245 Since most people unreflectively approve of virtue, Gay requires 
an explanation as to why this is the case.246 Hutcheson explains this phenomenon by 
claiming that we innately possess benevolent motives that drive us to promote the good 
of others and we approve of actions that promote universal happiness via our moral 
sense.247 Gay thinks we lack evidence for the existence of a moral sense and innately 
benevolent motives.248 Nevertheless, he holds that Hutcheson is right to claim that we 
often approve of other people’s happiness for its own sake. The attempt to explain this 
phenomenon leads him to develop an innovative moral psychology that draws on some 
brief comments that Locke makes about “the association of ideas.”249  
 According to Gay, all human activity is aimed at achieving pleasure and avoiding 
pain.250 He claims that we use the term “good” to refer to objects that produce pleasure 
and the term “bad” to refer to objects that produce pain.251 With each perception of an 
                                                        
245 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xiii. See also: Hutcheson, Inquiry, 85-86, 89, 101-102, 112-
115, etc.  
246 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxix. 
247 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xiii. It is important to distinguish moral approval from moral 
motivation; though Gay draws a distinction between them, he often treats the two in tandem. 
Hutcheson is more careful to treat these topics in different sections of the Inquiry. He starts from 
the observation that we draw a distinction between “moral good” and “natural good” (i.e., 
pleasure, advantage, or interest) and infers that we possess some inner sense that allows to 
distinguish the two species of good (89). The quality that this moral sense picks up on is 
benevolence, defined as a universal love for others (112). We morally? approve of other people 
insofar as they are beneficent. What explains our ability to act benevolently, for Hutcheson, is 
that we possess a “natural affection” for the good of others. This affection can be overridden by a 
but Hutcheson thinks that without it, we would be unable to act benevolently. Gay’s essay is 
meant to undercut both of these claims – that we require a moral sense to approve of benevolence 
and that we need to posit natural affection to explain the possibility of benevolent action.  
248 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xiv.  
249 Locke, Essay II.xxxiii. 
250 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xiii. 
251 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxii. Gay adopts this idea from Hobbes and Locke. See: 
Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, ed. Bernard Gert (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991), 47-
50; Locke, Essay, II.xx.  
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object as good or bad, there is a corresponding passion: love, in the case of goodness; 
hatred, in the case of badness.252 Love or hatred is followed by an affection of desire or 
aversion, which compels us to either seek the object or shun it.253 Gay maintains that the 
majority of passions we recognize as “implanted in our nature originally” are 
modifications of love and hate.254 Consider benevolence. Gay argues that each person is 
naturally indifferent to the happiness of others.255 Only because our happiness is 
dependent on others can we come to care about their happiness.256 What makes 
association friendly to morality is that we are dependent on others for our happiness, 
which creates links between people that are reinforced through association.257 
 How does the process of association work? First, we perceive an object as 
conducive to our happiness. Second, we feel pleasure at the thought of its conduciveness 
to our happiness. Third, the perception of the object and the pleasure accompanying this 
perception become so connected that they are experienced as continuous with one 
another.258 This last step, which connects the idea and sensation in such a way that the 
mind experiences them as one, is what Gay refers to as association. Consider Gay’s 
example of our desire for money.259 One perceives “the great many advantages from 
being possessed of money, and from thence conceive a pleasure in having it, thence 
                                                        
252 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxiii. 
253 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxiii. 
254 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxiii.  
255 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xiv. 
256 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxiii-xiv. 
257 The example Gay gives of how this process works is envy (“Preliminary Dissertation,” xxxii-
xxxiii).  
258 Gay explains how this process works on “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxx-xxxi. 
259 John Stuart Mill uses this same argument in illustrating his “proof” of the principle of utility. 
See: “Utilitarianism,” Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X: Essays on Ethics, Religion 
and Society, ed. J.M. Robson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006), 235-39. 
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desire it, thence discover to obtain it, thence receive an actual pleasure in obtaining it, 
thence desire to preserve the possession of it.”260 Over time, “the intermediate steps 
between money and happiness” are dropped and “that which was at first pursued only as 
a means, be to them a real end.”261 Association brings with it a kind of motivation. 
Because we associate money with increased pleasure, we are motivated to seek money 
not simply as a means to our happiness but as its own end.262 Gay stresses, if you run the 
desire for money “to the fountainhead,” you will see it comes from its propensity to add 
to your happiness but you do not experience it as such because of association.263  
 Gay thinks it is a fact about humans that we are susceptible to the pains and 
pleasures of others.264 If we know that our happiness conflicts with another’s happiness, 
our happiness will be lessened, and so we seek to have our happiness coincide with that 
of others.265 Through association, the idea of other people’s happiness becomes conjoined 
with the idea of our own happiness so much that the thought of one brings with it the 
                                                        
260 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxxi. 
261 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxxi. 
262 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxxi. 
263 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxx. Gay’s discussion of “resting places” is important. We 
naturally construct principles of conduct based on prior experience, and these principles direct us 
to objects conducive to our happiness. We use these principles as “resting places” in our 
deliberations so that we can make decisions quickly, without having to consider each variable that 
goes into acting a particular way. That said, Gay notes that this “habitual knowledge” is a form of 
prejudice that is rarely examined and is difficult to root out (“Preliminary Dissertation,” xxx). He 
thinks the prejudice of habitual knowledge leads philosophers like Hutcheson to believe in a 
moral sense (“Preliminary Dissertation,” xxx).  
264 Gay stresses this point on xxviii. An equally (if not more) important aspect of our dependence 
on others is our desire to be esteemed or loved (“Preliminary Dissertation,” xxv; xxvii-xxviii).    
265 Towards the end of the essay, Gay mentions our propensity to imitate others (“Preliminary 
Dissertation,” xxxiii). Our imitative capacity helps explain social cohesion. 
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thought of the other.266 The pleasure of the contemplation of our own happiness is 
extended to the happiness of others and vice versa. We cannot pursue our own happiness 
without regard to the happiness of others, and so our deliberations about what to do 
inevitably involve a concern for their happiness as well. What starts as a means-to-an-end 
becomes an end-in-itself, as the means and end become solidified in our thought.267 Gay 
seems to assume that we are constituted in this manner to sustain cognitive and 
motivational economy.268 There is no need to reason about whether a particular instance 
of promoting the general happiness would be good for us. We simply do so. 
 Gay is introduced to associationism through reading Locke, who discusses what 
he calls the “association of ideas.”269 Gay’s use of association is distinctive on three 
fronts. First, Locke introduces association to explain how custom is responsible for some 
ideas that we possess, but is not interested in the mechanism; by contrast, Gay provides 
the mechanism by using the language of sensations and ideas, thereby making sense of 
association within the Lockean framework. Second, Locke is concerned with association 
                                                        
266 “We first perceive or imagine some real Good, i.e., fitness to promote our happiness in those 
things which we love and approve of. Hence….we annex pleasure to those things. Hence those 
things and pleasure are so tied together and associated in our minds, that one cannot present itself 
but the other will also occur” (Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxx-xxxi).  
267 Acting on behalf of others becomes an “acquired” principle of action (Gay, “Preliminary 
Dissertation,” xxx). 
268 Gay, “Preliminary Dissertation,” xxx. Hutcheson makes a similar point about the moral 
sense—noting that God gives us the moral sense to help us determine which actions are 
benevolent more quickly than we would otherwise: “Notwithstanding the might Reason we boast 
of above other Animals, its Processes are too slow, too full of doubt and hesitation, to serve us in 
every Exigency, either for our own Preservation, without the external Senses, or to direct our 
Actions for the Good of the Whole, without this moral Sense” (Inquiry, 180).  
269 Locke does return to the topic of association again in his later work, “Of the Conduct of the 
Understanding,” Some Thoughts, 218-19. And here association seems to play a larger role in his 
psychology, insofar as it’s conceived as a “disease of the mind as hard to cure as any” (218). For 
more on this topic, see: Kathryn Tabb, “Locke on Enthusiasm and the Association of Ideas,” 
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 9 (forthcoming). 
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in knowledge acquisition, whereas Gay extends association to the moral sphere, showing 
how it leads to the development of previously non-existent motives.270 Third, Locke is 
suspicious of association and claims that “irreconcilable opposition between different 
sects of philosophy and religion,” results from “wrong and unnatural combinations of 
ideas” to which association gives rise.271 For Gay, association explains how we come to 
care for another person’s happiness despite only being naturally concerned for our own.   
Looking Forward to Hume 
 What can we take away from Gay’s attempt to confront the problem of partiality? 
He recognizes that our moral ideas are artificial: they are words we use to carve up our 
social reality, which track our interests as sensitive and social creatures. These concepts 
do not provide us with a standard by which we can know how to act; we need a rule to 
which we can all agree, and that tells us which conduct to pursue and which to avoid. 
Gay argues that we tend to act for the good of others and to approve of this fact. He 
explains this fact by association, which accounts for our developing a robust motivational 
base from a minimalist psychology. In this way, Gay sketches us a potential solution to 
the problem of partiality. Given the problem, we should see utility as the only standard by 
which to conduct ourselves; a standard to which we can commit via straightforward 
                                                        
270 Locke Essay II.xxxiii.17. Locke also notes that “by this one easy and unheeded miscarriage of 
the understanding, sandy and loose foundations become infallible principles, and will not suffer 
themselves to be touched or questions: such unnatural connections become by custom as natural 
to the mind, as sun and light. Fire and warmth go together, and so seem to carry with them as 
natural an evidence as self-evident truths” (218). He is suspicious that teachers often exacerbate 
this problem: “teachers are conscious themselves of the falsehood or weakness of the tenets they 
profess, since they will not suffer the ground whereon they are built to be examined” (218). See: 
Sheridan, Locke: A Guide for the Perplexed, 30-32. 
271 Locke, Essay II.xxxiii.18.  
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means. As the standard of utility will not require us to suppress our nature, we are left 
with little conflict between our concern for our near and dear and the loftier aims of 
morality.  
 There is overlap in how Cockburn and Gay both carry out the project of a moral 
science. Cockburn gives reason a large role in her moral theory, especially when it comes 
to determining the relations of fitness that make up the content of virtue. Gay appeals as 
well to ideas of fittingness and the relations between things when trying to make sense of 
why certain actions are virtuous or vicious – though he argues that these ideas are 
encapsulated in utility. Gay likewise thinks that reason is crucial in determining which 
actions are to be carried out, given that the criterion of virtue is context-dependent and 
highly sensitive to the complexities of moral life. Both Gay and Cockburn also give God 
a secondary role in their theory, in terms of providing the grounds of obligation (in the 
case of Gay) or a motive for virtue (in the case of Cockburn). For both, human nature, or 
at least facts about human beings and their context play a larger role in shaping the 
normative content of virtue.  
 What separates these two thinkers is Gay’s claims that the criterion of virtue is a 
result of human artifice. He recognizes that there is no solution to be had regarding what 
is to be considered murder, theft, etc. without the creation of a common standard to which 
we can all appeal. Cockburn is optimistic about our ability to agree about relations of 
fitness, and to conduct ourselves in light of this agreement, with the occasional threat of 
divine punishment. However, Gay finds reasons for skepticism in the nature of moral 
ideas as mixed modes. Each group of people is convinced that their conceptions of 
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martial, familial, or parental duty are intuitively correct, and yet their views are 
incompatible with one another. These differences in their conceptions of duty, Gay 
claims, give rise to factionalism, only further reinforcing their conflicting moral ideas. 
This concern is central to the problem of partiality, where our dispositions to do best by 
those closest to us collide with our loftier aim of living well alongside others. The power 
of Locke’s view, and of Gay’s attempt to make good on the Lockean moral science, 
comes in Gay’s aim of fixing a moral standard that is agreeable to all regardless of their 
moral ideas. 
 Provided that we can fix the correct standard, we should be able to able to provide 
a solution to the problem of partiality. One shortcoming of Gay’s is its being light on 
detail. Many have considered happiness promotion as the end of morality, though many 
disagree on both what leads us to be happy and that in which happiness consists. 
Although the definition of happiness is context-dependent, there will still be 
disagreements about which actions produce the best outcomes. If there are concerns 
about people being unduly influenced by their moral ideas, we should be equally worried 
about their ability to weigh evidence fairly, even provided their agreement with a shared 
moral standard. Gay does not consider the norms of judgment that are required to be in 
place to create competent moral agents. His appeal to the principles of association to 
explain our sense of moral obligation also reinforces the idea that being moral comes 
easy, or is at least a largely passive process. In the attempt to provide a solution to the 
problem of partiality, Gay seems to oversimplify our moral lives.  
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 Still, Gay manages to give us a way of thinking about how to solve the problem of 
partiality. He provides us with a moral standard that arbitrates between our disparate 
interests and manages our tendency to be partial and prone to faction, while also showing 
how we all become committed to this standard by way of basic psychological principles. 
With Hume, however, we get a more sophisticated version of the theory. Hume agrees 
that moral terms are artificial, and that we require a standard to provide steadiness to our 
natural approval and disapproval. Central to his own account is what he calls the common 
point of view, based in a particular construal of moral language, association, and 
sympathy. The norms that govern that common point of view concern usefulness. And 
yet, Hume’s views about this moral standard, and the manner by which we become 
committed to it, gives us more with which to work. I argue that Hume’s view is the 
culmination of the attempt to build a Lockean moral science, and the first fleshed out 
solution the problem of partiality offered by the British Moralists. I turn now to Hume.  
 
Modeling Impartiality: David Hume  
 John Gay argues that utility is the moral standard required to solve the problem of 
partiality, and claims that the principles of association can account for our seeing this 
standard as authoritative. While Gay’s view is elegant, there is a problem: it is because 
God wills the happiness of mankind, and our happiness is dependent on him, that we are 
obligated to recognize utility as the proper moral standard.272 Hume argues that the 
proper normative standard is usefulness. While “utility” has strictly hedonic associations 
                                                        
272 For more on this subject, see: Paul Russell, The Riddle of Hume’s Treatise: Skepticism, 
Naturalism, and Irreligion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Thomas Holden, 
Spectres of False Divinity: Hume’s Moral Atheism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).  
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– that is, concerning the balance of pleasures and pains – Hume means for “usefulness” to 
be a broader term, referring to something’s conduciveness to generally agreed upon ends. 
In the course of his argument to establish this standard, Hume develops the idea of a 
distinctively moral language, whereby we offer our approbation and disapprobation from 
a common point of view, as opposed to our own particular perspective. From a moral 
perspective, we speak about matters that are mutually beneficial, allowing us to cope 
productively with our natural partialities.   
 Like Gay, however, Hume runs into the problem of explaining how we come to 
see ourselves as committed to a moral standard that challenges our natural tendencies. 
The solution that Hume proposes builds on Locke’s and Gay’s insights about 
psychological association.273 Hume uses association to make sense of our naturally 
                                                        
273Both Gay and Hume make use of psychological association, in a moral context, to explain how 
we come to possess new motives for action, and they are the first in the British moralist tradition 
to do so. Gay’s “Preliminary Dissertation” was published in 1731, appended to a popular work on 
natural religion, eight years prior to Hume’s publishing the first two parts of A Treatise of Human 
Nature. This does not necessarily mean that Hume read Gay; after all, the mere fact that it was 
published during the period in which Hume was shaping his early philosophical views is not 
enough to establish a line of influence. Nevertheless, we have cause for concern when it comes to 
Hume’s self-reporting about the inspiration for his ideas. For example, Hume claims to be the 
inventor of associationism, which we know to be false, since Locke and Berkeley use the concept, 
and he notes their mutual impact on his work. Interestingly, other scholars have noted the 
similarities between Gay’s and Hume’s discussion of association, and some have gone so far as to 
provide evidence of influence. Ernest Mossner gives two pieces of evidence that Hume read Gay 
(The Life of David Hume. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). First, Mossner notes, 
Hume did have access to William King’s De Origine Mali, because he cites it a number of times 
in his “Early Memoranda.”  And second, Hume’s references to Bayle in the “Early Memoranda” 
are taken from editorial notes that Edmund Law made in his 1731 translation of King’s work (to 
which Gay’s essay was affixed). As Mossner points out: “Scrutiny of Hume’s five notes on 
‘King’ indicates that he was using the 1731 translation and was, therefore, exposing himself to 
the ideas of Law and Gay, as well as King. This fact is of importance, for example, because Gay’s 
short dissertation is the earliest known reconcilement of ethical utilitarianism with psychological 
associationism, two doctrines that were to be employed by Hume himself” (80). While this 
evidence is not definitive, some scholars have seen Mossner’s case for there being a non-
coincidental relation between Hume and Gay as persuasive. See: Albee, A History; Halévy, 
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sympathetic capacities, through which we enter into and take on the passions of others. 
Our sympathy compels us to attend to others; through practice and time, this attention 
becomes what Hume refers to as “delicacy.” The delicate person is able to make fine-
grained observations about conduct and characters – an ability that is developed in 
conversation with others about matters of mutual interest. A fidelity to the moral 
perspective is forged here. The more we engage with others, and the more delicate we 
become, the more our identity is tied up with the common point of view. We develop an 
identity as someone who wishes to be praiseworthy in the eyes of others. Hume argues 
that through this sophisticated process, we develop a commitment to the moral 
perspective that allows us to provide a solution to the problem of partiality.  
The Moral Perspective 
 Sympathy is an associative mechanism that accounts for our ability to take on and 
enter into the sentiments of other sentient beings.274 At the most basic level, sympathy 
allows us to experience another person’s pleasure or pain as our own. Say we see a 
colleague crying at his desk. We form the belief “Oliver is crying at his desk,” which 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Philosophical Radicalism; Jacqueline Taylor, Reflecting Subjects: Passion, Sympathy, and 
Society in Hume’s Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
274 See: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. P.H. Nidditch (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), 316-24. He introduces sympathy to explain what he calls the 
“secondary” cause of pride and humility, which lies “in the opinions of others”: “our reputation, 
our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other 
causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence when not seconded by the opinions 
and sentiments of others” (316). For more on the mechanism of sympathy, see: Páll Árdal, 
Passion and Value in ‘Hume’s Treatise’ (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 41-79; 
Gerald J. Postema, “‘Cemented with Diseased Qualities’: Sympathy and Comparison in Hume’s 
Moral Psychology,” Hume Studies 31.2 (2005): 249-298; Taylor, Reflecting Subjects, 41-68; Rico 
Vitz, “The Nature and Functions of Sympathy in Hume’s Philosophy,” The Oxford Handbook of 
Hume, ed. Paul Russell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 312-332.  
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leads us to infer that Oliver is sad. The idea of Oliver being sad produces a degree of 
sadness in us, though not to the extent that he is currently experiencing. This transition 
from the idea of Oliver’s sadness to the impression or feeling of sadness – mediated 
through the idea of ourselves, which lessens the degree to which the sadness overtakes us 
– is what Hume refers to as the mechanism of sympathy.275 Witnessing someone in pain 
produces a pain in ourselves which was previously non-existent. Sympathy can 
sometimes be blocked. I may believe that homeless people are lazy; if I see a homeless 
person in peril, I may feel contempt at the sight of his suffering.276 Hume does not think it 
is possible to block all instances of sympathy since there is no way to close oneself off 
completely: we naturally “reflect each other’s emotions.”277   
 Hume stresses that many of our emotions require other people to share in them in 
order for them to persist: “Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and 
obey one man: Let the sun rise and set at his command: The seas and rivers roll as he 
pleases, and the earth furnish spontaneously whatever may be useful or agreeable to him: 
He will still be miserable, till you give him one person at least, with whom he may share 
                                                        
275 As Hume puts it, “the idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a 
degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, 
as any original affection” (A Treatise, 317). 
276 For Hume’s discussion of contempt, and its relation to respect, see: A Treatise, 389-93. Hume 
often uses the language of contempt and shame to describe the experience of witnessing people in 
poverty. See: A Treatise, 307, 362, 393, 579. The role of contempt is underexplored in Humean 
philosophy. For some useful discussion of this passion, see: Christopher J. Finlay, Hume’s Social 
Philosophy: Human Nature and Commercial Sociability in ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’ (New 
York: Bloomsbury, 2007), 105-123; Amy M. Schmitter, “Family Trees: Sympathy, Comparison, 
and the Proliferation of the Passions in Hume and his Predecessors,” Emotion & Cognitive Life in 
Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy, ed.  Martin Pickavé and Lisa Shapiro (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 255-278; Swanton, Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 87-108. 
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his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy.”278 It is our dependence 
on the presence and recognition of others that Hume says constitutes our “most ardent 
desire of society,” or our desire to be in concord with others.279 We rely on one another 
for emotional recognition. Our sympathetic capacities, which make us susceptible to the 
pain and pleasures of others, make it so that we are simply stuck with each other on 
account of our mutual emotional dependence. Unlike Gay, Hume does not think that this 
mutual dependence leads to a blending of the idea of our own happiness with that of 
others; instead, it leads to the development of previously non-existent norms with which 
we learn to comply on account of our sensitivity to this fact of mutual dependence.280  
 
 But the story does not end here. “’Tis true,” Hume notes, “there is no human and 
indeed no sensible creature, whose happiness or misery does not, in some measure, affect 
us, when brought near to us, and represented in lively colours,” but the measure to which 
we are sensible to the happiness or misery of another is dependent on how much we 
identify with the sensible creature in question.281 As he stresses, “an Englishman in Italy 
is a friend: A European in China; and perhaps a man wou’d be belov’d as such, were we 
                                                        
278 Hume, A Treatise, 363.  
279 Hume, A Treatise, 363. 
280 The one instance where the blending of our happiness with that others may be totalizing is the 
family. In other instances, however, this blending will be necessarily incomplete. There are three 
species of norms, for Hume: those which relate to our material needs (i.e., justice), those required 
for the maintenance of institutions (i.e., allegiance), and those related to our emotional 
dependence (i.e., manners and politeness). Most character traits that Hume deems “virtuous” 
concern one or more of these three categories. For more on the specific virtues in Hume, see: 
Annette C. Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume’s ‘Treatise’ (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), 198-219; Rachel Cohon, Hume’s Morality: Feeling and 
Fabrication (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 96-125; 239-267; Swanton, Virtue 
Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 87-108;  Annette C. Baier, “Kinds of Virtue Theorist: A Response 
to Christine Swanton,” Hume on Motivation and Virtue: New Essays, ed. Charles R. Pigden (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 249-258; Christine Swanton, “Reply to Baier,” 259-263.  
281 Hume, A Treatise, 481. 
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to meet him in the moon. But this proceeds only from the relation to ourselves; which in 
these cases gathers force by being confined to a few persons.”282 Our maximal sensitivity 
is confined to few: “a man naturally loves his children better than his nephews, his 
nephews better than his cousins, his cousins better than strangers, where every thing is 
equal.”283 The happiness of others impacts us to the degree that they resemble us – the 
greater resemblance, the more vivid their emotions will be, as we can tie them back to 
ourselves.284 The problem is that “our common measures of duty…always follows the 
common and natural course of our passions,” the implication being that we will only take 
ourselves to have duties to those closest to us.285  
 If every person judged a trait to be virtuous on the basis of “his own peculiar point 
of view,” our mutual judgments would be in “continual fluctuation,” and we would never 
be able to “converse together on any reasonable terms.”286 Hume notes that in order to 
“prevent those continual contradictions, and arrive at a more stable judgment of things, 
we fix on some steady and general points of view.”287 Scholars have come to refer to this 
                                                        
282 Hume, A Treatise, 482. 
283 Hume, A Treatise, 483-84. 
284 As Hume points out, “Nature has preserv’d a great resemblance among all human creatures, 
and that we never remark any passion or principle in others, of which…we may not find a parallel 
in ourselves. The case is same with the fabric of the mind, as with that of the body. However, the 
parts may differ in shape or size, their structure and composition are in general the same. There is 
a very remarkable resemblance, which preserves itself amidst all their variety; and this 
resemblance must very much contribute to make us enter into the sentiments of others, and 
embrace them with facility and pleasure…the stronger the relation betwixt ourselves and any 
object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to the related idea 
the vivacity of the conception, with which we always from the idea of our own person” (A 
Treatise, 318).  
285 Hume, A Treatise, 484. 
286 Hume, A Treatise, 581.  
287 Hume, A Treatise, 581-82. 
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standard as the “common point of view.”288 Hume thinks of this perspective as a 
reflective standard we use to correct our immediate sentiments of praise and blame. He 
gives a visual-aesthetic standard to illustrate the process: “external beauty is determin’d 
merely by pleasure’ and ‘tis evident, a beautiful countenance cannot give so much 
pleasure, when seen at the distance of twenty paces, as when it is brought nearer to us. 
We say not, however, that it appears to us less beautiful: Because we know what effect it 
will have in such a position, and by that reflexion we correct its momentary 
appearance.”289 Because we know that the ideal distance for determining the beauty of a 
face is closer than twenty paces, we discount any judgments that we make prior to 
traversing the necessary distance to achieve that more ideal perspective.290  
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 Likewise, Hume thinks that reflection helps moderate our snap judgments of 
praise or blame about someone’s traits which aren’t made from the appropriate ideal. As 
in the visual case, where we recognize that we require a standard of measurement to 
meaningfully talk about the size of objects, we recognize that we require a standard for 
the propriety of character traits to converse with others about moral matters. Like in the 
visual case, just because we adopt a standard does not mean that we will cease from 
making snap judgments: as Hume notes, “our passions do not readily follow the 
determination of our judgment,” as they are “more stubborn and inalterable.”291 The fact 
that, say, envy is an improper sentiment will not keep us from experiencing it, or even 
from feeling that it is justified.292 However, we will know that our envy is out of step 
with the standard that reflection has suggested we adopt. When we consider something to 
be in accordance with the adopted standard, our judgment takes the form of a “calm 
passion,” which exercises some defeasible influence over us.293 Our feeling that our envy 
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is improper may not successfully counteract the violent reaction of the envy, but we will 
feel its impropriety as long as we can reflect on and adopt the requisite standard. 
 I have not yet said anything about the content of this standard – only that 
reflection leads us to adopt a common standard; that this standard can be used to cast 
doubt on our snap judgments; and that the judgments do not erase the possibility of 
experiencing sentiments that are improper for the perspective of any standard that we 
adopt. At this point, the visual metaphor loses its power. Consider the following quote: 
“all sentiments of blame or praise are variable…but these variations we regard not in our 
general decisions, but still apply the terms expressive of our liking or dislike, in the same 
manner, as if we remain’d in one point of view.”294 But Hume is not thinking of the 
common point of view as a heuristic attempt to attain cognitive distance on a situation – 
despite his using the language of “coolness” and “reflexion,” which imply that he is 
enjoining us to step back from our initial judgments of praise and blame and consider the 
traits of others in a more steady frame of mind.295 Reflection, itself, does not give us a 
standard by which to judge traits as virtuous or vicious. Through reflection, we can adopt 
a common moral standard that expands our concerns beyond certain self-interested or 
parochial interests; however, short of fixing the content of this standard, we are left with 
empty appeals to “generality,” “commonality,” and “impartiality.”  
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 So in what does the standard of morality consist, according to Hume? “Virtue” is 
a term that we use to describe objects of which we tend to approve, while “vice” is a term 
used to refer to objects that often receive our disapproval.296 Hume claims that our 
approvals and disapprovals (i.e. our ideas of virtue and vice) are directed at particular 
character traits that individuals possess and that explain their behavioral patterns.297 He 
begins by observing that we attribute thick descriptions to our fellows – honorable, 
shameful, etc. – and afford them the relevant praise or blame. On what basis do we 
approve and disapprove of these characters; or, what standard is involved in us ascribing 
virtue and vice to others? Part of what is involved, Hume notes, is pleasure when 
contemplating honorable conduct, and love for the person who possesses it.298 But, as a 
scientist of human nature, he seeks the explanatory grounds of attributions of virtue and 
vice, and settles on four. A trait receives approval if it is useful to the one who possesses 
it; agreeable to the person who possesses it; useful to others; or agreeable to others.299  
 While agreeableness and usefulness possess equal weight in explaining why we 
approve of certain traits, the case is different with moral judgments, where usefulness 
plays a larger role. Usefulness is in many ways the operative concept of Hume’s later 
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ethics.300 The aim of Hume’s second Enquiry is to discover the source of our approbation 
for those “social virtues,” benevolence and justice. These virtues form the basis of our 
lives together. Hume argues that our moral judgments are shaped most by what is useful 
or harmful to society, noting that “those whose habits and conduct are hurtful to society” 
are objects of the “strongest sentiment of disgust and hatred.”301 Nevertheless, according 
to Hume,  philosophers do not often admit considerations of usefulness “into their 
systems of ethics,” because it is difficult to understand how we come to approve of 
character traits in terms of their general usefulness.302 For usefulness to be linked to 
moral approval, Hume points out that “the social virtue must, therefore, be allowed to 
have a natural beauty and amiableness, which, at first, antecedent to all precept or 
education, recommends them to the esteem of uninstructed mankind, and engages their 
affections.”303 Explaining this link leads Hume to invoke the “common point of view.”  
Language and Moral Content 
 As reflective beings we adopt a “method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, 
of correcting our language, where the sentiments are more stubborn and inalterable 
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[emphasis mine].”304 He is clearer about this emphasis on language in the second 
Enquiry. When I approve or disapprove of some character trait, I often do so from my 
own perspective. For Hume, I use the language of self-love: “when a man denominates 
another his enemy, his rival, his antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the 
language of self-love, and to express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his 
particular circumstances and situation.”305 But, he claims, “the more we converse with 
mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain,” the more we recognize that 
“…every man's interest is peculiar to himself, and the aversions and desires, which result 
from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree.”306 We require a language 
that is distinct from self-love: “general language, therefore, being formed for general use, 
must be moulded on some more general views, and must affix the epithets of praise or 
blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of the 
community.”307 We develop a moral language, which allows us to reflect on the value of 
character traits from this shared perspective enshrined in the language.308  
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 From the perspective of self-love, we view individuals as they relate to us; from 
the perspective of morality, we consider individuals as possessors of certain character 
traits that are useful or harmful. Annette Baier distinguishes between the stance one takes 
as a moral evaluator and that which a lover takes regarding her beloved (read: any 
example where there is affection or familiarity between the two parties in question will 
suffice). When asked about the character of one’s lover, Hume notes that “he will tell 
you, that he is at a loss for words to describe her charms.”309 In contrast to this lack of 
description, Baier says “the moral evaluator cannot be at a loss for words to describe 
what she approves—so must be able to ‘give you the character for’ what she approves in 
you. From the moral viewpoint, particular repeated and repeatable ‘characters’ have been 
singled out for notice, and a special language evolved for referring to them.”310 Baier 
goes on to quote what I take to be the clearest expression of Hume’s idea that the 
common point of view is linguistic: in our attempt to evaluate characters, we “invent a 
peculiar set of terms, in order to express those universal sentiments of censure or 
approbation, which arise from humanity, or from views of general usefulness and its 
contrary. Virtue and Vice become then known: morals are recognized.”311  
 Let me unpack this claim. To be concerned for humanity is to take an interest in 
characters which are useful for it. Likewise, no one is concerned with bare usefulness; 
something is always useful for some individual or group. When it comes to discussing the 
shape of moral language, Hume maintains that the “peculiar set of terms” we invent are 
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meant to reflect views about the “general usefulness and its contrary.” Although we value 
a great many different things, moral evaluation is always done via reference to its 
usefulness or harmfulness. Take Hume’s example of a benevolent person.312 He thinks it 
is important to dispel the idea that we approve of benevolence because it makes us feel 
good. We approve of a benevolent person to the extent that “happiness and satisfaction, 
[is] derived to society from his intercourse and good offices.”313 As Hume argues, “the 
happiness of mankind, the order of society, the harmony of families, the mutual support 
of friends” exercise “dominion over the breasts of men” and therefore “the circumstances 
of utility, in all subjects, is a source of praise and approbation: That is constantly 
appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions.”314   
 Hume claims that we invent a “set of terms” to express “those universal 
sentiments of censure or approbation” – through this process “Virtue and Vice then 
becomes known” and “morals are recognized.” What comes first, the “set of terms” or the 
“universal sentiments”? Hume distinguishes between the approval that we express when 
using “the language of self-love” and the approval we convey from the common point of 
view. Hume draws a distinction between terms like “enemy, rival, antagonist, and 
adversary,” which express a partial evaluation, and others like “vicious, odious, or 
depraved” that convey something more objective about the person at which the 
                                                        
312 Benevolence is certainly a virtue, according to Hume, though a fraught one. See: Árdal, 
Passion and Value, 109-147; T. A. Roberts, The Concept of Benevolence: Aspects of Eighteenth-
Century Moral Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1973); Baier, A Progress of the Sentiments, 113-
14; Rico Vitz, “Hume and the Limits of Benevolence,” Hume Studies 28.2 (2002): 271-296; Rico 
Vitz, “Sympathy and Benevolence in Hume’s Moral Psychology,” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 42.3 (2004): 261-275; Swanton, The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche, 181-194. 
313 Hume, Enquires, 178. 
314 Hume, Enquires, 181-82. 
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evaluation is directed. When someone uses these terms, they “speak another language, 
and express sentiments in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him.”315 It 
is after we have shared terms that can make moral evaluations; or, evaluations that are 
understood and concurred with by our fellows. It does not make much sense to say that 
“universal sentiments” exist prior to the “set of terms” they are meant to express. It is 
only by learning to use the moral language that we begin to develop moral sentiments, 
properly speaking.316  
 The moral language allows us to render evaluations about characters that can be 
shared by our fellows. I cannot reasonably expect someone else to view my adversary as 
their adversary as well, but if my adversary displays certain distasteful character traits 
(i.e., a propensity to talk over others) I presume that others can share in the evaluation of 
my adversary, on that count at least. It is possible, for example, that I attach more 
significance to the phenomenon of talking over others (potentially because my adversary 
                                                        
315 Hume, Enquires, 182; 231. 
316 There are significant connections here between Hume’s linguistic analysis of the moral 
perspective and Locke’s account of language. Exploring this point in greater detail would go the 
purposes of this chapter. Since Hume is commonly aligned with sentimentalism, it’s easy to 
forget that not every sentiment or passion qualifies as a “moral sentiment” on his picture. Moral 
sentiments are those sentiments which are involved in judgments about a person’s character 
(either oneself or another), when that character is considered from a more general perspective 
than one’s own. This is where Hume’s examples of “enemy, rival, antagonist, adversary,” and 
“vicious, odious, and depraved” are helpful in understanding his point. Initially, one might think 
that the difference between judging another to be a “rival” and judging them to be “odious,” on 
the grounds that the sentiment involved in the former determination is “calmer” than that which is 
involved in the latter. However, to call someone “odious” is a significant charge, and the affective 
component of such a judgment is rather strong – involving the passion of disgust. When one 
refers to another person as odious, the expectation is that other people (and perhaps even the 
odious person himself) can understand, affirm, and partake in this judgment. The sentiment 
involved here may be quite strong since when one feels the odiousness of another person, one 
imagines that one is feeling on behalf of the community. Regardless, this sentiment is considered 
“moral” because it was produced by contemplating the character of another from a general 
perspective, and it can be tested by the ability of others to enter into this sentiment.   
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engages in it) but all parties to the evaluation will agree that it is not a laudable trait, even 
if it is not a particularly vicious one. Hume admits that there will be differences in how 
one feels when rendering an evaluation of another person’s character, though he does not 
think that these differences in feeling present much of a concern. The point of a moral 
language is to find common ground in how certain traits are spoken about. It may be that 
violations of politeness bother me more than they do other people – the strength of my 
evaluation will not be determined by the extent to which others share in my feeling of 
disapprobation but in the recognition that some action is, in fact, impolite. Importantly, 
Hume does think that we begin to “feel” these moral distinctions more as we further 
identify ourselves with the common point of view, which I discuss more in the next 
section. 
 Gay uses association to explain how we come to be concerned for the happiness 
of others despite only naturally caring for our own happiness. The process works as 
follows: I approve of my happiness; I recognize that I depend on others to attain my 
happiness; by association, I begin to see the happiness of others as not only a means to 
achieving my own happiness but as inextricable to it; I approve of other’s happiness like I 
approve of my own. After this judgment is rendered, Gay then has a story to tell about 
how it motivates us to act. Hume thinks of moral principles in the same manner. We are 
naturally concerned for our own happiness – via relations of contiguity and resemblance 
– and we build sympathetic bonds with those around us, but when it comes to rendering 
evaluations of character that are distinct from our particular interests, we have no 
considerable feelings. It is only by conversing with others that we widen our scope of 
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concern and develop norms to help coordinate our conduct. Throughout A Treatise, 
Hume stresses that it is the associative mechanism of sympathy that is responsible for any 
feelings that become attached to these moral evaluations – all while recognizing that said 
affection will be “calm” and easily overridden by other considerations.  
 For Gay and Hume, we develop norms that reflect our common interests and form 
a minimal attachment to moral norms via our capacity to sympathize with others. What is 
distinctive about Hume’s account is the way in which he couches the concept of 
usefulness in a model of conversation and justification and requires that we become 
competent in the moral language to engage in proper deliberation. Hume offers us a 
standard of virtue but also a procedure for resolving moral disputes. By appealing to the 
idea of conduct or characters being beneficial or detrimental, we give ourselves the tools 
to productively disagree with one another about matters of mutual interest. We are forced 
to take others seriously. When deliberating from a moral perspective, the views and 
sentiments of others are the evidence required to determine if an action is the proper 
object of approbation or disapprobation. It is not enough to speak to our own perspective 
– we must try to speak for the common interest if we are to enjoy the fruits of living well 
together. 
 
Humean Moral Pluralism? 
 In Humean Moral Pluralism, Michael Gill argues that Hume is a moral pluralist, a 
view according to which “there is a multiplicity of different moral ends…[which] can 
come into conflict with each other and…there is no invariable ordering principle for 
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resolving all such conflicts.”317 Gill’s interpretation challenges my reading of Hume, 
particularly my claim that Hume follows Gay in holding that norms of usefulness 
regulate other value considerations. In this section, I canvass Gill’s reasons for reading 
Hume as a moral pluralist and respond. I argue that, while Hume recognizes that human 
beings value different ends, objects, activities, etc., and that weighing these values can be 
rather difficult, he does not maintain that “there is no invariable ordering principle for 
resolving all such conflicts” of value. When occupying the common point of view, from 
which we make moral judgments, Hume thinks it is a matter of fact that we bestow 
greater approval on those traits and behaviors that are useful than those we find merely 
agreeable; further, agreeable traits, if harmful, meet collective disapproval.318  
 Gill attempts to establish that Hume is a “moral multiplist,” placing him alongside 
Samuel Clarke and Joseph Butler.319 While Hutcheson claims that “moral judgments 
                                                        
317 Michael Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3. 
318 There is some controversy about the extent to which Hume is a moral theorist in our sense of 
the term – in that he attempts to not only explain our moral judgments, but also to give us some 
guidance about what to do or how to deliberate. Throughout his book, Gill seems to suggest that 
he views Hume as a kind of moral anthropologist, who attempts to give “the best causal 
explanation of our activity of moral judgment” (Humean Moral Pluralism, 4), without entering 
into many of the controversies that moral philosophers often find themselves embroiled. 
However, Gill’s main focus seems to be on Hume’s general disinterest in “conceptual metaethics” 
(Humean Moral Pluralism, 4). While I agree with Gill that metaethics is a minor concern for 
Hume, I do think that Hume has substantive things to say about how we should deliberate and 
what sort of character we should cultivate. On these matters, Hume gives a great deal of weight to 
considerations of utility. For more on this scholarly debate, see: Mackie, Hume’s Moral Theory, 
5-6; Stephen Darwall, “Hume and the Invention of Utilitarianism,” Hume and Hume’s 
Connexions, ed. M.A. Stewart (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 61; Robert 
Shaver, “Hume’s Moral Theory?” History of Philosophy Quarterly 12 (1995): 317-31; Roger 
Crisp, “Hume on Virtue, Utility, and Morality,” Virtue Ethics, Old and New, ed. Sebastian 
Gardiner (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005), 159-78. 
319 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 6-19. Gill’s inclusion of Samuel Clarke here as a “moral 
multiplist” is important, since his role in the development of moral philosophy during this period 
is often understated.   
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track only our thoughts about general benevolence,” Clarke, Butler, and Hume maintain 
that the values of “justice, veracity, friendship, gratitude,” are not reducible to matters of 
benevolence.320 Hume is, of course, less multiplist than Clarke or Butler since he only 
recognizes four grounds of approval in his works: X is useful to oneself; X is useful to 
others; X is agreeable to oneself; X is agreeable to others. Gill therefore overstates his 
case when he says that “Hume’s catalogue of the virtues is thus closer to Clarke’s and 
Butler’s pictures of the content of morality than to Hutcheson’s monistic picture.”321 For 
Hume, we approve of gratitude, but our approval is not based in the idea that this value is 
intrinsically good – it is approved of insofar as it is either useful or agreeable.  
 The next step in Gill’s argument is establishing Hume’s “conflict multiplism,” 
distinguishing him from Clarke and Butler, who argue that there are multiple, non-
reducible moral values that never come into conflict.322 Agreeableness and usefulness can 
often push against one another. Gill takes the example of pride, which is agreeable to its 
possessor but disagreeable to others.323 However, pride is agreeable to others if displayed 
in a moderate fashion; a well-placed and temperate degree of pride is an object of moral 
approval for Hume.324 Second, Gill is unclear about the level at which the approval and 
disapproval is operating. Hume follows Hutcheson and Malebranche in claiming that the 
passions approve of themselves – the prideful person will approve of his passion when in 
                                                        
320 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 20.  
321 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 23. 
322 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 15. 
323 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism. See: 24 and 28, for Gill’s discussion of pride; 30 and 42, for 
his discussion of military glory.  
324 As Hume notes, “the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride” (A Treatise, 600).  
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its grip.325 But this is different from moral approval, which is  rendered from the common 
point of view.326 Even though an observer can surely admit that an individual’s pride 
feels good to that person, it does not follow that the observer approves of this pride. 
 Gill recognizes two paths open for the conflict multiplist. One could argue that 
when values come into conflict, there is a hierarchy of values that help us determine 
which value will win out. He refers to this position as “ordered multiplism.”327 One could 
also hold that there is no hierarchy of values to help adjudicate these conflicts between 
values. He refers to this position as pluralism.328 For Gill, Hume is a pluralist, but he 
recognizes the possibility of reading him otherwise. Gill considers a place where Hume 
notes that commonsense places usefulness over other kinds of value:  
 
 
“In all determinations of morality, this circumstance of public utility is ever 
principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, either in philosophy or common 
                                                        
325 Nicolas Malebranche notably claims that “the passions all seek their own justification; they 
unceasingly represent to the soul the object agitating it in the way most likely to maintain and 
increase the agitation…false judgments and the passions unceasingly contribute to each other’s 
preservation” (The Search after truth, ed. Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), 397; Hutcheson follows Malebranche in maintaining that “all 
the Passions, and Affections justify themselves; or, we approve our being affected in a certain 
manner on certain Occasions, and condemn a Person who is otherwise affected. So the Sorrowful, 
the Angry, the Jealous, the Compassionate, think it reasonable they should be so upon the several 
Occasions which move these Passions; but we should not therefore say that Sorrow, Anger, 
Jealousy, or Pity are pleasant, and that we chuse to be in these Passions because of the 
concomitant Pleasure” (An Inquiry, 110-11). In a letter to Hutcheson, Hume notes that “You seem 
here to embrace Dr Butler's Opinion in his Sermons on Human Nature; that our moral Sense has 
an Authority distinct from its Force and Durableness, and that because we always think it ought 
to prevail. But this is nothing but an Instinct or Principle, which approves of itself upon 
reflection; and that is common to all of them [emphasis mine]” (The Letters of David Hume, vol. 
1, ed. J.Y.T. Greig (New York: Oxford University Press), 47. I credit Aino Lahdenranta for 
drawing my attention to this aspect of Hume’s moral psychology. See: Eleonore Le Jalle, “Hume, 
Malebranche, and the Self-Justification of the Passions,” Hume Studies 38.2 (2014): 201-20. 
326 See section III of this paper, where I make this argument.  
327 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 38. 
328 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 37.  
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life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means, be 
decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests 
of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to 
prevail; as soon as farther experience and sounder reasoning have given us juster 
notions of human affairs; we retract our first sentiment and adjust anew the 
boundaries of moral good and evil. (E 81; see also 78, 82).”329 
 
Hume stresses that our sentiments may approve of certain traits in an immediate manner, 
and that these approvals may be at odds with more considered judgments of usefulness. 
When these conflicts arise, we favor usefulness and adjust our intuitive judgments to 
match our considered ones. I defended this position earlier in the chapter, when I was 
examining the development of moral language, and the primacy of usefulness. Gill 
admits this passage from Hume:  
 
“Moral good and evil are certainly distinguish’d by our sentiments, not by reason: 
But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of 
characters and passions, or from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of 
mankind, and of particular persons. My opinion is, that both these causes are 
intermix’d in our judgments of morals; after the same manner as they are in our 
decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty: Tho’ I am also of opinion, 
that reflexions on the tendencies of actions have by far the greatest influence, and 
determine all the great lines of our duty (T 3.3.1.27).”330 
 
                                                        
329 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 42. 
330 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 45. 
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While usefulness and agreeableness both impact what we morally approve, usefulness 
has a larger impact on approval. Take the example of helping your friend do his logic 
homework. This decision is agreeable: your friend needs assistance, you are in a position 
to help him, and so your doing so expresses a great deal of humanity. However, let us say 
that helping your friend feels like a chore and that he does not appear to be getting any 
better at logic. We might think your agreeable action has bad consequences for both him 
and yourself, insofar as it teaches him undue dependence on you and leads you to resent 
him. At this point, it becomes clear that we disapprove of you helping your friend, despite 
its original agreeableness.  
 If I am right about Hume, Gill argues that the non-consequentialist objection 
would follow. As he points out, John Balguy (1686-1748) first voices this objection 
against Hutcheson, saying that “Is virtue no otherwise good or amiable, then as it 
conduces to public or private advantage? Is there no absolute goodness in it? Are all its 
perfections relative and instrumental?”331 If Hume holds that goodness is determined on 
the basis of its outcome, then it follows that there are no intrinsically good or bad actions. 
This option is a problem, according to Gill, because if it is true, then Hume doesn’t allow 
for non-consequentialist ends in his moral theory. Everything is subject to trade-offs in 
deliberation, and every action can be justified, provided that it produces the right sorts of 
outcomes. Gill gives the following example to illustrate the absurdity of this position.  
                                                        
331 John Balguy, “The Foundation of Moral Goodness,” British Moralists, 1650-1800, vol. 1, ed. 
D.D. Raphael (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991), 402. Quoted in: Gill, Humean Moral 
Pluralism, 56. 
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 “An artist, call her Jane, has a desire to produce a beautiful object herself, say a 
 painting. Jane  also has the desire that the world contain as many beautiful objects 
 as possible, regardless of who produces them. From her possessing those two 
 desires, can you infer that Jane will  prefer not to create a painting she wants to 
 create if she believes that by doing so she can spur two other people to produce 
 two beautiful paintings? No. The satisfaction Jane receives  from producing a 
 beautiful painting herself is quite different from…the pleasure she receives 
 from observing a beautiful painting produced by someone else.”332 
 
While Jane may value two beautiful paintings produced by two other people, she will feel 
differently about them if their production means sacrificing a beautiful painting she might 
herself produce. This point ties in with what Gill says about the non-fungibility of 
Humean pleasures.333 The approval that comes along with producing a work of art is 
qualitatively different than observing two beautiful works of art: “Hume’s account of the 
motivational influences of the indirect and moral passions implies that self-approval has a 
deliberative weight of a different kind from the deliberative weight of approval of 
others.”334 In other words, no interpersonal trade-offs can take place when it comes to 
value. 
 But Gill assumes that Jane’s desire to produce a work of art is greater than her 
desire that the world possess beautiful objects. Jane might identify with this loftier goal 
and possess a greater desire to see it through. Tough questions arise in this instance. 
                                                        
332 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 59. 
333 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 61. 
334 Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, 63. 
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Should one place a greater weight on one’s own artistic cultivation than on promoting the 
production of beautiful objects generally? How does one best promote the production of 
beautiful objects? Can one help accomplish this goal by cultivating one’s own talents? 
Perhaps by identifying with the common point of view, and making a judgment about 
what policy of conduct will best promote the production of beautiful objects, Jane decides 
that she should take half the time she spends on her own painting and put it towards 
teaching underprivileged, artistically-inclined students to paint. Hume would likely 
commend Jane’s decision here, claiming that it expresses a degree of humanity not 
present in the person who merely pursues their own talents at the first sight of conflict 
between their cultivation and the promotion of the general good.335  
 I have provided some reasons for thinking that Gill’s pluralist interpretation of 
Hume misses the mark on two fronts. First, Gill overstates Hume’s potential multiplism. 
Hume is concerned with two sources of value: usefulness and agreeableness. Second, 
though Hume notes that agreeableness plays a role in determining what we value, when it 
comes to conflicts between agreeableness and usefulness, usefulness exercises greater 
influence in what we ultimately see as morally praiseworthy. Gill does an admirable job 
making the case for Humean pluralist metaethics and normative ethics – my worry is that 
in his attempt to make Hume’s view plausible, Gill dethrones usefulness as the standard 
                                                        
335 The Humean moral pluralist is able to recognize the value in Jane’s decision no matter which 
she chooses, either producing a painting herself or working to ensure that others can do so. Either 
way, a value of some significance is being expressed. Still, I argue that Hume would give the 
following analysis of the cases. While Jane (-qua cultivating her talents) is hardly blameworthy, 
her decision strikes us as merely agreeable. We feel a sense of delight when considering Jane’s 
decision to spend her nights working in the attic on a new landscape series. We might even be 
inclined to pick up a brush ourselves. Still, Jane is hardly praiseworthy, especially considering the 
humanity that would be conveyed by her decision to teach underprivileged students how to paint. 
Given the two options the latter decision would be of greater moral value, all things considered.   
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of moral approval. Hume is not a utilitarian in Gay’s sense, or in the sense of how 
Bentham later uses this term. Still, Hume’s moral theory is consequentialist insofar as he 
deems the standard of mutual benefit to be authoritative. Only by appealing to mutual 
benefit and detriment can we avoid factionalism and the conflict of moral attitudes. But 
how does one come to recognize the authority of usefulness? I turn next to Hume’s 
account of moral authority.    
 
The Authority of Impartiality 
 Humans are sympathetic creatures – we are affected by the pleasures and pains of 
others, and can, with effort, come to adopt their point of view. This fact, alongside our 
mutual dependence and the necessity of our coordination with others to achieve shared 
ends, accounts for the development of a shared moral language. This language allows us 
to converse about character traits and conduct that are useful from the common point of 
view. But Hume runs into a problem. When I judge a trait to be useful – say, fortitude in 
face of uncertainty – my judgment is constituted by a calm affection of approval.336 But 
calm affections are easily overridden by passions, since the latter are more closely tied to 
the production of desires, which are responsible for our conduct.337 For calm approval to 
have an impact on action, Hume must explain how we come to view such approvals as 
authoritative and how this judgment of their authority is tied to motivation. I argue that 
Hume’s explanation takes the form of an account of moral responsiveness. There are two 
aspects to responsiveness: delicate taste and due pride. I treat each of them in turn.  
                                                        
336 Hume, Enquires, 228-29, 239, 259; A Treatise, 276; Hume, “Of the Passions,” sect. 5-6.  
337 Hume, Enquires, 213n1, 271; Hume, A Treatise 413-22, 455-70, 574-91; Hume, “Of the 
Passions,” sect. 5-6.  
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 Scholars draw on Hume’s concept of taste to make sense of his account of moral 
judgment but it does not often appear in discussions about his view of moral 
obligation.338 Hume conceives of moral norms as arising from conversation with others 
about matters of shared interest. In this way, the content of morality is shaped by what is 
important to us. Hume argues that there is never a genuine conflict between what is in our 
own self-interest and the interest of everyone, and so he is less concerned to explain why 
acting morally concords with enlightened self-interest.339 While he is not as interested in 
this sense of moral obligation, Hume is drawn to the idea of moral responsiveness: our 
capacity to take in and respond to moral considerations. The authority of moral norms 
concerns our sensitivity to their demands. Moral success concerns our being able to 
appreciate the importance of these norms. As Hume points out, the failure to recognize 
moral distinctions “proceed from bad education, want of capacity, or a perverse and 
unpliable disposition.”340  
                                                        
338 To be fair, “taste” does not appear in Hume’s discussion of moral obligation in the second 
Enquiry. He does treat the concept in section VII, “Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to 
Ourselves,” in a discussion of “the great charm of poetry”: “the very sensibility to these beauties, 
or a delicacy of taste, is itself a beauty in any character; as conveying the purest, the most 
durable, and most innocent of all enjoyments” (259). Hume claims that poetry is in large part 
successful because it expresses passions that are easy for an audience to enter into, via sympathy.  
339 Hume thinks it is obvious to any right thinking person that acting morally is conducive to self-
interest; it is therefore not the job of philosophers to convince anyone of this fact: “That the 
virtues are immediately useful or agreeable to the person possessed of them, are desirable in a 
view to self-interest, it would surely be superfluous to prove. Moralists, indeed, may spare 
themselves all the pain which they often take in recommending these duties. To what purpose 
collect arguments to evince that temperance is advantageous, and excesses of pleasure hurtful. 
When it appears that these excesses are only denominated such, because they are hurtful” 
(Enquires, 280. See also: 281-83).  
340 Hume, Enquires, 280.  
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Delicacy and Moral Refinement 
 The first aspect of moral responsiveness is delicacy. While the concept of 
“delicacy” crops up often in Hume’s works, he does not discuss it directly in either the 
Treatise or second Enquiry. It does, however, receive a fuller treatment in his essays, 
“The Standard of Taste” and “Of the Delicacy of Taste and Passion.” In “Of Delicacy,” 
Hume distinguishes between two forms of delicacy: of passion and of taste. He notes: 
“some People are subject to a certain delicacy of passion, which…gives them a lively joy 
upon every event, as well as piercing grief, when they meet with misfortunes and 
adversity.”341 Delicacy of passion is an increased susceptibility to the violent passions. A 
person who is quick to anger after being slighted, or who is apt to cry when hearing a 
piece of music, is said by Hume to have “delicate passions.” What makes a passion 
“violent” is not its felt intensity, but its tendency to incite bodily movements.342 The 
person who possesses a delicacy of passion is prone to being moved by their passions.343  
                                                        
341 Hume, “Delicacy,” Essays, 3. The editor notes that “when Hume speaks here of a ‘delicacy of 
passion,’ he means a disposition to be affected strongly by the violent passions in the face of 
prosperity or misfortune, favors or injuries, honors or slights, and other accidents of life that lie 
beyond our control. What he here calls ‘taste’ – the sense of beauty and deformity in actions or 
objects – is also a passion, broadly speaking, but a normally calm one. A delicacy of taste is a 
keen sensitivity to beauty and deformity in actions, books, works of art, companions and such” 
(3-4n1). Hume also address the “delicacy of taste” in “The Standard of Taste,” Essays, 226-51.  
342 A differing, and prominent, interpretation of the distinction between calm and violent passions 
is found in Elizabeth S. Radcliffe’s recent work Hume, Passion, and Action (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 147-51. She notes that, “Hume defines the division between calm and 
violent passions in terms of the internal upheaval with which the passion is felt…violent 
passions…are known by their internal feeling, and are clearly identified as passions” (147). 
According to Radcliffe, Hume departs from Hutcheson in identifying “violence” with bodily 
motion. Because of the role the violent passions play in Hume’s discussion in “Of the influencing 
motives of the will,” I think that the claim to Hume distinctiveness is overstated.  
343 As Hume notes, “a passion is a violent and sensible emotion of the mind, when any good or 
evil is presented, or any object, which, by the original formation of our faculties, is fitted to excite 
an appetite” (A Treatise, 437). Hume stresses that “a calm passion may easily be chang’d into a 
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 Hume contrasts a delicacy of passion with a “delicacy of taste,” or a sensitivity to 
“beauty and deformity of every kind, as that does to prosperity and adversity, obligations 
and injuries.”344 In “Of the Standard of Taste,” Hume notes that the person of delicate 
taste is one whose “organs are so fine, as to allow nothing to escape them; and at the 
same time so exact as to perceive every ingredient in the composition: this we call 
delicacy of taste.”345 Drawing the analogy with our sense of taste, Hume notes that “a 
good palate is not tried by strong flavors; but by a mixture of small ingredients, where we 
are still sensible of each part, notwithstanding its minuteness and its confusion with the 
rest.”346 A savant can make “quick and acute” judgments of objects without 
deliberation.347 As he notes, “when objects of any kind are first presented to the eye or 
imagination the sentiment, which attends them, is obscured and confused…but allow him 
to acquire experience in those objects, his feeling becomes more exact and nice.”348  
 In the process of cultivating their taste, Hume argues that the delicate person 
develops a set of epistemic virtues that contribute to their impartiality.349 This suggestion 
has led scholars to work to construct a Humean notion of a “true judge,” or the ideal 
critic.350 Hume’s virtues of taste are not principally about a lack of bias, though being 
                                                                                                                                                                     
violent one, either by a change of temper, or of the circumstances and situation of the object, as 
by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion, by custom, or by exciting the imagination” 
(438). What makes a passion violent, as opposed to calm, then is simply its tight connection with 
desire or appetite, which exercises influence over the will (413-18).  
344 Hume, “Delicacy,” 4. 
345 Hume, “The Standard of Taste,” 235. 
346 Hume, “The Standard of Taste,” 236. 
347 Hume, “The Standard of Taste,” 236. 
348 Hume, “The Standard of Taste,” 237. 
349 Hume, “The Standard of Taste,” 238. 
350 For good examples of this literature, see: Wieand, “Hume’s Two Standards of 
Taste,” Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1984): 129–42; Stephanie Ross, “Humean Critics: Real or 
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unbiased is necessary for a judge. The virtues of taste are those which contribute to one’s 
fruitfully conversing with others, which allow one to refine their powers of observation 
and discernment. In this manner, the true judge is not only unbiased but sociable; they 
offer up provisional judgments of matters, knowing that they will be further refined by 
their fellows.351 Consider the following judgment: “Gerald is an unsociable sod: he 
pollutes the air around him with his unyielding cynicism.” Someone may remind me that 
Gerald’s mother died last year and, while my description of his conduct is accurate, my 
characterization of his motives is not. This acquaintance is not excusing Gerald’s 
behavior but providing further information so that I can make a reasonable judgment of 
him in light of this new evidence – a lesson that I can extend to other cases.  
 With the ability to make fine-grained judgments, and an openness to competing 
descriptions, the critic enjoys a broader scope of pleasures and pains than do most. Hume 
notes that a delicate taste “enlarges the sphere both of our happiness and misery and 
makes us sensible to pains as well as pleasure, which escape the rest of mankind.”352 He 
gives two examples of enlarging, one aesthetic and one moral. First, when a delicate 
person is presented with “a poem or picture…the delicacy of his feeling makes him be 
sensibly touched with every part of it; nor are the masterly strokes perceived with more 
exquisite relish and satisfaction, than the negligences or absurdities with disgust and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Ideal?,” British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (2008): 20–28; Galgut, “Hume’s Aesthetic Standard”; 
Baceski, “Hume on Art Critics”; James Shelley, “Hume and the Verdict of True Judges,” Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 71.2 (2013): 145–53. 
351 I would argue, further, that the lack of bias the true judge exhibits is based in their being 
properly sociable. Discussing this topic further goes beyond the aims of the chapter.   
352 Hume, “Delicacy,” 5. 
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uneasiness.”353 Second, for the delicate person, “a polite and judicious conversation 
affords him the highest entertainment; rudeness or impertinence…a punishment to 
him.”354 They find poorly constructed poems and unamiable company offensive, while 
the coarse person prefers ruder ways of spending their time. A problem with the coarse 
person’s indifference is he is not skeptical of his passions – he naturalizes them.  
 Take the example of someone who uses their free time to watch Bachelor in 
Paradise as opposed to developing a skill (gardening, martial arts, etc.). When receiving 
criticism from their fellows, this person may insist that they prefer watching television to 
other activities; people prefer different things and should not be criticized for their 
preferences. Hume responds that this person is giving their desires the veneer of 
authority. It is only because of the unrefined state of their character that this person finds 
developing a skill less preferable to spending their time in idleness. This point seems 
elitist on its face; however, the argument runs similarly regardless of one’s preferences. 
Hume does not seek to provide us with a hierarchy of preferences in his writings, though 
he argues that certain activities are preferable to delicate persons. What concerns Hume is 
the self-certainty that individuals display about their own intuitions and preferences prior 
to any self-cultivation. Without a delicate taste, we lack the desire to become more than 
whatever we currently are and we despise the suggestion that we should wish to be so.355 
                                                        
353 Hume, “Delicacy,” 5. 
354 Hume, “Delicacy,” 5. 
355 He quotes Ovid’s Epistualae ex Ponto [Letter from Pontus] immediately afterwards: 
“Ingennuas didicisse fideliter artes, Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros [A Faithful study of the 
liberal arts humanizes character and permits it not to be so cruel]” (2.9.47-48). Hume pursues this 
topic further in “Of Refinement in the Arts.” Here, he claims that “besides the improvements 
which they receive from knowledge and the liberal arts, it is impossible but they must feel an 
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 By cultivating a delicate taste, we learn to attend to the objects under 
consideration, focusing not on how it relates to our particular interests, desires, or aims, 
but on the features of the object itself. With this outward-facing focus on the objects, we 
recognize that the descriptions that we offer are provisional, and open to discussion with 
similarly-minded people. After all, one cannot decisively describe an object, whether a 
piece of music, a painting, or a person. Part of the descriptive process, for Hume, is 
comparative. Through experience we learn to describe objects and compare them with 
other objects, both like and unlike. Comparisons reveal new facets of an object and give 
us a new appreciation of the ways in which its features are unique or derivative. We are 
often made aware of these comparisons by discussing these matters with our fellows who 
have different experiences from our own. Over time, we come to see the joint judgments 
of delicate people as authoritative; we no longer take our own view to be paramount.  
 Because we distance ourselves from our own judgments in becoming delicate, 
Hume claims that we are less disposed to the influence of violent passions. We thereby 
begin to make the transition from delicacy of passion to delicacy of taste. As he notes, 
taste “improves our sensibility for all the tender and agreeable passions; at the same time 
that it renders the mind incapable of the rougher and more boisterous emotions.”356 How 
is this transition possible? As we saw previously, the “rougher and more boisterous 
                                                                                                                                                                     
encrease of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to each other’s 
pleasure and entertainment. Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, are linked together by an 
indissoluble chain” (Essays, 271). Hume sees no conflict between refinement and authenticity; 
there is a sense in which, for him, the self becomes realized through its engagement in the polite 
arts, the pleasures of conversation, and projects of mutual interest with others. Hume’s position 
reflects that of Shaftesbury: see, Michael B. Gill, “Shaftesbury on Politeness, Honesty, and 
Virtue,” New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today, ed. Patrick Müller 
(Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2014), 167-184. 
356 Hume, “Delicacy,” 6. 
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emotions” are associated with our own particular perspective – we feel very strongly 
when it comes to considering how an object impacts us. When we are considering 
something more abstract, like the joint judgments of delicate individuals, we feel, but in a 
tender way. Over time, our identity is tied up with the experience of more tender 
sentiments. This transformation is seen most clearly in the context of aesthetics. With art, 
Hume claims, “nothing is so improving to the temper as the study of the beauties, either 
of poetry, eloquence, music, or painting…the emotions which they excite are soft and 
tender.”357  
 Hume argues that the transition from violent passions to tender sentiments 
happens also in the context of morals. On the face of it, this view is difficult to establish. 
Consider the case of an immoral aesthete like Hannibal Lecter, who shows an 
appreciation for the finer things in life along with enjoying the suffering of his fellows. 
Further, consider the character, A, from Either/Or, whose aestheticism leads him to 
experience ambivalence about ultimate values. While one could dismiss the case of 
Lecter as an aberration, this seems too easy. The salient point about Lecter, which 
connects him to A, is the ambivalence, bordering on indifference, that results from their 
cultivated aesthetic distance. We often associate the moral perspective as an attached, 
concerned, concrete interest for our fellow beings. This degree of attachment seems to be 
at odds with the aesthetic perspective. Even worse, morality seems to require that we take 
the interests of others to be significant on an intuitive level. We cannot accept a high-
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minded ambivalence when it comes to persons, lest we end up undercutting the authority 
of those norms sanctioned by the common point of view.   
 The full response to this criticism cannot be offered until we consider the roles 
played by pride and conversation in establishing moral responsiveness. For now, it is 
enough to stress that, for Hume, delicacy consists not only in our distancing from violent 
passions but the cultivation of new sets of sentiments, produced by the perspective shift 
provided by delicacy. Judgments about another’s conduct is based one’s particular 
expectations. We might think, “how did this particular action impact me, or comport with 
my aims?” Because we are attached to our aims and desires more so than those of others, 
our response when another’s action conflicts with our own can be quite extreme. We 
might feel that anyone who acts in a manner discordant with our interests is our enemy or 
is otherwise not someone with whom we can identify. The problem is not that we make 
these judgments – after all, we ought not identify with malicious souls – but that we do so 
flippantly. When we begin to attend to conduct or characters, keeping our focus on 
matters of mutual interest, our correlative passions are less violent and determinative.  
 The passions that we experience when judging others from the common point of 
view are calm, measured, and provisional. Considerations of mutual interest are 
complicated; we cannot easily settle the degree to which some action or trait is useful or 
detrimental. These matters are complex, taking a great deal of time and experience to be 
properly managed. As “delicate” individuals, we are aware of these difficulties and 
conduct ourselves with the necessary caution, which is reflected in the passions that we 
experience. It is not enough for our passions to be calm, however, they must also be 
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informed by the conceptual distinctions found in the moral language, and grounded in a 
concern for the mutual interest. While Hannibal Lecter can successfully make fine-
grained distinctions about characters and conduct, the basis for his distinctions are not 
found in the common interest but his own desires and preferences. In his manner, Lecter 
has a great understanding of his own nature but very little about those who lie outside of 
himself, since he expresses little concern for anything, or anyone, that cannot be 
incorporated into a preexisting set of desires, preferences, and aims. 
 Cultivating delicacy requires the presence of other people. To be delicate in 
morals is to perceive with clarity and discernment the character and conduct of others, 
and to consider the ways in which they are either beneficial or detrimental to the moral 
community. But one cannot render proper judgments without experience, which is only 
amassed over time in conversation with similarly oriented individuals. The model for 
conversation is found in polite society, where one reflects on “human affairs, and the 
Duties of common Life, and to the Observation and Blemishes or Perfections of the 
particular Objects, that surround them.”358 Moral education begins with reading history 
and learning about the deeds of others, but we only become moral agents when we begin 
to use our capacities in concert with others to discuss the duties of common life. By 
learning to make our case, and to receive feedback, we come to appreciate how to 
properly judge characters. I turn now to consider the matter of conversation, and the way 
in which this moral responsiveness can only be developed alongside others.   
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The World of Conversation 
 We begin to see how this account of delicacy conduces to our responsiveness to 
norms legitimized from the moral perspective. If we conceive of the latter perspective as 
structured by the coordination of our shared interests, then moral deliberation is best 
modeled by the practice of polite conversation. Hume is unclear about how these 
conversations are meant to proceed. While he does not give us examples of these 
conversations taking place, he gives us an idea of how one might engage with others in 
this conversational context. Hume does so by providing us with a sketch of a person who 
engages in social life, tending to their duties, cultivating their degree of personal merit, 
and contributing to the well-being of the society of which they are a part.359   
 Throughout Hume’s writings, he draws a distinction between the academy and 
polite society. Hume most clearly draws the distinction between polite society and the 
academy in “Of Essay-Writing.”360 He claims that the world of learning, concerns itself 
                                                        
359 Consider Hume’s discussion of Cleanthes in Enquires, 269-70. Cleanthes is the model of 
“personal merit,” a concept that Hume seeks to unfold in the second Enquiry. Among the positive 
qualities that Cleanthes is said to possess, Hume notes that he is, first, “fair and kind” in his 
treatment of others; second, that his education and hard work will secure him the “greatest 
honours and advancement”; third, that he possesses “wit and good manners”; and fourth, that he 
possesses a “cheerfulness…[that] runs through the whole tenor of his life, and preserves a 
perpetual serenity on his countenance, and tranquility in his soul.”  
360 “Of Essay Writing” appeared only in the second edition of the Essays (1742), suggesting that 
Hume in some way disavowed its contents. That said, there are a number of reasons the essay 
could have been removed subsequent editions. Hume removed three unrelated essays for the third 
edition – “Of Essay Writing,” “Of Moral Prejudices,” and “Of the Middle Station of Life” – and 
replaced them with “Of National Characters,” “Of the Original Contract,” and “Of Passive 
Obedience,” all of which were interventions in contemporary debates. Removing the former three 
pieces suggests nothing more than that he wished to make room for the latter essays, which would 
be of public interest. Further, there is little in “Of Essay Writing” that Hume does not say 
elsewhere. Take the problem at the center of the essay: the disconnect between the world of the 
learned and the world of conversation. This is a theme throughout Hume’s work, and what led 
him to write the Essays, Enquires, and the History, to bridge the gap between polite society and 
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with “difficult Operations of the Mind, which require Leisure and Solitude”; while polite 
society, or the conversable world, involves “gentle Exercises of the Understanding, to 
obvious Reflections on human Affairs, and the Duties of common Life.”361 Hume argues 
that reflecting on the duties of common life “require the Company and Conversation of 
our Fellow-Creatures.”362 We cannot have a proper investigation of morality without the 
input of others who offer their sincere engagement. By conversing with others, Hume 
argues that we “bring Mankind together in Society, where every one displays his 
Thoughts and Observations in the best Manner he is able, and mutually gives and 
receives Information, as well as Pleasure.”363 The conversable world is therefore the 
cradle of our sociability and humanity.  
 Hume sees himself as the mediator between the “college and cells” and polite 
society. He is also a proponent of what he calls the l’Art de Vivre, or “the art of society 
and conversation.”364 While the rules of justice must be observed for society to exist, a 
community cannot come to exist without conversation and politeness. Through 
conversation, we learn to correct the natural vices of our nature. As Hume notes, “thus, as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the scholarly world. This theme also runs throughout the work of many of Hume’s major 
influences, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Kames, etc.  
361 Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” 533. Hume’s comments about “Colleges and Cells” (534) mirror 
Shaftesbury’s own in Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 3 vols., ed. Douglas 
Den Uyl (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 105. For Shaftesbury, conversation forges 
connections between people, combats ill-will, and gives content to our ideas of the good. Kames 
speaks of “the delicate pleasures of conversation, in communicating opinions, sentiments, and 
desires” and says of women, “the female sex have risen, in a slow but steady progress, to higher 
and higher degrees of estimation. Conversation is their talent, and a display of delicate 
sentiments: the gentleness of their manners and winning behaviour, captivate every sensible 
heart” (Lord Kames, Sketches on the History of Man, 3 vols., ed. James A. Harris (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 1997), I.41, I.116). 
362 Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” 534. 
363 Hume, “Of Essay Writing,” 534. 
364 Hume, “Of Civil Liberty,” 90-1. 
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we are commonly proud and selfish, and apt to assume the preference above others, a 
polite man learns to behave with deference towards his companions, and to yield the 
superiority to them in all the common incidents of society.”365 He returns to this point 
throughout the Essays, noting that “arts of conversation …leads us to resign our own 
inclinations to those of our companion, and to curb and conceal that presumption and 
arrogance, so natural to the human mind.”366 Similar to sympathy, conversation takes us 
outside of ourselves, forcing us to confront those more distasteful parts of ourselves and 
to engage with others on mutual footing with hopes of receiving their approval.  
 Consider the case of the zealot, who presumes to speak for humanity when he 
speaks only for the party to which he belongs. The zealot uses the words “odious,” 
“vicious,” fully expecting to “move some universal principle of the human frame, and 
touch a string to which all mankind have an accord and symphony.”367 However, his 
principles and partial sentiments cannot be endorsed by the party of humankind.368 The 
zealot’s delusion can be illustrated by the following four-step descent into disorder: first, 
the zealot presumes that his own sentiments are shared by everyone; second, this self-
assurance closes him off to the need to rely on others to form reasonable judgments; 
third, the zealot becomes unresponsive to the sentiments of humanity; fourth, acts of 
cruelty follow. To halt this descent, we must remove all obstacles for conversation and 
cultivate the desire in others to engage with their fellows about matters of mutual 
importance.  
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By shielding ourselves from malice, hatred, and the coolness of indifference, we 
become less prone to the fiery rhetoric of enthusiasts or to the gloom of the 
superstitious.369 We choose to speak from a perspective that can be equally adopted by 
others in polite society. What obstructs one’s ability to switch perspectives is 
righteousness stemming from challenging the moral principle that one has adopted.370 
Delicacy and conversation undercut this threat on two fronts. First, delicacy gives us 
access to a set of passions that undermine zealotry; these passions initially lack vivacity, 
but gradually become entrenched. Second, conversation reminds us that the moral project 
is undertaken with others: norms are provisionally adopted and justified from a common 
point of view. There is a worry that Hume cannot account for the entrenching of our calm 
sentiments, that they will always be overridden by violent passions. Still, all that he needs 
for the argument to work is the possibility that we can develop a disposition to be calm. 
We will then be disposed to look to our fellows, who will reinforce the authority of our 
calm sentiments and help remind us of our larger commitments.   
 At this point, we can return to the examples of Hannibal Lecter and A (from 
Either/Or). In both cases these figures are closed off, intentionally or not, to sincere 
commerce with their fellows. Though they are adept at drawing distinctions between 
characters and conduct, the basis on which these distinctions are made is problematic, 
being founded in their own particular set of interests. To the extent that Lecter or A 
recognize the existence of a common moral language that we use to offer our descriptions 
and judgments, they do not experience it as authoritative. This fact is attributable to their 
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not conversing with others. Were they to allow themselves to interact with others on an 
equal footing, treating their own ideas as provisional and the joint verdict of well-
meaning delicate people as paramount, the unsociability to which they are both prone 
would lose its allure. Of course, Lecter has the problem of being naturally malicious but, 
as I pointed out above, we are setting aside this fact for the sake of argument. Under the 
sway of his fellows, A would at the very least no longer be able to look himself in the 
mirror without feeling as if he had mistaken his own childishness for profundity.  
A Due Sense of Pride 
While the delicacy of taste is central to Hume’s understanding of our moral 
responsiveness, the story does not end here. To be responsive to moral considerations, we 
must see ourselves as invested in the social order that is regulated by these norms of 
usefulness. While moral responsiveness requires an attunedness to considerations of 
usefulness, it also requires that we identify with the moral scheme to which we are 
receptive, lest we experience it as an intrusion on our agency. As sensitive, imaginative, 
and sympathetic creatures, we are responsive to a great many things, not all of which we 
see as compatible with our ends. For Hume, the process of identification with the moral 
point of view is completed by way of our sense of pride, or our desiring to maintain a 
particular status in the eyes of others and ourselves. This status is tied to fulfilling our 
duties as sociable beings and to our being worthy of love and respect.  
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In the Treatise, Hume defines pride as a self-directed pleasure.371 Along with 
humility, pride plays a central role in his account of the passions.372 Particularly 
interesting is how pride relates to what Hume refers to as “love of fame.”373 We wish to 
have a positive view of ourselves, and because we are sympathetic creatures, we wish 
others to share in this judgment. As Hume notes, “our reputation, our character, our name 
are considerations of vast weight and importance.”374 We are concerned about how we 
appear to others, and are easily influenced by the opinions that others have of us. Because 
of this sensitivity to the judgments of others, we desire to appear praiseworthy in their 
eyes by regulating our conduct in accordance with shared standards:375  
“By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a name, a reputation in the 
world, we bring our own deportment and conduct frequently in review, and 
consider how they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard us. This 
constant habit of surveying ourselves…keeps alive all the sentiments of right and 
wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a certain reverence for themselves as well as 
others, which is the surest guardian of every virtue. The animal conveniences and 
                                                        
371 Hume, A Treatise, 277-79. He puts it somewhat differently in “Of the Passions,” saying that 
“Pride is a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment or possession, 
which we enjoy” (2.1).  
372 Pride is a central passion for Hume. For more on its role in his moral theory, see: Annette 
Baier, “Master Passions,” Explaining Emotions, ed. A.O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of 
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141 
pleasures sink gradually in their value; while every inward beauty and moral 
grace is studiously acquired, and the mind is accomplished in every perfection, 
which can adorn or embellish a rational creature.”376 
 
By learning to conduct ourselves in a praiseworthy manner, we gain a kind of respect for 
virtue, and begin to see vice and anything contributing to it as, in some sense, beneath us. 
We feel shame at the very thought of acting in a way contrary to the norms approved of 
from the common point of view. Through this process we then cultivate an identity as 
someone who has what Hume calls personal merit.377 We aspire to be someone who is 
praiseworthy in light of the norms of justice and politeness.  
 Still, there can be reasonable disagreement about which actions are properly just 
or polite, even given agreement about the authority of the norms themselves, or even 
about much of their content. Hume does not expect there to be complete consensus about 
the application of norms of justice or politeness – such is not the role of the moral 
language. Rather, through the mechanism of sympathy and our interactions with one 
another in civil society, the language and its rules of application begin to more 
consistently track characters and conduct in a way that allows for meaningful agreement 
between people. Given that people are sincerely engaged in conversation with their 
fellows about matters of mutual interest, disagreement does not undermine the validity of 
                                                        
376 Hume, Enquires, 276.  
377 Personal merit is the central concept of Hume’s later moral philosophy. In the second Enquiry, 
he aims to “discover the true origin of morals” by “analyz[ing] that complication of mental 
qualities, which form what, in common life, we call Personal Merit: we shall consider every 
attribute of the mind, which renders a man an object either of esteem and affection, or of hatred 
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the moral language but allows for further consensus and the progress of sentiments. In 
this way, Hume provides us with a model of moral conversation that allows for 
reasonable, productive disagreement between people about the mutual interest while still 
forming the basis of a sophisticated account of moral identity.  
 Why does our pride help us cultivate a practical identity consistent with the 
sociable virtues? Why does it not cause us push back against any blame that we receive 
or feel contempt for those who try to censure us? Hume notes that pride is associated with 
traits like “courage, intrepidity, ambition, love of glory.”378 But individuals who are 
possessed of such traits are not typically sensitive to the praise and blame of others – they 
often consider themselves to be above such matters, and choose to conduct themselves on 
the basis of internal principles. Many of the characters of history with whom we find 
ourselves fascinated, and whose deeds we contemplate, are seen as praiseworthy 
precisely because of their not having to rely on others.379 These individuals are often seen 
as having traits that fall under the “heroic” or “military” virtues.380 But if we approve of 
individuals who possess a pride that makes them less sensitive to the praise and blame of 
                                                        
378 Hume, A Treatise, 599.  
379 Consider Hume’s example of Alexander the Great, whose pride leads him to ignore the advice, 
and also the well-being, of others: “Go, says Alexander the Great to his soldiers, when they 
refus’d to follows him to the Indies, go tell your countrymen, that you left Alexander compleating 
the conquest of the world. This passage was always particularly admir’d by the prince of Conde, 
as we learn from St. Evremond. ‘Alexander,’ said that prince, ‘abandon’d by his soldiers, among 
barbarians, not yet fully subdu’d, felt in himself such a dignity and right of empire, that he cou’d 
not believe it possible any one cou’d refuse to obey him. Whether in Europe or in Asia, among 
the Greeks or Persians, all was indifferent to him: Wherever he found men, he fancied he had 
found subjects’” (A Treatise, 599).  
380 Hume expresses ambivalence about military virtue, saying that: “heroism, military glory, is 
much admir’d by the generality mankind. They consider it as the most sublime kind of merit. 
Men of cool reflexion are not so sanguine in their praises of it” (A Treatise, 600-602). See also: 
Enquires, 249; 259; 337.  
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others, how can we say that it is connected to our responsiveness to the dictates of 
morality? At best, it would seem that pride does not play an essential role in this process, 
but is only sometimes related, while at other times it is absent.  
 Though human beings are disposed to have what Hume calls an “over-weaning 
conceit” of themselves, he distinguishes this from a due pride, which he thinks is 
necessary for personal merit: “tho’ an over-weaning conceit of our own merit be vicious 
and disagreeable, nothing can be more laudable, than to have a value for ourselves, where 
we really have qualities that are valuable.”381 The difference between “over-weaning 
conceit” and a due “value for ourselves” turns on the extent to which we possess those 
traits seen as valuable from the common point of view. Though Hume is not wholly 
consistent with his terminology, we might think of over-weaning conceit as vanity; on 
this construal, vanity is blameworthy whereas pride is praiseworthy.382 From our own 
perspective, pride “makes us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a confidence and 
assurance in all our projects and enterprizes.”383 Although someone may be possessed of 
qualities that are admirable, it is pride that “acquaints” us with these qualities and gives 
us occasion to “know our own force.”384 He argues that it is this awareness of our 
abilities, provided they are worthy of merit, that gives us the necessary “boldness” and 
“good opinion of ourselves” to move confidently through the world.385  
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 Hume stresses that people are often suspicious of “self-applause,” since it is seen 
as a sign of vanity.386 In response, we develop and adopt rules of polite conversation to 
govern our expressions of pride. By learning to express our pride in a tenor that is 
agreeable to others, we experience it differently and see certain manifestations of pride as 
merited and others as unmerited. Those merited expressions of pride are met with praise 
by others.387 One might respond: just because we learn to express our pride differently 
does not mean we come to feel differently. We may choose to moderate our pride in light 
of prudence. Still, other people revel in our merit, provided it is expressed in the right 
way.388 Also, not every person is expected to moderate their pride in the same way. The 
degree to which it is appropriate to express our pride depends on our “rank and station in 
the world, whether it be fix’d by our birth, fortune, employments, talents, or 
reputation.”389 And this makes decent enough sense: it would be improper to express a 
great deal of pride on account of occupying a station that fortune secured for us. Our 
awareness of this fact should naturally shape our idea of what we see as a reasonable 
degree of pride to express.390 
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given us such a prejudice against self-applause, that we are apt to condemn it, by a general rule, 
wherever we meet with it; and ‘tis with some difficulty we give a privilege to men of sense, even 
their most secret thoughts” (Hume, A Treatise, 598). 
387 “The world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride, which secretly animates our conduct, 
without breaking into such indecent expressions of vanity, as may offend the vanity of others” (A 
Treatise, 600).  
388 Hume, A Treatise, 599.  
389 Hume, A Treatise, 599.  
390 I don’t want to make too much of this point. After all, Hume does not distinguish between 
merit and demerit on the basis of agential responsibility. See: Hume, “Of Some Verbal Disputes,” 
Enquires, 312-23. 
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 Because “the world naturally esteems a well-regulated pride,” we seek to become 
worthy of esteem.391 We wish to not only be seen as good by others, but to be able to see 
ourselves as honorable. We can see how pride ties into matters of delicacy. To be of a 
delicate nature is to be sensitive to moral distinctions and to consider them as 
authoritative over our conduct. This enables us to engage in productive conversations 
with our fellows and to negotiate our interests for the purposes of living well together. 
Our pride makes us conscious about how we appear to others, brings home their praise 
and blame to us, and compels us to conduct ourselves in a manner so as to receive the 
former and to avoid the latter.392  We are conscious of the possibility of unmerited praise, 
and approve of those traits constitutive of personal merit, so we wish to be seen in a 
positive light and to form ourselves in a way as to be the object of merited praise. It is 
also true that a life possessed of personal merit, which involves conducting ourselves in a 
manner consistent with both the rules of justice and politeness, is the happiest one.  
 I have completed my interpretation of Hume. I discussed how sympathy opens us 
to the emotions of others, and how our interdependence leads us to adopt a language to 
regulate our conduct for the purposes of living together. Our sympathy and commerce 
with others results in the development of a moral language that tracks the interests of a 
group while still allowing for diversity, historically and culturally. By speaking this 
language, we learn to take on a perspective different from our own and consider actions 
                                                        
391 Hume, A Treatise, 600. 
392 “‘Tis necessary to fell the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate 
our actions accordingly. And shou’d it be said, that prudence may suffice to regulate our actions 
in this particular, without any real pride, I wou’d observe, that here the object of prudence is to 
conform our actions to the general usage and custom” (Hume, A Treatise, 599).  
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and characters in terms of their being either beneficial or detrimental, generally speaking. 
In this way, usefulness serves as the moral standard that overcomes the problems found 
in Hutcheson’s and Shaftesbury’s thought. In this section, I considered the authority that 
this standard exercises over us. Hume thinks of agents as responsive to the demands of 
morality, provided they are delicate and moderately prideful. His account of moral 
authority is found in this story of how we develop these latter features.  
 
 
Delicacy, Contempt, and Partiality 
 In this chapter, I have examined the writings of Gay and Hume as they pertain to 
the problem of partiality. Gay extends the empiricist aspects of Locke’s method to ethics, 
a topic on which scholars have often found Locke’s views wanting. One subject on which 
Gay differs from Locke nowhere considers the potential of people’s motives to be shaped 
positively through association, so that they learn to act in a reliably moral fashion. Gay 
argues that people come to recognize that their own happiness is tied up with the 
universal happiness; once these ideas are fused in thought through association, people 
learn to guide their conduct in light of this happiness. In other words, people naturally 
become utilitarians, according to Gay. The story is more complicated for Hume, and 
involves pride and the capacity of taste. However, the lesson is largely the same: human 
nature is to a large degree malleable. If people are guided by the right standard, 
usefulness, they can learn to overcome their partial tendencies with a little effort, at least 
in a great many cases. 
 We end up back at the problem of partiality. Just because a person’s motives are 
malleable does not mean that they are either as malleable as Hume assumes or that this 
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malleability, if possible, is even desirable. Given that there is a natural limit to how much 
we can extend our concern or love, any moral theory that requires universal benevolence 
will run afoul of our psychology. Even given time, and an optimistic reading of how 
significant a change we can make to our motivational scheme, either through the means 
of association or by way of discussion and the cultivation of delicacy, there is still a 
question of whether this change would have unfortunate consequences. Consider the 
delicate person whose family largely consists of vulgar individuals. This person’s high-
minded contempt would likely override any bonds of affection that would otherwise lead 
him to appreciate his family, even given their faults. Unless his family were to consist of 
mostly cruel people, we might judge this person to be heartless and moralistic. 
 The delicate person seems exceedingly arrogant, not being able to bear the 
presence of those not similarly fashioned. As Hume notes, “polite and judicious 
conversation affords him [the delicate person] the highest entertainment; rudeness or 
impertinence is as great a punishment to him.”393 Being presented with coarseness, either 
in affection or conduct, this person is filled with “disgust and uneasiness.”394 Uneasiness 
and disgust are repelling passions for Hume. When we feel them, our aim is to remove 
ourselves from their presence. If we are threatened by the course person, our uneasiness 
may give rise to contempt or malice, and lead us to desire their destruction. Hume 
presents the delicate person as sociable, as someone who takes joy in being surrounded 
by and conversing with their fellows. But when we consider the passions that the delicate 
person feels for those unlike himself, we can see that Hume’s story is more complicated. 
                                                        
393 Hume, “Delicacy,” 5.  
394 Hume, “Delicacy,” 5. 
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The delicate person desires company and concord but only insofar and they can partake 
in similar passions and conduct.  
 Few people are delicate, according to Hume, though he holds out hope that no 
person is incapable of developing this capacity. Delicate persons will band together to 
form a faction of their own. In the previous chapter, I discussed Cockburn’s criticism of 
Shaftesbury as an aloof elitist whose ethical writings had little to offer common people. 
Though Hume is hardly an aristocrat, his delicate person may as well be. If conversation 
is a significant component to our commitment to morality, and those most delicate do not 
wish to be with others not like themselves, there is a two-fold worry. First, coarse persons 
will not have the opportunity to develop properly; second, delicate persons will become 
increasingly insular and self-certain, which breeds zealotry and enthusiasm. If Hume’s 
invocation of the common point of view is meant to combat faction and its offspring, his 
appeal to delicacy and refinement to ensure that we are committed to the moral 
perspective appears to undo the work he does by putting the moral standard into place.   
 In the next chapter, we consider a different solution to the problem of partiality, as 
presented by Joseph Butler and Adam Smith. These figures place greater faith in our 
natural moral responses. For Gay and Hume, we should be suspicious of our workaday 
commonsense moral intuitions. This distrust is a legacy of Locke’s writings. For him, our 
moral ideas are fabrications, being the result of custom and the principles of association. 
Because these ideas are not grounded in facts about reason, the world, or even ourselves, 
there is substantive disagreement about moral matters. The only hope for agreement we 
have, for Locke, is to find an external standard to which we can all assent. Gay and Hume 
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share this view and spend a great deal of time in their writings trying to account for the 
ability to cultivate dispositions that can block our otherwise partialist tendencies. Hume 
thereby leaves us with a picture of the moral agent that is not all that different than 
Shaftesbury’s enthusiast, who is inoculated from the dangers of faction and malice, but 
who considers himself to be above much of the business of common life. 
 Butler and Smith are dubious of this account of moral agency. They argue that the 
suspicion Gay and Hume have regarding our local, partialist sentiments is without 
justification. For Butler and Smith, our local sentiments provide us with the only 
evidence we have regarding how to conduct ourselves. It is these very sentiments, 
whether love, pity, or benevolence, that form the basis of our connections to others and 
underwrite our commitment to our duties to ourselves, to others, and to God. Absent the 
evidence provided to us by these local sentiments, we are left without a sense of what is 
proper or even why facts about propriety and merit matter. Gay and Hume thereby strip 
away the authority of our partial sentiments, and seek to replace them with more refined 
and idealized attitudes. Butler and Smith restore the standing of local our sentiments in 
ethics. In doing so, they also provide a more adequate solution to the problem of 
partiality. Not all expressions of partiality are virtuous. But we cannot find a proper 
criterion for determining the reasonable scope and limits of partiality if we do not allow 
for our local sentiments to have the authority befitting of our frame.   
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AN ETHICS OF PARTIALITY: JOSEPH BUTLER AND ADAM SMITH 
 
 In Chapter II I discussed one potential solution to the problem of partiality, as 
presented by Gay and Hume. For both, we make room for reasonable partiality by 
showing how commitments to our near and dear motive us to act for the common good. 
The account of our growth from beings with minimal other-regard into moral agents – 
that is, persons who treat justice and politeness as authoritative over their conduct – is 
complicated. Gay and Hume, give a powerful impartialist response to the problem of 
partiality. In this chapter, I turn to an alternative, partialist solution to the problem of 
partiality, found in the writings of Joseph Butler and Adam Smith.  
 Butler and Smith see impartiality as functioning within the scope of a 
fundamentally partial moral theory. For them, our duties are to be understood in terms of 
the relations we bear to those in our “little department.”395 Our sentiments – compassion, 
resentment, shame, etc. – guide us in  discharging these duties. While Gay and Hume 
argue that our sentiments are trustworthy insofar as they motivate us to act in accordance 
with moral norms, Smith and Butler consider them to be normatively action-guiding. 
Butler and Smith are certainly concerned about impartiality, but they think about it less in 
terms of principles in light of which we ought to regulate our conduct and more in terms 
of practices of self-regulation that ensure that self-deception does not lead us astray. A 
central concern for Butler and Smith is not that love will cause us to act immorally but 
                                                        
395 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985), VII.ii.1.44. 
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that we will allow our commitment to an impartial moral principle to silence our natural 
sentiments.  
 I have divided this chapter into six parts. First, I examine Butler’s views about the 
passions, conscience, and of our duties to our near and dear. Second, I discuss his 
concerns about self-deception and its connection to the injunction to love God. I argue 
that there is a fundamental tension in Butler’s theory between two seemingly 
authoritative moral standards: one that is provided by our sentiments and the other by 
God. Butler’s view ends up being a version of Christian Stoicism. Third, I turn to Smith’s 
critique of Stoicism. Fourth, I explore Smith’s account of reasonable partiality. I argue 
that Smith is a skeptical moralist, who holds that morality consists of non-overlapping 
spheres of duty governed by sentiments that cannot be captured by any one principle. 
Fifth, I consider how Smith views the relation between nature and philosophy. I end with 
a discussion of Smith’s method, and how he conceives of the nature of ethics.  
 
The Supremacy of Our Passions 
 Joseph Butler (1692-1752) was best known in his time for publishing two works: 
Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (1726/1729) and The Analogy of Religion, 
Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature (1736).396 In the 
Analogy, Butler establishes the reasonableness of belief on the basis of probabilistic 
reasoning about the natural world and the structure of our moral natures. The Analogy is 
most remembered for its two appendices: “Of Personal Identity,” which provides an 
                                                        
396 For a great background on the composition and contents of the Fifteen Sermons, see: Bob 
Tennant, Conscience, Consciousness and Ethics in Joseph Butler's Philosophy and Ministry 
(New York: Boydell, 2011), 38-75. 
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argument against Locke’s account of personal identity, and “A Dissertation Upon the 
Nature of Virtue,” a truncated version of his ethical theory, which also includes a notable 
critique of act-utilitarianism. Butler’s Fifteen Sermons cover a variety of topics, including 
conscience, self-deception, resentment, and our proper relation to God. The sermons were 
aimed at the members of the Court of Chancery, whom the Rolls Chapel served, which 
was charged with weighing considerations of equity against common law to ensure that 
equity was applied in a manner consistent with conscience.397  
 Butler argues that virtue consists in following one’s nature. The Sermons are 
meant to explain “what is meant by the nature of man, when it is said that virtue consists 
in following, and vice in deviating from it.” 398 To undertake an investigation of human 
nature, one must determine “what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their 
economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, 
which is correspondent to this whole nature.”399 There are three components of the 
“inward frame”: conscience, self-love and benevolence, and the passions.400 Each of 
these “internal principles” plays a role in enabling us to fulfill our moral natures.401 
Butler thinks of these principles as hierarchically ordered under conscience, or the 
                                                        
397 For more on this historical background, see: Aaron Garrett, “Bishop Butler on Bullshit” 
(unpublished); Aaron Garrett, “Reasoning about morals from Butler to Hume,” Philosophy and 
Religion in Enlightenment Britain, ed. Ruth Savage (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
169–186; David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 71-87; Theodore 
Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010), 675-710.  
398 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons & other writings on ethics, ed. David McNaughton (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2017), Preface.13, p.5. 
399 Butler, Preface.12, p.5 
400 Butler, Preface.14, p.6 
401 Butler, Sermon 1.4, p.18 
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“principle of reflection,” by which agents “approve and disapprove their own actions” 
and provide negative reinforcement for that conduct which conflicts with our nature.402  
 Benevolence and self-love are dispositions that lead us to approve of our own 
happiness and that of others; conscience ensures that our internal principles are 
functioning properly; the passions direct our conduct and motivate us to act. For Butler, 
the passions serve as the only “principles of action,” in that they direct us towards 
particular objects and afford us the motivation to pursue them. I take it that his claim is 
much stronger than Hume’s view about the motivational inefficacy of reason. Hume 
argues that our sentiments, when functioning correctly, motivate us to act in accordance 
with the ends set by justice and politeness. I claim that, for Butler, the passions not only 
motivate us to act morally but provide us with the ends of morality. To understand this 
claim and its implications for his views about partiality, I turn to Butler’s treatment of 
compassion.403  
                                                        
402 Butler, Sermon 1.8, p.19. Butler uses the following example to helpfully differentiate between 
the roles of these internal principles: “thus a parent has the affection of love to his children: this 
leads him to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them: the natural affection leads 
to this: but the reflection that it is his proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and 
commendable to do so; this added to the affection becomes a much more settled principle, and 
carries him on through more labor and difficulties for the sake of his children, then he would 
undergo from that affection alone” (Sermon 1.8, p. 20). There are puzzles about how to construe 
Butler’s claim that conscience possesses a natural supremacy over the other internal principles, 
about how self-love and benevolence are related to one another, and if a regard to our own self-
interest is sufficient to secure virtue morally. For a rundown of the major points of debate in 
Butler scholarship, see: David McNaughton, “Butler’s Ethics,” The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 377–392; Aaron 
Garrett, “Joseph Butler’s Moral Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/butler-moral/#ConPriHumNat>. 
403 The topic of compassion is understudied in the Butler scholarship. One exception is Terence 
Irwin’s The Development of Ethics: Volume II: From Suarez to Rousseau (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 476-557 
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The Aim of Compassion 
 While every passion contributes to private and public good, certain passions have 
a “primary intention and design” that belong to our “public or social capacity.”404 There 
are two such passions: joy in the happiness of another and compassion in their distress. 
Compassion is a response to another’s suffering that motivates us to ameliorate whatever 
situation is responsible for bringing the suffering about.405 Butler notes that “compassion 
is a call, a demand of nature, to relieve the unhappy; as hunger is a natural call for 
food.”406 While we at times are compelled to turn away from distress, he claims that this 
reaction “when it is in our power to relieve them, is as unnatural, as to endeavor to get rid 
of the pain of hunger by keeping away from the sight of food.”407 Butler recognizes that 
our lives are spent attending to our personal affairs, so when we are faced with real 
misery we require “an advocate in us on their behalf, to gain the unhappy admittance and 
access, to make their case attended to.”408  Such is the role of compassion in our nature. 
 Butler takes up the idea that reason is sufficient to motivate moral action – “is it 
not better to do this from reason and duty? Does not passion and affection of every kind 
perpetually mislead us?”409 He responds that without the passions we are lacking a 
                                                        
404 Butler, Sermon 5.1, p.46 
405 Butler is careful to distinguish a “real sorrow and concern for the misery of our fellow 
creatures,” from “some degree of satisfaction from a consciousness of our own freedom from that 
misery” a reflection on “our own liableness to the same or other calamities” (Sermon 5.n1, p.52). 
By doing so Butler attempts to distance his own view of compassion from that of Hobbes, who 
maintains that it is nothing more than an imaginative concern for our own safety. Interestingly, 
Butler does admit that most instances of compassion include a sense of relief due to our having 
escaped a similar fate, but he maintains that this relief is not compassion, strictly speaking.  
406 Butler, Sermon 6.6, p.56 
407 Butler, Sermon 6.6, p.56 
408 Butler, Sermon 6.6, p.56 
409 Butler, Sermon 5.3, p.47 
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“sufficient principle of action,” noting that “reason alone, whatever anyone may wish, is 
not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as man.”410 Only when 
reason is “joined with those affections which God has impressed upon his heart: and 
when these are allowed scope to exercise themselves, but under  strict government and 
direction of reason; then it is we act suitably to our nature.”411 I return to this point about 
reason directing the passions; for now, it is crucial to see that, for Butler, to disregard our 
passions’ natural aims is a “violation of and breaking in upon that nature and constitution 
that he [God] has given us.”412 He worries about individuals who are “over-refined” in 
their moral views. When reflective beliefs have been allowed to trump natural affections, 
people fall “into errors, which no one of mere common understanding could.”413  
  Compassion allows “reason and conscience will have a fair hearing.”414 We often 
adopt beliefs that harden our hearts. While developing these beliefs may be useful for 
protecting ourselves from undue stress, Butler thinks we often run the risk of 
overcorrecting our compassionate responses. For Butler, as for Mandeville and Rousseau, 
compassion is a disarming passion.415 Our experience of it is meant to stop us in our 
                                                        
410 Butler, Sermon 5.3, p.47 
411 Butler, Sermon 5.3, p.47 
412 Butler, Sermon 5.3, p.47 
413 Butler, Sermon 5.15, p.51 
414 Butler, Sermon 6.12, p.59 
415 See: Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits, Vol. 1, ed. 
F.B. Kaye (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988), 169-181. Mandeville’s tale of the lion here is 
particularly instructive (176-181). Mandeville remarks the following about our custom of eating 
meat: “I have often thought, if it was not for this Tyranny which Custom usurps over us, that Men 
of any tolerable Good-nature could never be reconcil’d to the killing of so many Animals for their 
daily Food, as long as the bountiful Earth so plentifully provides them with Varieties of vegetable 
Dainties. I know that Reason excites our Compassion but faintly, and therefore I would not 
wonder how Men should so little commiserate such imperfect Creatures as Crayfish, Oysters, 
Cockles, and indeed all Fish in general: As they are mute, and their inward Formation, as well as 
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tracks. Compassion leads us to reconsider how we are conducting ourselves and whether 
we are meant to alter our behavior. This passion shakes us out of complacence to allow 
our general good-will and benevolence to flow more freely.  
The Role of Conscience  
 The position I have been forwarding regarding Butler’s moral theory is rather 
heterodox – I argue that the passions, as opposed to conscience or our dispositions to self-
love or benevolence, tell us what we ought to do. To make this case clearer, I have to say 
more about conscience, self-love, and benevolence. Butler does say that conscience, or 
the principle of reflection, is supreme in his account of the inward frame of man; so how 
are we to understand this claim and to render it consistent with my argument?416 In 
Sermon VIII, Butler mentions that, by tracing a passion “up to its original,” we may “see, 
what it is in itself, as place in our nature by its Author; from which it will plainly appear, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
outward Figure, vastly different from ours, they express themselves unintelligibly to us, and 
therefore ’tis not strange that their Grief should not affect our Understanding which it cannot 
reach; for nothing stirs us to Pity so effectually, as when the Symptoms of Misery strike 
immediately upon our Senses…But in such perfect Animals as Sheep and Oxen, in whom the 
Heart, the Brain and Nerves differ so little from ours, and in whom the Separation of the 
Spirits from the Blood, the Organs of Sense, and consequently Feeling it self, are the same as they 
are in Human Creatures; I can’t imagine how a Man not hardened in Blood and Massacre, is able 
to see a violent Death, and the Pangs of it, without Concern” (173). Rousseau holds similar views 
about the impact of custom on our naturally compassionate tendencies. See: Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, “Second Discourse,” The ‘Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. Victor 
Gourevitch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 152-54, 166-67. 
416 The literature on Butler’s account of conscience is extensive. See : Nicholas L. Sturgeon, 
“Nature and Conscience in Butler’s ethics,” Philosophical Review 85.3 (1976): 316-356; Amélie 
Rorty, “Butler on Benevolence and Conscience,” Philosophy 53 (1978): 171-184; Stephen 
Darwall, “Conscience as Self-Authorizing in Butler's Ethics,” Joseph Butler’s Moral and 
Religious Thought: Tercentenary Essays, ed. Christopher Cunliffe  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 209-241; R.G. Frey, “Butler on Self-Love and Benevolence,” Butler’s Moral and 
Religious Thought, 243-268; Thomas Hill, “Four Conceptions of Conscience,” Nomos XL 
(1998): 13–52; Sahar Akhtar, “Restoring Joseph Butler's Conscience,” British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 14:4 (2006): 581-600; Terence Irwin, The Development of Ethics, 476-557; 
Aaron Garrett, “Butler to Hume.” 
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for what ends it was placed there.”417 Further, “when we know what the passion is in 
itself, and the ends of it, we shall easily see, what are the abuses of it.”418  
 Butler mentions that “passion or appetite implies a direct simple tendency towards 
such and such objects, without distinction of the means by which they are to be 
obtained.”419 Take compassion. Perhaps there is no reasonable way to relieve my friend’s 
misery. Butler notes that “it will often happen there will be a desire of particular objects, 
in cases where they cannot be obtained without causing injury. Conscience interrupts, and 
disapproves their pursuit in these circumstances.”420 Let us say that my friend’s misery 
can only be temporarily satiated by us destroying private property. Compassion may then 
lead me to engage in harmful and imprudent behavior. Reflection will thereby disapprove 
of destroying property because doing so will not fulfill the natural aim of compassion, 
and will come into conflict with good-will and benevolence. Conscience therefore 
ensures that the correct means to the ends proposed by our passions are taken.  
 The other role of conscience is to help weigh our passions.421 As Butler points 
out, “the several appetites, passions, and particular affections, have different respects 
                                                        
417 Butler, Sermon 8.3, p.69 
418 Butler, Sermon 8.3, p.69 
419 Butler, Sermon 2.13, p.31 
420 Butler, Sermon 2.13, p.31 
421 Akhtar, “Restoring Butler’s Conscience,” disputes whether this is a role of conscience, and 
claims there is another “capacity” in human nature responsible for weighing the “power, motives 
and intentions to determine whether we are living according to our internal principles” (582). I 
take it that Butler’s account of conscience is ambiguous; it refers both to the snap judgments we 
make in situations of serious moral import, and to the weighing of motives we do in our “cool 
hours.” This may lead us to be unsatisfied with Butler’s account of conscience. I suggest the way 
out of disappointment is to downgrade the importance of conscience in his moral theory. Once we 
appreciate that, for Butler, our passions do the primary normative work we become less 
concerned with the precise role of conscience in the theory. We should be happy to know that 1) 
our sentiments are teleologically structured; 2) there is a natural ordering of our sentiments; 3) 
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amongst themselves. They are restraints upon, and are in a proportion to each other. This 
proportion is just and perfect, when all those under principles are perfectly coincident 
with conscience, so far as their nature permits, and it in all cases under its absolute and 
entire direction.”422 Butler’s point is that our “frame” (i.e. the composite of our passions 
and capacities) naturally balances the passions. Anger gives us courage for self-defense 
and the motivation to punish those who have acted unjustly.423 Anger can be carried to an 
excessive degree, becoming settled resentment, but our good-will, benevolence, and 
compassion often block established resentment. We may feel anger that our friend has 
again canceled plans at the last minute, but our compassion will temper this anger, 
allowing us to remember that she has been busy as of late and is experiencing a great deal 
of stress. Each passion naturally balances the other. When this proportion between 
passions is “just and perfect,” conscience approves of our conduct. However, as we know 
from experience, the passions often need assistance to achieve this balance.  
 Butler thinks of conscience as a magistrate that condemns actions with the aim of 
reforming behavior; the manner by which it seeks to reform behavior is shame.424 He 
                                                                                                                                                                     
this ordering is determined by our ability to fulfill the duties associated our station; and 4) we 
possess a reflective capacity that both informs us when the ordering is off and gives us the ability 
to set things right.  
422 Butler, Sermon 3.2, n.1, p.37 
423 See also: Charles L. Griswold, Forgiveness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
Ch. 1; Ernesto V. Garcia, “Bishop Butler on Forgiveness and Resentment,” Philosophers’ Imprint 
11.10 (2011): 1–19; Linda Radzik, “Joseph Butler on Forgiveness,” Vergebung: Philosophische 
Perspektiven auf ein Problemfeld der Ethik, ed. Johannes Brachtendorf and Stephan Herzberg 
(Munster: Mentis, 2014), 139–147; Martha Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, 
Generosity, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 24-88.  
424 Smith gives shame a similar role in his theory. See: TMS II.ii.13; III.i.16-18; III.i.73; III.i.99; 
III.i.105, etc. For recent accounts of the role of shame in morality, see: Gabriele Taylor, Pride, 
Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); 
Martha Nussbaum, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame and the Law (Princeton: Princeton 
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notes, “shame; a man can as little doubt whether it was given him to prevent his doing 
shameful actions, as he can doubt whether his eyes were given him to guide steps.”425 
The role of conscience here is recognize that some passion has gone beyond its limit – 
that it has interfered with another passion – and to inform us of this imbalance. If the 
imbalance of passion has led us to act, we feel shame. The role of shame is to get us to 
stop and reflect on the balance of our passions. Perhaps our anger at our friend on 
account of her cancelling has led us to type out an unamiable text message; conscience 
will step in and inform us that this would be ill-fitting with the aims of good-will and the 
love that we feel for our friend. We might feel ashamed at having considered sending the 
text but more ashamed were we to have sent it – in the first case, conscience stops an 
action; in the second case, it attempts to ensure that it will never happen again.   
 Let us take stock. According to Butler, virtue consists in following our nature. 
Our nature is threefold, consisting of the passions, self-love and benevolence, and 
conscience. By way of self-love and benevolence, we possess stable desires for the 
happiness of ourselves and others. Our passions are designed to secure the desires of self-
love and benevolence. While the passions possess natural ends, they come into conflict 
with one another. To function properly, we require some means by which to balance our 
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passions with each other as well as with self-love and benevolence. Conscience plays this 
role – reflecting on the republic of our passions and ensuring there is peace.  
Love of Others – The Little Department 
 Butler includes two sermons on our duties to others. The first of these is dedicated 
to the supposed conflict between self-love and our love of others. In the second sermon, 
Butler turns to the question of how we are to love our neighbor. According to him, love 
manifests itself as a “disposition to produce happiness.”426 He distinguishes between four 
sorts of happiness: universal love, love of mankind, love of one’s country, and love of 
one’s neighbor. Regarding universal happiness, Butler notes that “man is so much limited 
in his capacity...and as we are not used to consider things in so general a way; it is not to 
be thought of, that the universe should be the object of benevolence to which creatures as 
we are.”427 Butler argues love of mankind assumes an “object too general and very much 
out of our view.”428 Even public spirit is only applicable to those “men of public stations 
in the character of a patriot,” which is “speaking to the upper part of the world.”429  The 
proper object of love is then our neighbor, or those near and dear. 
 Butler differentiates three senses by which we ought to love our neighbors as 
ourselves: first, that we “bear the same kind of affection to our neighbor, as we do to 
ourselves”; second, that the love we bear to our neighbor should have “some certain 
proportion or other” to self-love; third, that the love we have for ourselves and our 
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neighbor should “bear the particular portion of equality, that it be to the same degree.”430 
Regarding the first, Butler notes that we should at the very least “cultivate the affection of 
good-will to our neighbor” and that it should influence us to have the same regard for him 
that we have for ourselves. We ought to “appropriate to ourselves his good and welfare; 
to consider ourselves as having a real share in his happiness.”431 Butler is not insisting 
that we begin to see our interests and those of our neighbor as indistinguishable. Rather, 
he argues that the “imperfection of nature, and state we are in” falsely contributes to the 
idea that our interest is at odds with our neighbor’s interests.432 By cultivating good-will 
for them, we help to undercut this pernicious and impactful fiction.433  
 Butler treats the “due love of our neighbor” as a “general temper of mind.”434 The 
first aspect of this temperament is a “readiness to forgo our right for the sake of peace as 
well as in the way of compassion.”435 Compassion may lead us to act in ways that go 
beyond justice. Perhaps the recipient of our good-will is not deserving of it, either 
because we are not in a position to assist them, or because their state is the result of their 
own negligence or viciousness. As this attitude to “forgo our right” is a direct 
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consequence of “love and good-will,” this should tell us something about the lexical 
priority of love and justice for Butler. Though he wants our attempts to contribute to 
other people’s happiness to be constrained by justice, this is only relevant when 
discussing the general happiness, as opposed to those associated with our “neighbour, 
parent, master, magistrate,” etc.436 Love of our neighbor requires that we set aside desert. 
Instead, we should attend to those around us, reducing their suffering and contributing to 
their happiness whenever it is possible to do so, within the constraints of our own powers.  
 Butler argues that if we attend to the immediate tendency of neighborly 
benevolence “it will teach us, that the care of some persons, suppose children and 
families, is particularly committed to our charge by Nature and Providence; as also there 
are other circumstances, suppose friendship or former obligations, which require that we 
do good to some, preferably to others.”437 While we should cultivate good-will towards 
all, it is dangerous to consider the scope of our duties as extending beyond the little 
department. We are not competent judges of what produces happiness for all; we must 
approach these cases with caution. As Butler notes, “reason, considered merely as 
subservient to benevolence, as assisting to produce the greatest good, will teach us to 
have particular regard to these relations and circumstances; because it is plainly for the 
good of the world that they should be regarded.”438 In other words, reason is subservient 
to benevolence and we do well by the world when we attend to our little department.  
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An Ethics of Partiality 
 Our obligation to cultivate good-will towards others compels us to help them 
when we are in a position to do so while also simultaneously preventing us from 
engaging in cruelty. However, when it comes to promoting the happiness of others, our 
efforts should be directed at our loved ones, family, friends, and benefactors. Butler gives 
three reasons for this: the structure of the passions themselves; the limits of our 
knowledge about which actions produce happiness for those outside our little department; 
our place in the system of nature and our relation to God. I examined the first point in the 
last section; I discuss the second point here, leaving the third to the next section.  
 Butler is seen by many as an anti-utilitarian thinker on the basis of his “A 
Dissertation of the Nature of Virtue,” the second appendix to his Analogy of Religion 
(1736).439 Butler notes that “we have the capacity of reflecting upon actions and 
characters, and making them an object to our thought: and on doing this, we naturally and 
unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of 
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good-desert; and disapprove others, as vicious and of ill-desert.”440 He argues that 
experience bears this out; we approve and disapprove of an action based on its qualities 
and not its consequences. Butler also thinks we distinguish between virtue and vice and 
speak of their discernment in terms of a reflective capacity: “conscience, moral reason, 
moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or 
as a perception of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both.”441 
 The aim of the “Dissertation” is to examine the contours of this capacity. Of 
particular importance is Butler’s claim that “benevolence and the want of it, singly 
considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice. For if this were the case, in the 
review of one’s own character or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense 
would be indifferent to every thing, but that the degree in which benevolence prevailed, 
and in which it was wanting.”442 Conscience recognizes the value of veracity and justice 
without considering the extent of these actions to increase happiness. Butler takes aim at 
the “careless readers” of Hutcheson who imagine “the whole of virtue to consist in singly 
aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in 
the present state.”443 God’s nature is directed to promote happiness but humans do not 
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share this aim, otherwise conscience would perceive no conflict between happiness and 
justice and veracity. Conscience shows us that we are meant to pursue other ends as well.  
 It is important to remember that, for Butler, conscience functions immediately, 
approving and disapproving of actions before we even have the opportunity to reflect on 
their consequences. God gives us this capacity so that we do not have to weigh the 
potential impact of every action before choosing one. We rarely have the luxury to 
undertake these sorts of calculations and cannot be sure we are any good at such 
calculating, even given the requisite time. As Butler points out: 
 Though it is our business and our duty to endeavour, within the bounds of 
 veracity and justice, to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness 
 and diversion of our fellow-creatures: yet from our short views, it is greatly 
 uncertain, whether this endeavor will in particular instances, produce an 
 overbalance of happiness upon the whole; since so many and  distant things must 
 come into account.444  
 
Knowing which actions promote the greater good requires knowing how our actions will 
impact everyone’s well-being, not simply those individuals who make up our little 
department. Even worse, Butler points out, many cases where people shirk duties for the 
sake of increasing happiness proceed from “ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect 
principle, concealed perhaps in great measure from persons themselves.”445 Since people 
cannot be trusted to know themselves, they should not neglect their duties on the basis of 
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abstract moral standards like universal happiness. We are also limited regarding our 
ability to know, and therefore promote, the general happiness and so our attempts should 
be constrained to our near and dear.446  
 I discussed how we come to learn about the nature and scope of our duties by 
looking at how our sentiments push us towards certain objects and repel us from others. If 
we are honest with ourselves, and willing to constrain ourselves in light of the aims of 
our sentiments, we see that (a) we should work to alleviate the suffering of others, full 
stop; (b) we should promote the happiness of others when we are in a position to do so; 
(c) we should promote the happiness of those in our little department, full stop; (d) we 
should care for ourselves so that we can manage (a), (b), and (c) successfully. Regarding 
the conflict between the duties, Butler thinks that (c) trumps (b) but not necessarily (a). 
While Butler does not believe that (a) and (c) will come into conflict, there are reasons to 
believe that our chief duty is compassion, so that if we were in a position to help our 
father or relieve the suffering of a stranger, we ought to help the stranger. Settling this 
means entering into complications that go beyond the scope of this chapter.447 
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 Butler and Hume disagree about which forces constitute the largest threat to 
morality. For Hume, the dominant concern for morality is factionalism that arises from 
accepting principles of action that are opposed to the common point of view. For Butler, 
the concern is that we deceive ourselves; that we silence our sentiments on account of 
their conflict with our narrow self-interest. Butler thinks the problem of self-deception is 
systemic, so much that we can even quell our own conscience. The only way to get 
around this problem is to cultivate a love for God so that we are brought closer to our 
nature. However, as we will see, Butler’s solution to the problem of self-deception ends 
up leading us further from our nature. It seems that by loving God, we silence the very 
sentiments that we are trying to save by cultivating this love. 
 
Getting Out of Our Own Way 
 Given that our passions direct us to moral ends, and reflection settles all conflict 
between them, it seems the problem of partiality has been solved. But this is too easy. 
There are three ways for our passions to go wrong on Butler’s view: through (a) a conflict 
of the passions; by (b) not being honest with ourselves about where our passions are 
leading us; and (c) suppressing our passions by committing to moral principles that are 
anathema to our inner frame. In this section I will examine (b) and (c) by discussing 
Butler’s discussion of self-deception in Sermon VII and X and his Sermons preached in 
the House of Lords (1740). I end the section by considering our role in the system of 
nature as children of God, the attitude called for by this role, and how it informs us about 
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Butler’s ethics. This sets up my discussion of Smith, who eschew Butler’s views about 
love of God while keeping the substance of his moral theory.  
Self-Deception and the Problem of Hypocrisy 
 Butler refers to self-deceit as the most “melancholy reflection.”448 As he points 
out, “many men seem perfect strangers to their own characters’”449 How are we to 
understand self-deception?450 Butler says “there is plainly, in the generality of mankind, 
an absence of doubt or distrust, in a very great measure, as to their moral character and 
behavior; and likewise a disposition to take for granted, that all is right and well with 
them in these respects.”451 People shy away from reflecting on their character to avoid 
shame. Butler distinguishes self-deception from the pedestrian way that people distort 
their sentiments, like those “men of pleasure,” who choose pleasure over their greater 
interest.452 For Butler, inattention to our self can be general – “a general ignorance of 
themselves, and wrong way of thinking and judging in every thing relating to 
themselves” – or particular, confined to passions like ambition or covetousness.453 
 In some ways, being partial to particular aspects of one’s personality is more 
worrying than the case of general self-deception; people can use reflection on certain 
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aspects of their character to shield themselves from its unsavory aspects. As Butler notes, 
“there is such a thing as men’s being honest to such a degree, and in such respect, but no 
further…such general and undistinguishing censure of their whole character…confirms 
them in their self-deceit. They know that the whole censure is not true, so they take for 
granted that no part of it is.”454 Say that you are a jealous person, prone to distrust of 
others, even those with whom you are close. However, you are also a generous person – 
you go out of the way to do favors for others. It is likely that your generosity, when 
mixed with jealousy, makes it so that your benevolence is wrapped up with a need to gain 
fealty from others. You use generosity as a shield to avoid facing your jealousy, saying 
“look, I am a good person – see all the things I do for others.”  
 Partial honesty entrenches the inconsistency between a person’s judgments of 
himself and that of others. The person’s commitment to think well of himself is 
strengthened by his knowledge that he does possess laudable qualities. He has a desperate 
need to protect his own reputation for fear that these traits be exposed as a farce. In turn, 
this leads to a kind of self-assurance that further strengthens his negative judgments of 
others. This holds even in pedestrian cases; for example, many of us have experience 
with individuals who are constitutionally impatient but who cannot stand impatience in 
others. Butler is more concerned with those instances where the vices in question are 
problematic, and the judgments of others severe, though the structure is the same in both 
cases. He argues that there is a worry with some vices that the person may develop a 
“hardness of heart with respect to others,” which can lead one to engage in any and all 
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forms of wickedness and injustice, and what he refers to as “oppression,” the worst of all 
evils.455 
 Oppression, for Butler, consists in the rigid application of principles to censure or 
punish others without a “merciful, a liberal, a kind and compassionate” spirit.456 This is 
not to say that justice is not principally important for the functioning of society. Butler 
suggests that only those individuals who are fundamentally self-deceived would apply a 
principle of justice so rigorously that it admitted of no other considerations, even of 
mercy.457 Justice and mercy are two sides of the same coin, according to Butler. Failing 
to treat another person with compassion can only proceed from one’s inability to see this 
person as anything less than hateful. To maintain this stance, it would have to be assumed 
that one acted with the authority of God himself, as Balaam did when he heeded the call 
of Balaak to curse the Israelites.458 Surely, to act with this assumed authority in a way 
that is forbidden by God – without compassion – requires a fair amount of mental 
gymnastics but is nonetheless something of which we humans are capable.  
 In this way, Butler thinks of self-deception along the lines of a self-forgetting. He 
gives the example of the “extravagant person” who spends themselves into ruin, despite 
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knowing that “their expenses so far exceeded their income.”459 Think of someone who 
continually charges items to his credit card without having the money to make his 
monthly payments. Perhaps this person knows that he is imprudent but does not care. 
Butler rejects this explanation, suggesting instead that the person does care about his 
unfortunate state and that it is precisely this concern that causes him to turn away from its 
cause. While I cannot close my eyes, plug my ears, and forget that An Autumn Afternoon 
is playing on my television, I can willfully forget about my credit card statement by 
distracting myself. As Butler points out, “it is as easy to close the eyes of the mind, as 
those of the body: and the former is more frequently done with willfulness…than the 
latter; the actions of the mind being more quick and transient, than those of the 
senses.”460 This self-forgetting may take the form of drinking or drug use; it may also 
express itself through more productive means, like writing an article or a book.   
 Self-forgetfulness and an oppressive spirit come together in interesting ways for 
Butler.461 Were it not for the negative impact that self-deception has on how we interact 
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with and treat others, he would likely see it as a silly, unfortunate, but ultimately harmless 
propensity. The self-deceived person characteristically lacks the proper suspicion of their 
motives and dispositions – they act with a kind of single-minded self-assurance that is 
easily observable to others, on account of its blatant hypocrisy. Butler notes, “whilst men 
are under the power of this temper…they are fortified on every side against conviction: 
and when they hear the vice and folly of what is in truth their own course of life…they 
will often assent to us…persuading themselves that they are out of the case, and that it 
hath no relation to them.”462 Take the example of a local businessman who extolls the 
virtues of fairness and humanity while cheating his customers and upselling his products. 
When the case of the businessman’s hypocrisy is made by an onlooker, Butler says he 
will likely double down on the values of fairness and humanity while re-describing his 
own actions in this manner.   
 The redescription of one’s acts fits nicely with an oppressive spirit. After all, the 
oppressor does not think of himself as such; he considers himself to be just. As Butler 
points out, “tyranny…unjust wars, and persecution, by which the earth has been laid to 
waste; all this has all along been carried with the pretense of truth.”463 He refers to this 
veneer of justice as “justest satire upon what has in all times been carrying on under 
it.”464 We misconstrue the tyrant when we refer to him as capricious; such a person acts 
on principle but appeals to mistaken principles and clumsily applies them. On Butler’s 
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view, the only justifiable moral principles are those derived from the functioning of our 
sentiments. Few of these principles give a single overriding reason to act – they are meant 
to be balanced against one another, with context determining which principle will receive 
the most weight in a circumstance. If we attend to our inner frame, we will still make 
mistakes about the weight of particular principles, but we will never act with the sort of 
self-certainty indicative of oppressive behavior.  
 Considering the danger of self-deception, Butler does not give us many tools to 
combat it, short of telling us to be watchful of our own character and to put ourselves in 
other people’s shoes before acting.465 But as we saw in the discussion of oppression, self-
deception can take the form of a refined “deep and calm source of delusion” that can 
survive the most vigilant inspection of one’s character.466 After all, if one commits to a 
set of principles and if this commitment means sacrificing humane sentiments for some 
other end, then the proponent can see this as an unfortunate but ultimately justifiable 
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result. Butler thinks that the only solution to this problem is to cultivate a greater love for 
God, which will put us in closer touch with our station and its corresponding duties.  
Love of God – Submission and Ignorance 
 Butler’s comments on self-deception create problems for his moral theory. His 
theory becomes even more fraught when we consider his views about loving God. Butler 
claims that the “whole of piety and virtue” is encapsulated in the duty to love our 
neighbors and to love God.467 I maintain that, for Butler, while we should cultivate 
feelings of compassion and benevolence towards our fellow human beings, we should 
never lose sight of the fact that “the present world is not our home,” and our chief duties 
are those related to our station of servitude of God.468 I argue that, once we pay mind to 
Butler’s comments about the love of God, what appears to be an intuitive and partialist 
moral system threatens to collapse into a Christianized Stoicism, like with Hutcheson. 
This view gives us two conflicting standards with which to deliberate: first, our frame 
(passions, dispositions, conscience, etc.) and our relation to others; second, our relation to 
God. The second, for both Butler and Hutcheson, seems subservient to the first, which 
puts us in a self-effacing relationship with our sentiments.  
 While our family members are the proper objects of our love, we may not hold 
any of them up as exemplary. When it comes to individuals of merit, we consider them 
with a loving esteem, provided that we are properly attuned to virtue: “to be a just, a 
good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a peculiar affection to or love of justice, 
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goodness, righteousness, when these principles are the objects of contemplation.”469 
Added to the fact that all “superior excellence of any kind...is the object of awe and 
reverence to all creatures,” Butler concludes that we love those who embody traits of 
which our frame approves, especially when they are expressed more perfectly than in 
ourselves.  
 When it comes to our relation to God, Butler shifts from talk about love to piety, a 
distinct attitude. For him, love includes a component of well-wishing that is unnecessary, 
if not improper, when it comes to how we think about God. That said, according to 
Butler, piety seems to be the relevant love-like relation we ought to have to God. Piety is 
expressed in two ways; as a “resignation to the divine will, which is the general temper 
belonging to this state; which ought to be the habitual frame of our mind and heart”; 
second, as “acts of devotion,” which are meant to be “exercised at proper seasons.”470 He 
claims that “human nature [is] formed to compliance, yielding, submission of temper,” 
which means that when we encounter something of great value that we do not yet 
possess, we “suspend our desires after it.”471 Exemplary persons become objects of awe 
and reverence. When our love is directed at God, the result is a resignation of will:  
 “Nature teaches and inclines us to take up with our lot: the consideration, that the 
 course of things is unalterable, hath a tendency to quiet the mind under it, to beget 
 a submission of temper to it. But when we add, that this unalterable course is 
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 appointed and continued by infinite wisdom and goodness; how absolute should 
 be our submission, how entire our trust and dependence?”472 
 
In the case of a person, our will may be suspended to some degree, giving way to a 
contemplative respect that provides further reasons to, at the very least, not taint the value 
of this revered object. In the case of God, our resignation “may be said to be perfect, 
when our will is lost and resolved up into his.”473 When we cede our will to God, we 
become an agent of his divine will. In terms of the first aspect of piety, Butler stresses 
that we ought to “acquaint ourselves with God, and be at peace.”474 The result of this 
temper is a kind of tranquility that cannot otherwise be experienced in this life.  
 Piety consists in the “actual exercise of those affections towards God, which are 
supposed habitual in good men.”475 Virtue involves acting in accordance with our nature; 
our dispositions of self-love and benevolence form our background propensities; our 
passions direct us to the pursuit of objects that conduce to these propensities; reflection 
informs us of the proper means for achieving this end. Compassion, good-will, 
resentment, etc. have people as their proper objects. Butler argues that we can determine 
the ends of our passions by observing how they function in everyday life. This 
knowledge is collected and implemented by reflection and deliberation. However, he 
changes his tune about the passions in Sermon XIV, saying that we should “withdraw 
from the avocations of sense…to yield ourselves up to the influence of the divine 
presence, and to give full scope the affections of gratitude, love, reverence, trust and 
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dependence; of which infinite power, wisdom and goodness, is the natural and only 
adequate object.”476 We ought to love, revere, and trust God in a way that makes 
subservient the aims given to us by our sentiments regarding our fellows beings. 
 Sermon XIV puts Butler’s comments on ignorance in a new light. Near the end of 
the Sermons, Butler gives a different view of our station: “our condition in this world is a 
school of exercise for this temper [resignation and submission]: and our ignorance, the 
shallowness of our reason, the temptation, difficulties, afflictions, which we are exposed 
to, all equally contribute to make it so.”477 If this world is a “state of discipline and 
improvement,” we ought to improve ourselves in light of some goal, which seems to be 
resignation and submission to God. However, resignation does not consist in following 
one’s nature as constructed, shoring it up against the dangers of self-deception. We are 
instead meant to fashion our nature – to silence those passions that tie us to this world 
and keep us from hearing the voice of God. But are these two aims not at odds with each 
other? How can we be true to our nature when doing so means remaking ourselves?  
 In the final Sermon, “Upon the Ignorance of Man,” Butler leaves us with four 
reminders about our knowledge of the world. First, we cannot expect to be able to plumb 
the depths of reality. Second, this temper of ignorance is the proper response to all 
apparent injustices that seem to result from the nature of things. We can know with great 
certainty that God exists and that he is good – any perceived problem we find in nature is 
the result of our own ignorance. Third, given our natural state, we should seek the 
regulation of our manners and faculties in light of the aims for which we were created. 
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Lastly, we should cultivate gratitude for that being who stands above us. It is the third 
point that presents problems for Butler. If we follow the ends set by our passions, we 
have the basis for a sophisticated and intuitive partialist theory of morals. If we redirect 
these passions to God, we end up with an ethics that undercuts much of what Butler says 
in the earlier Sermons and he ends up closer to Stoicism than expected: 
“In all lowliness of mind we set lightly by ourselves: that we form our temper to 
an implicit submission to the Divine Majesty; beget within ourselves an absolute 
resignation to all the methods of his providence, in his dealings with the children 
of men: that, in the deepest humility of our souls, we prostrate ourselves before 
him, and join in that celestial song; ‘Great and marvellous are thy works, Lord 
God Almighty; just and true are thy ways, thou King of saints: who shall not fear 
thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name.”478  
 
 Butler reminds us to “to govern and regulate out passions, mind, and affections” 
with an eye to following our nature; to free ourselves from those ill-tempered passions, 
self-deception, and the untoward selfishness so inimical to virtue.479 Doing so ensures our 
happiness in this life and in the life beyond. This manner of self-discipline means truly 
coming into our own. Butler gives us a beautiful vision of the moral life. That said, there 
is the aforementioned tension in his moral theory. Which normative standards are 
authoritative – those which concern our relations to others, or our relation to God? I do 
not think Butler ever resolves this tension. Admittedly, there are important philosophical 
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questions about how to weigh the duties associated with our various stations, theological 
or not. Butler identifies a tension that many of us feel in our moral lives.  
 
Smith and the Science of Sentiment 
 Our discussion of Smith begins with the recognition of a tension in Butler’s 
ethics. For Butler, our sentiments provide us with crucial information about how to 
conduct ourselves. We are meant to care for the good of our little department. With the 
help of our conscience and the use of rules to correct for the dangers of self-deception, 
this task is one that can be managed by most human beings. Though Butler argues 
strongly for constricting our moral concern to those in our little department, he also ends 
the Sermons by considering our duties to God. Some of what we are called upon to do for 
God seems at odds with the cultivation of love for those near and dear. While God does 
not require that we cast off our concern for our little department, taking our relation to 
God seriously shifts the normative standard to God as opposed to our frame. The result is 
a tension in our identity. How can we wholeheartedly commit to the good of others when 
we know that the wellspring of our station lies beyond this earth? 
 Adam Smith (1723-1790) follows Butler to a large degree in the content of his 
moral theory. Smith’s account of the impartial spectator, and his description of how it 
develops as a tool for individuals, is closely connected to Butler’s view of conscience. 
Butler and Smith both place greater trust in our natural sentiments than do either Gay or 
Hume, and argue that the source of normativity lies therein. Both figures claim that moral 
rules should play a secondary role to sentiment-directed judgment. Smith follows Butler 
in claiming self-deception is the chief roadblock to virtuous conduct. In short, there is 
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significant overlap between their ethics. What Smith avoids with his theory is the 
aforementioned tension that Butler creates by shifting the source of moral value from our 
sentiments to God. In Smith’s work, we get a fully-formed solution to the problem of 
partiality. The remainder of this chapter sketches his proposed solution.  
 Before illustrating Smith’s solution to the problem of partiality, it is important to 
lay out some basics of his moral theory. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/1790), 
he sets out to answer two questions: first: “wherein does virtue consist? Or what is the 
tone of temper, and tenour of conduct, which constitutes the excellent and praise-worthy 
character?”; second, “by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, 
whatever it may be, recommended to us?”480 We can differently express these questions 
as follows. First, what makes another person, or ourselves, an object of esteem and 
approval? Second, what explains our tendency to carve the world up in moral terms; or in 
terms of conduct being proper and improper, responses to conduct being merited and 
unmerited, etc. These are questions about moral psychology – Smith is interested in 
which mechanisms account for our making moral judgments and the grounds on which 
we take ourselves to be making them. In other words, Smith is observing the contours of 
our nature and using this investigation as the basis of his moral science.  
 In TMS VII, Smith examines the moral thought of figures that he considers 
important for understanding his own moral theory. Smith frames his discussion around 
the two aforementioned questions, laying out the different answers one might offer and 
categorizing different figures accordingly. To the first question, Smith thinks there are 
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three potential answers: someone is an object of our esteem insofar as their conduct is 
either proper (Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Shaftesbury, among others), prudential 
(Epicurus), or disinterestedly benevolent (Cambridge Platonists and Hutcheson); To the 
second question, Smith considers four possible options: moral distinctions are made on 
account of our own self-love (Hobbes, Mandeville), reason (Cudworth and Clarke), the 
moral sense (Hutcheson), or a sentiment such as sympathy (Hume).   
 Smith characterizes his own view as a propriety theory – we approve and 
disapprove of characters on account of their conduct and affections being proper, given 
their station in life and the circumstances in which they find themselves. TMS I and II are 
largely dedicated to explaining what it means for an action or affection to be proper. He 
distinguishes between two kinds of propriety: propriety proper, which concerns one’s 
affections (i.e. whether one has the correct attitude in some circumstance) and merit, 
which refers to one’s conduct (i.e. whether one has acted correctly). In both cases, 
propriety is determined by sympathy, or the concordance we experience with an agent’s 
affection or with the affection of those individuals who are impacted by the agent’s 
action. When it comes to the second question – explaining our tendency to carve up the 
world morally – Smith puts himself alongside Hume as one who argues that our 
propensity to approve of certain characters, and to disapprove of others, is explained in 
terms of our sympathetic capacities. Sympathy thereby leads us to make moral 
distinctions and determines the content of our moral categories.  
 By eschewing the role that God plays in guaranteeing the normativity of our 
sentiments, Smith furthers Butler’s solution to the problem of partiality. For Smith, we 
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have no recourse other than our sentiments. What distinguishes Smith from figures like 
Gay and Hume is that he thinks regulating our sentiments with an impartialist principle 
like utility leads us to have a problematic relation to the needs of those with whom we are 
naturally concerned. For Smith, the source of moral value lies in these relations and not 
in an external principle. Smith recognizes the problem of partiality; further, he 
acknowledges that faction and bias present concerns for any moral theory. Smith argues 
that by paying mind to our sentiments and to how they bond us to others, and by heeding 
the dangers of self-deception, we do justice to our natural partialities while correcting for 
our factionalist tendencies. Smith holds that we can avoid these concerns by being honest 
with ourselves, and by finding others to keep us honest.  
 One might at this point be concerned that Smith puts undue faith in our 
sentiments. Perhaps Smith is naïve or relies on God as the source of value after all – that 
the existence of a creator secures the normativity of our sentiments. In this case, there 
would be little to separate Smith from Butler, and Smith’s ethics would produce the same 
tension that we have been discussing throughout the chapter. While a consideration of 
Smith’s religious belief goes beyond the aim of this chapter, I will consider an alternate 
interpretation, whereby he is able to avoid the problems of Butler’s ethics. On my 
reading, Smith is a skeptic. He argues that our sentiments, with the help of reflection and 
other aspects of our frame, give us the only proximate evidence we have regarding how 
we should conduct ourselves. To look outside our nature – to God, the universe, or other 
abstract sources of value – is to lead ourselves astray, the result of which will be, at best, 
a fractured moral identity; at worst, widespread conceit and cruelty. 
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The Dangers of Stoicism 
 In TMS VII, Smith examines different moral theories he considers to be 
significant, for understanding his own theory. 481  Smith dedicates almost half the 
discussion to the Roman Stoics (Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, in particular), whose 
writings enjoyed a resurgence post-Renaissance in Europe. A number of figures treated in 
the dissertation – principally Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler – can be seen as 
operating in Stoic tradition. Throughout the dissertation, I have pointed to a tension in 
each of their views, namely, their acceptance of two conflicting normative standpoints: 
our human frame and God (or nature, for Shaftesbury). Smith sees this tension as native 
to Stoicism and develops his own theory in response. Smith argues that the standpoint of 
nature is epistemically unattainable for human beings: we cannot know what nature calls 
upon us to do. Further, when we claim to possess this knowledge, we express a conceit 
that distances us from the only normative standard to which we have access: our 
sentiments. Through this process, Smith argues, we weaken our connection to our little 
department, thereby creating the tension in our moral identity found in Butler, 
Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson. 
 Smith’s discussion of Stoicism in TMS VII is framed by their doctrine of suicide, 
according to which it is proper to commit suicide insofar as one is called upon to do so by 
nature. It is notable that Smith uses the doctrine of suicide to frame his criticism of Stoic 
moral theory, as the topic comes up only rarely in Marcus Aurelius’ and Epictetus’ 
writings. Still, Smith argues, in this doctrine we clearly see the tension in Stoicism 
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between the acceptance of two conflicting normative standards. As this tension is found 
in Butler, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, and Smith developed his theory in response, we 
must turn to his discussion of the Stoics to understand the character of his moral theory. 
We begin where Smith suggests – with the discussion of suicide. 
Stoicism – Epistemic Concerns 
For the Stoics, the propriety of suicide is determined by the extent to which one’s 
existence adds to the prosperity of the universe. As Smith points out:   
 
“The prosperity of the whole should, even to us, appear preferable to so 
insignificant a part as ourselves…if, indeed, any opportunity of extricating 
ourselves should offer, it became our duty to embrace it. The order of the 
universe, it was evident, no longer required our continuance in this situation, and 
the great Dictator of the world plainly called upon us to leave it, by clearly 
pointing out the road which we were to follow…we might be assured [that our 
doing so] tended most to the prosperity and order of the whole, which was what 
we ourselves, if we are wise and equitable, ought most of all to desire” (TMS 
VII.ii.1.18).482 
The Stoic’s duty is to support the “order of the whole” and to commit suicide only if he is 
no longer in a position to provide this support. But to determine the propriety of suicide, 
he must first know the role that he occupies in the system of nature, the duties associated 
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with this role, and his ability to fulfill them. As Epictetus notes, “you are an actor in a 
play the character of which is determined by the Playwright…if He wishes you to play 
the part of a beggar, remember to act even this role adroitly; and so if your role be that of 
the cripple, an official, or a layman. For this is your business, to play admirably the role 
assigned to you.”483 The first step is to identify one’s assigned role. 
 We might take Epictetus literally when he refers to one playing the role of 
official, beggar, or citizen, and think of these stations as being populated with positional 
duties that one is expected to fulfill. If one is born an aristocrat and acts in a way that 
brings shame on one’s family – say, by currying the favor of a foreign despot – it is 
proper to commit suicide, particularly if it is requested by someone of stature. The 
disgraced aristocrat can no longer fulfill his role in society on account of his sullied 
reputation.484 Smith’s discussion of suicide in TMS VII centers on the loss of one’s social 
position. He is thinking of cases where someone’s honor has been besmirched.  
 But there is a problem. One occupies a number of roles with overlapping duties. 
Perhaps the aristocrat is also a father – is he allowed to abscond from his fatherly duties 
on account of his embarrassment? Further, often pride lurks behind these supposedly 
honorable means of safeguarding one’s position: “under the Emperors this method of 
dying seems to have been, for a time, perfectly fashionable…we find an account of 
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several persons who chose to die in this manner, rather from vanity and ostentation, it 
would seem, than from what would appear, even to a sober and judicious Stoic, any 
proper or necessary reason.”485 In committing suicide, the Stoic, hardly acts like a “sober 
and judicious” spectator, tending to the duties of their station. Smith balks at the idea that 
reputation is relevant to determining whether to commit suicide, claiming that were the 
Stoic to enter into the “views of the great Superintendent of the universe,” the “complete 
approbation of his own breast” should be significant to comfort him.486 
 For Smith, this epistemic gap between ourselves and nature creates a tension in 
the Stoic’s view. Perhaps one could appeal directly to the system of nature; such an 
appeal might take the form of a rational intuition that one is no longer of use to nature. 
Smith argues that achieving this degree of knowledge is impossible, as “sublime 
speculations” about one’s place in nature are beyond the “narrowness of our 
comprehension.”487 As we cannot look to the universe to be our guide, we should seek 
the approval of the impartial spectator.488 Our only access to the “exquisite and divine 
beauty” of moral perfection is through one’s “observation upon the character both of 
himself, and of other people” and the work of moral progress.489 To determine whether 
one should commit suicide, the Stoic must attain a perspective that is unattainable.  
 The Stoic must instead rely on a moral exemplar to set the standard of propriety 
for suicide. But, as is clear in Seneca’s work, there are two different standards for proper 
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suicide – one for the sage and another for the rest of us.490 The sage possesses all 
knowledge concerning matters virtuous, vicious, and indifferent, and is not bothered by 
illness, poverty, or any other external impediments to their will.491 While Seneca means 
for the sage to be our model, he is aware that most people are fearful of death. For those 
of us non-exemplars who wish to be free of weariness, there is always suicide.492 But 
even in these conditions, the sage might reason that “if the body is useless for its duties, 
why wouldn’t it be appropriate to escort the failing mind out the door?”493 The sage 
might comfort themselves: “that flesh will never drive me into fear…I shall never show 
‘respect’ for this paltry body. When I see fit, I shall dissolve my partnership with it.”494  
 So what makes the sage’s decision to commit suicide proper? For Seneca, when 
the sage commits suicide, he chooses to exit life but does not flee from it out of fear or 
cowardice.495 The sage’s decision to commit suicide is not determined by emotions that 
bind his will.496 Seneca treats the difference between the sage and others as an internal 
one. But Smith argues that few people fit the model of the sage, meaning that virtuous 
suicide will be open to a few.497 Even for the sage, the standard of propriety is on shaky 
ground, not only because they may be acting pridefully, but since the decision to do so is 
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meant to proceed from a recognition of an external standard: that they can no longer 
perform their duties.498 After rejecting a conventional standard of propriety, Seneca offers 
the standard of the sage, who is meant to provide guidance about when committing 
suicide is proper. But the latter fails to give us guidance about when to end our lives.     
Absent a workable standard of propriety for suicide, the decision to commit 
suicide boils down to deciding whether life is worth enduring. Smith notes that, for the 
Stoics, “there neither was nor could be any evil in death; and that, if their situation 
became at any time too hard for their constancy to support, the remedy was at hand, the 
door was open, and they might, without fear, walk out when they pleased.”499 If one 
simply walks out when one pleases, one implies that the only relevant standard when 
deciding to commit suicide is the desire to not live. Seneca even suggests that being fed 
up with life is a sign from nature that one should end it: 
 
“Life is not always something to hang onto. Our good does not consist merely in 
living but in living well. Hence the wise person lives as long as he ought to, not as 
long as he can. He considers where he will be living, and how, and with whom, 
and what he will be doing…If he encounters many hardships that banish 
tranquility, he releases himself. Nor does he do so in a time of need; rather, as 
soon as he begins to have doubts about his fortunes, he makes a careful 
assessment to determine whether it is time to quit.”500 
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If one’s life is troublesome, it follows that one is justified in committing suicide. But if 
Stoicism requires that one submit to the system of nature, then suicide should be 
prohibited: any situation can be overcome by understanding that it, while unfortunate 
from one’s own perspective, is in fact necessary to the system of nature.  
Stoicism – Moral Concerns 
The Stoic is epistemically immodest when he claims to know the conditions under 
which it is proper to end his life. In directing focus towards the system of nature, the 
Stoic diverts his attention away from its proper object: the “little department” he 
occupies.501 Two consequences follow from this epistemic immodesty. First, the Stoic 
becomes less receptive to the sociable affections directed at his little department and to 
the commitments that flow from it. Second, the Stoic cultivates an excessive degree of 
self-estimation, in the form of pride, which exacerbates the first problem – thereby 
further obscuring the question of when it is proper for one to commit suicide.  
When the Stoic focuses his attention on the system of nature, he treats himself and 
those related to him as components of this system.502 As Marcus Aurelius points out: 
 
“Let my first conviction be that I am part of a Whole, which is under Nature’s 
 governance; and my second, that a bond of kinship exists between myself and all 
 other similar parts. If I bear those two thoughts in mind, then…being a part...I 
 shall cheerfully accept whatever may be my lot. In the second place, inasmuch as 
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 there is this bond of kinship between myself and my fellow parts, I shall do 
 nothing that might injure their common welfare.”503 
 
Instead of collapsing the spheres of natural moral concern, Smith argues that Stoicism 
calls on us to cultivate unhealthy attitudes towards our “little department,” so that even 
when we act on their interests, we do so for the wrong reasons.504 For the Stoic, the 
obligations we have to others are captured by the relation they bear to us. Instead of 
engaging with others in their particularity, the Stoic interacts with them as parts; their 
individuality is subsumed under the relation they bear to the Stoic within the system of 
nature.505 The obligations I have concerning my father are specific to the fact that he is a 
father and I am his child – although I might have different obligations to him qua rational 
human being.506 When I consider my obligation to my father, I look to his desires, goals, 
and our shared history when deciding what I owe him. By using an abstract relation as a 
guide for how to act, Smith argues that Stoicism replaces our sentiments with an 
idealized set of attitudes that destabilize morality.507 
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 For Smith, the Stoic does not properly relate to his little department. He treats his 
near and dear as objects of beneficial conduct or sources of obligation, as opposed to 
wellsprings of love or solace, which require a degree of vulnerability to others that is not 
recommended by the Stoics.508 Without vulnerability, one cannot enter into the 
sentiments of those with whom one frequently interacts. Besides being unable to attend to 
the needs of these individuals, the Stoic cannot gauge how his actions will impact the 
emotional well-being of other people. We are meant by the Stoics to downplay our 
affections, which leaves us unable to interact with others in way that befit these 
relationships.509 When our sentiments have been shaped so that we only note the 
perspective of nature, we see those around us merely as objects of our conduct.  
 By limiting the importance our emotional responses, we foster a stubborn 
indifference to feeling. One consequence of this cultivated indifference is the 
undercutting of mutual sympathy, which is crucial for determining the propriety of one’s 
sentiments. As moral agents, we should be concerned with bringing our sentiments into 
coincidence with others. It is the coincidence of sentiment that provides us with a 
standard of what to approve of and how to act.510 If we are unwilling to partake in the 
exchange of mutual sympathy, we are likely to favor our own judgment over that of 
others, at great cost. When our approval floats free from mutual sympathy, we are likely 
to be perverted by a wrong system like Stoicism. This system, alongside deadening our 
                                                        
508 Smith, TMS III.4.11 
509 Smith, TMS VI.ii.3.6 
510 Smith, TMS I.i.2.1; VI.ii.1.17. 
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sensitivity to others, leads us into error and produces a distorted sense of our relations to 
our little department.  
Pride compounds the problem. As Smith notes, pride was the contributing factor 
to suicide becoming “perfectly fashionable” during the Roman Empire.511 He discusses 
pride in a few places in TMS and distinguishes it from vanity. The proud person 
“disdains to court your esteem. He affects even to despise it, and endeavours to maintain 
his assumed station, not so much by making you sensible of his superiority, as of your 
own meanness.”512 A vain person “is very seldom convinced of that superiority which he 
wishes you to ascribe to him. He wishes you to view him in much more splendid colours 
than those in which, when he places himself in your situation, and supposes you to know 
all that he knows, he can really view himself.”513 The vain person courts the esteem; the 
prideful person’s sense of his own merit leads him to have contempt for esteem.514 
Repugnance for esteem separates the prideful from the magnanimous. As scholars 
have pointed out, magnanimity is an important virtue for Smith.515 The distinction 
                                                        
511 Smith, TMS VII.ii.1.32. 
512 Smith, TMS VI.iii.35. 
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and love of domination, may lead one to subdue one’s fellows to achieve this harmony (TMS 
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Encounter (Routledge, 2018), 243-7. 
515 Eric Schliesser, “The Obituary of a Vain Philosopher: Adam Smith’s Reflections on Hume’s 
Life,” Hume Studies 34.2 (2003): 327-362; Ryan Hanley, Adam Smith and the Character of 
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between pride and magnanimity lies in how one reacts to fortune. While magnanimity 
involves possessing fortitude, pride “render[s] us altogether indifferent and unconcerned 
in the success or miscarriage of [that] which Nature has prescribed to us as the proper 
business and occupation of our lives.”516 This indifference is compounded by Stoic 
severity, which is at odds with the “great cheerfulness” that Smith associates with 
magnanimity.517 Cheerfulness signifies a generous spirit; the core of generosity is 
gratitude and a concern for public interest.518 This concern is not echoed by the Stoic, 
whose “hardness of heart” renders him insensible to sociability and silences his 
sensitivity to his “humble department,” including the need for him to continue existing.519 
We can now bring together the elements of Smith’s moral criticism of Stoicism. 
When we adopt the perspective of nature, we sever our connections to others. The 
consequence is increased self-assurance, which gives way to excessive self-estimation in 
the form of pride. This pride codifies our sense of independence, which only further 
disconnects us from our sociable nature, leading us to consider actions such as suicide as 
praiseworthy. I now move to consider the extent of Smith’s skepticism. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Virtue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 132-74; Andrew J. Corsa, “Modern 
Greatness of Soul in Hume and Smith.” Ergo 2.2 (2015): 1-32; Eric Schliesser, Adam Smith: 
Systematic Philosophy and Public Thinker (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 358-70. 
Hanley discusses magnanimity and its pitfalls: “the tragedy of magnanimity lies in the fact that 
the dazzle of its display renders both the possessor and its spectator unable to assess worth – an 
ironic failing given that the turn to magnanimity was itself justified as an attempt to recover the 
concept of moral worth from its vulgarization by the rich and great” (170).   
516 Smith, TMS VII.ii.1.47 
517 Smith, “The Death of David Hume,” Hume, Essays, xlvi.  
518 Smith, TMS IV.ii.10-11) 
519 Smith, TMS VI.iii.15; VI.ii.3.6 
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Skepticism – Following Our Nature 
 
 What does Smith’s criticism of the Stoic principle of suicide reveal about his 
commitments as a moralist? I suggest that Smith is a skeptical moralist on two fronts. 
First, his method for determining what is virtuous does not proceed on the basis of first 
principles, whether about moral motivation or about the aims of human action. Smith 
begins his moral inquiry by observing how we proceed in our moral lives, gathering 
evidence about how we react to different situations, and noting its impact on our ability to 
live well alongside others. Second, Smith rejects the Stoic’s appeal to intuition in 
determining what we are called upon to do. His account of moral virtue is based in 
sympathy – judgments about how we ought to act are based in the concordance with our 
fellows, as opposed to nature or other abstract ideas of propriety. In this manner, Smith’s 
ethics is fallibilist along the lines of Academic Skepticism under Carneades, or of 
Cicero.520 
 Skepticism is tied to a rejection of philosophical schools – the skeptic accuses the 
schools of dogmatism. Smith engages with these schools in TMS VII, albeit in a different 
way.521 One way to interpret TMS VII is as Smith’s attempt to show how his theory 
corrects the shortcomings of others while also preserving what is valuable in them. On 
this view, Smith engages his predecessors with the aim of producing a synthetic moral 
                                                        
520 For more on these topics, see: R.J. Hankinson, “Values, objectivity and dialectic: the sceptical 
attack on ethics; its methods, aims and success” Phronesis 49 (1994): 45–6; Harold 
Thorsrud, Ancient Scepticism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009); Richard Bett, 
“Ancient Scepticism,” Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 112-128; Richard Bett, “Scepticism and Ethics,” The Cambridge 
Companion to Ancient Scepticism. ed. Richard Bett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 181-194.  
521 For another treatment of this topic, see: Charles L. Griswold, Adam Smith and the Virtues of 
Enlightenment (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 147-78 
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system. Some scholars place Smith in the history of eclecticism, a cousin of the skeptical 
tradition.522 Both eclectics and skeptics reject the dogmatism of the schools – the latter 
focus on criticizing the foundations of their doctrines, while the former handle their 
doctrines as a toolbox, using them “piecemeal.”523 As one scholar points out, eclecticism 
was an “even more destructive challenge to the schools, in that it questioned the unity of 
their doctrines as schools and was harder to dismiss out of hand than skeptic[ism].”524 
The eclectic neutralizes the schools’ influence by showing that one can accept particular 
doctrines without becoming a school partisan, and that one can combine the insights of 
opposing schools. But this interpretation misses the spirit of TMS VII. 
  Smith uses the doctrines of the schools in his ethics. His account of prudence 
draws on the Epicureans; his view of benevolence on the Neo-Platonists; his account of 
propriety on the Peripatetics and Stoics. We might interpret Smith as an eclectic, one who 
forms his view from common moral experience and the writings of predecessors, insofar 
as their doctrines are confirmed by experience. But referring Smith as an eclectic in this 
sense is uninformative as, in many ways, the history of modern ethics is of the triumph of 
eclecticism, where the stranglehold of the Ancient schools fades into the background.525 
The term, “eclecticism,” also falls short in helping to explain why Smith’s criticism of his 
                                                        
522Aaron Garrett and Ryan Hanley, “Adam Smith: History and Impartiality,” Scottish Philosophy 
in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. I: Morals, Politics, Art, Religion (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 239-282. 
523 Aaron Garrett, “Eclecticism of Eighteenth-Century Philosophy,” The Routledge Companion to 
Eighteenth Century Philosophy, ed. Aaron Garrett (New York: Routledge, 2014), 9. 
524 Garrett, “Eclecticism,” 9. 
525 Garrett and Hanley “Adam Smith: History and Impartiality” 2015; Garrett, “Eclecticism”; 
Ulrich Johannes Schneider, “Eclecticism and the History of Philosophy,” History and the 
Disciplines: The Reclassification of Knowledge in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Donald R. Kelley 
(New York: University of Rochester Press, 1997), 83-101. 
  
196 
predecessors takes a particular shape. The question is why does Smith endorse common 
moral experience as a standard for evaluating his predecessors? 
 Consider Smith’s engagement with Stoicism. Smith’s criticism of the Stoics is 
aimed at their moral epistemology. For Smith, the Stoic is not licensed to the claim that 
nature calls upon them to do anything, much less to commit suicide. This assumed license 
leads the Stoic to draw spurious conclusions about the character of duty and the nature of 
obligation. What begins as an error ends up having tremendous consequences: on account 
of a presumed access to nature, the Stoic rejects proximate, albeit defeasible, evidence for 
how one ought to act. As a result, the Stoic does not feel the weight of those duties tied to 
their little department. By identifying the Stoics’ failure to properly ground moral 
judgment, Smith is not undercutting the possibility of making reasonable attributions of 
praise and blame but shifting our sense of what evidence is required for these attributions.  
For Smith, our judgments and attributions receive weight from their concordance 
with others. Through testing and revising our judgments, they are seen as trustworthy. 
This method of testing and revising our beliefs is recommended by Carneades, the first 
Academic Skeptic and a hero of David Hume’s: “In ordinary life, when we are 
investigating a small matter we question one witness, when it is a greater matter, several 
witnesses, and when it is an even more essential matter we examine each of the witnesses 
on the basis of the mutual agreement among the others.”526 We call on others to  
substantiate our claims and to curb our self-certainty. Without their assistance, we 
proceed naively, avoiding what is required to develop the skills for competent moral 
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judgment. Smith supplements this model of revision by attempting to shape our conduct 
through moral illustration. By providing us with portraits of virtue, Smith seeks to 
awaken our sentiments and intensify our attachment to ideas of propriety and merit.  
 This latter project comes to fruition towards the end of TMS VII, where Smith 
discusses his approach to practical ethics. According to Smith, ethics ought to proceed by 
offering descriptions of virtues and vices in order to illustrate the “deformity and misery” 
of the latter and the “propriety and happiness” of the former.527 The aim of this exercise 
is to get clear on the “sentiment of the heart” from which each virtue originates and to 
convey a “general way of acting” associated with their exercise.528 Though the approach 
is imperfect, Smith argues that an observer armed with a “delicate and an accurate 
pencil,” can replicate our experiences of the virtues and awaken us to their value.529 By 
giving us “agreeable and lively pictures” of virtue, our love for them becomes 
“inflamed.”530 Once we are inflamed, we are more likely to guide our judgments by the 
correct ideas of propriety and merit, and to act in a virtuous manner as well: 
 
 “By the justness as well as the delicacy of their observations they may often help 
 to both correct and to ascertain our natural sentiments with regard to the propriety 
 of conduct, and suggesting many nice and delicate affections, form us to a more 
 exact justness of behaviour, than what, without such instruction, we should have 
 been apt to think of.”531 
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The description the moralist offers opens up the possibility for us to relate differently to 
our sentiments. Through this process, we gain more productive ways to express these 
sentiments and a better understanding how they bolster our moral commitments. 
 For Smith, attempts to justify our moral conduct in terms of intuition, or by appeal 
to abstract conceptions of propriety, run headfirst into skeptical arguments. By not 
recognizing the strength of these objections, one risks operating in a dangerous manner. 
Many figures in the skeptical tradition, like Carneades or Cicero, stress that we should 
heed the duties of common life since they provide the only measure for how we ought to 
act. Few go beyond this injunction to avoid doing violence to appearances for the sake of 
communing with a deeper source of value. Smith uses his criticism of the Stoics as a 
jumping off point to construct an ethics of common life – an effort on which he reflects in 
the discussion of practical ethics. Smith focuses on suicide because it is a limit case, 
where the reasons to go on seem to come up short. He shows how our connection to 
ourselves and others fails, on the Stoic account, and how it can be preserved. 
 
Making Room for Reasonable Partiality 
 At the outset of this chapter I stated that Smith’s moral theory is similar to that of 
Butler, particularly when it comes to how they think our passions should inform our 
conduct. Despite there being little literature on the relation between Butler and Smith, 
this claim is largely accepted by scholars.532 Smith is seen as in the sentimentalist camp 
of the British Moralist tradition, and many would agree with an older tradition of 
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scholarship that lists Butler as being at least a peripheral member of this ethical school. 
There is no need for me to re-litigate whether Smith has been rightly classified; my 
concerns about the application of the term “sentimentalism” to Hume have already been 
discussed in Chapter II. What remains for me to do is clarify the contrast between Smith 
and Butler and, by doing so, deepen our understanding of the contours of Smith’s moral 
theory – a theory whose details have been analyzed by many scholars over the past 30 
years. I will build on this wealth of scholarship and take much of it for granted. 
 Throughout the dissertation, I have discussed the ways in which our sentiments 
dispose us to act primarily for the good of our friends, family, and loved ones. We have 
seen that partial concern can lead to bias and faction; we have also seen that for some, 
like Hume, these sentiments are a stepping stone to treating considerations like the 
common good as authoritative, downgrading the authority of these local considerations in 
matters of mutual concern. From this observation we see that a hierarchy forms, for 
Hume, between norms grounded in the impartiality of usefulness and the norms given by 
our frame. I argue that there is no such hierarchy in Smith’s moral theory. The concentric 
spheres of concern that are given to us by nature cannot be subverted by more general 
abstract principles like usefulness, at least when it comes to morality. (Such a hierarchy 
does exist in the case of jurisprudence but to examine the relationship between morality 
and jurisprudence goes beyond the stated purpose of this chapter.) 
 Most scholars argue that usefulness is a secondary principle for Smith, that the 
sentiments are inextricably connected to his account of morality, and that he holds a 
Ciceronian conception of virtue. What scholars disagree about is the extent to which the 
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impartial spectator – however it may be construed – corrects our more natural sentimental 
dispositions.533 I hardly aim to settle this issue in the remaining pages. That said, I do 
wish to cast the debate in a different light, which may go part of the way to its resolution. 
Though the impartial spectator is very much a product of our nature – resulting the 
imagination, severing the self into actor and observer and viewing one’s conduct from the 
perspective of the latter – it is only authoritative insofar as it remains connected to our 
nature. The judgments handed down by the impartial spectator are the result of reflecting 
on the extent to which one’s conduct lines up with one’s commitments. In this manner, it 
does not provide us with a perspective by which we forge genuinely moral norms that 
                                                        
533 As Garrett and Hanley note in their “Adam Smith: History and Impartiality,” there are a 
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then correct our parochial concerns. To do so would be to view our moral commitments 
from the removed standpoint of a philosopher, as proposed by the Stoics. 
 I have argued that Smith finds the Stoic procedure of moral reflection problematic 
and its account of propriety unacceptable. Few scholars would argue that Smith accepts 
Stoicism, even in a qualified sense; even those who afford the impartial spectator a great 
deal of authority caution that doing so does not imply that Smith’s theory is either Stoic 
or Kantian for that matter. Still, for Smith, moral claims do not originate with the 
impartial spectator but with our nature and, more particularly, with our sentiments and 
the relations that they reinforce. The role of the impartial spectator is analogous to 
Butler’s conception of conscience – it forces us to confront the extent to which we are 
abiding by the duties we already recognize. To heed the call of conscience, and to be of 
merit, is to not allow our unsociable desires or self-deception to subvert our nature. I 
make this case by, first, looking at Smith’s discussion of the relation between nature and 
philosophy and argue that, for him, we can trust our nature more than we can philosophy 
when it comes to morality. Second, I suggest that Smith’s method in TMS expresses this 
very idea – that the aim of philosophy is to reinforce our nature as opposed to seeking its 
correction. 
 
Weighing the Perspective of Nature and Philosophy 
 Throughout Smith’s writings he makes a distinction between nature and 
philosophy, typically associating reason with the latter and our instincts, dispositions, and 
sentiments with the former. The relationship between nature and philosophy in Smith’s 
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work is difficult to ascertain and there is much scholarly literature on the subject.534 
Although scholars agree that the concept of nature does some heavy lifting in Smith’s 
moral theory, at least with regard to his account of the passions, it is not clear whether the 
principles of nature and philosophy ever genuinely conflict – and if they do, which of 
these forces possesses genuine authority over the other and on what grounds it claims this 
title. Surely Smith means for TMS to educate his audience on the nature of virtue and 
their duties as human beings. Part of the process involves examining ourselves and 
refining the baser parts of our nature. In this way, philosophy plays a corrective role with 
regard to nature. At times, however, Smith notes that it plays a supportive role for nature, 
reinforcing tendencies that nature has bestowed on us and giving them greater weight in 
our reasoning (e.g. justice).535 Other times, philosophy uncovers irregularities in our 
sentiments that are best left uncorrected for Smith (e.g. moral luck).536 
 My goal in this section is not to propose a solution to this interpretative problem 
in Smith’s work but to examine those passages where he discusses the tension between 
“nature” and “philosophy” which bear on the problem of partiality. I argue that, for 
Smith, nature determines the weight of our moral duties while philosophy gives us the 
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tools to better understand how our nature functions and what it demands of us. As our 
nature compels us to show greater concern for those in our little department, Smith 
claims that it is the role of philosophy to inform us of what this duty entails and not to 
correct this natural partiality. Unlike Hume, Smith does not argue that this partiality can 
be justified on consequentialist grounds. There is no principle that gives normative 
weight to our sentiments; rather, these sentiments are the only tool we possess to guide 
our conduct. Nature provides us with a roadmap, Smith notes, because the “happiness of 
mankind” cannot be left dependent on the very “slowness and uncertainty of 
philosophical researches.”537 Though this discussion can tell us more about how Smith’s 
views about the relationship between nature and philosophy more generally,  examining 
this subject goes beyond the scope of this chapter. 
 I frame much of the following discussion around a comment that Smith makes 
about the scope of our duties and those with which we should be rightfully concerned: 
 “To what purpose should we trouble ourselves about the world in the moon? All 
 men, even those at the greatest distance, are no doubt entitled to our good wishes, 
 and our good wishes we naturally give them. But if, notwithstanding, they should 
 be unfortunate, to give ourselves any anxiety upon that account seems to be no 
 part of our duty. That we should be but little interested, therefore, in the fortune of 
 those whom we can neither serve nor hurt, and who are in every respect so very 
 remote from us, seems wisely ordered by Nature; and if it were possible to alter in 
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 this respect the original constitution of our frame, we could yet gain nothing by 
 the change.”538 
 
The Stoic claims that to become fully virtuous, one must be able to see oneself as a 
citizen of the world, whose duties extend equally to all components of the system of 
nature. As I discussed in this chapter, Smith is not persuaded by this approach to thinking 
about our duties – he finds it problematic on both epistemic and moral grounds. His claim 
in the passage just quoted seems straightforward. There are many sentient beings in the 
world, most of whom we will never interact with and whose well-being will not impact 
us in any manner. While we should wish the best for these people, provided they are 
reasonable, it seems wholly improper to spend any time agonizing over their fate since 
they are not our concern. Luckily, Smith notes, our nature ensures that we pay little mind 
to those outside our little department; our imagination stays fixed on the well-being of 
our friends and loved ones, and on how we can work on behalf of their good.  
 One could run the following argument against the justifiability of our inattention 
to others. Take any family in West Virginia. Chances are that this family has many of the 
same needs and concerns as my own. Perhaps they are financially worse off than my 
family, geographically stuck, and tethered to an uncertain lifestyle. Say that this lifestyle 
bears great significance for many members of the family. Considering the ways in which 
I may be of service to this family in a time where there is greater potential for me to 
impact their lives – say, by using my skills as an educator to increase the opportunities 
that their children have – why should I not see my fate as tied up with their own? In some 
                                                        
538 Smith, TMS III.3.9 
  
205 
ways, this criticism may come off as unfair. Smith lived in different times. While 
egalitarianism and cosmopolitism are the standard assumptions of democratic thought, 
Smith was writing in a time where the world was much smaller. Still, the criticism cannot 
be swept under the rug. Smith was aware of the complexities of exchange and knew that 
our actions had an impact on our compatriots and on our fellow humans more generally. 
It would be irresponsible to not recognize this fact, even in the 18th century.  
 However, Smith’s claim that we should not concern ourselves with “the world in 
the moon” is not properly thought of in causal terms. His position is not that we should 
show greater care for those closest to us because our actions have a negligible impact on 
those with whom we are not acquainted. If an economist were to demonstrate that our 
actions – say, regarding the products we purchase – impact people on the other side of the 
world, it would follow that we should be concerned for others to the extent that our 
decisions help or hurt them. If it can be shown that my decisions exercise greater 
influence over the lives of a family in Bangladesh than over those my own family, we are 
forced to conclude that we should show greater concern for the family in Bangladesh.539  
 What Smith would find troublesome about this view is the appeal to utility to 
ground the decision to prioritize others over our little department. Much has been written 
about Smith’s views on utility. He dedicates a chapter in TMS to the impact of utility on 
our judgments about aesthetic and moral beauty, which also offers a window into how he 
views Hume’s moral system in relation to his own. The criticism Smith makes of Hume 
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the roots of this view, see: Peter Singer, Leslie Cannold, Helga Kuhse, “William Godwin and the 
Defense of Impartialist Ethics,” Utilitas 7.1 (1995): 67-86. 
  
206 
in TMS IV focuses on his failure to properly characterize how our moral sentiments 
function in everyday contexts. For Smith, Hume attempts to reduce our praise and blame 
of others (and ourselves) to considerations of utility – that is, the extent to which one 
“promote[s] or disturb[s] the happiness both of the individual and of society.”540 Smith 
argues that this way of understanding our moral lives is too simplistic, noting that “the 
sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the 
perception of utility.”541 While humanity, generosity, and public spirit are certainly useful 
to others – by tightening the bonds of society – we do not praise them on these grounds.  
  Smith criticizes Hume on the same grounds that Hume did Mandeville, and all 
those who reduce all human motivation to self-love.542 For Hume, these figures are 
driven to explain human behavior in the simplest manner possible. This drive for 
simplicity has its source in the desire to make one’s explanations aesthetically pleasing. 
There are few things more beautiful than a clean, orderly, simple explanation that 
connects to form a coherent explanatory system. Were it the case that our conduct was 
properly understood as various expressions of self-love, one could construct a science of 
human nature that explains our actions on par with those that physics offers for how 
middle-sized dry goods move in space. If only matters were that simple. As we discussed 
in Chapter 2, Hume seeks to explain all instances of praise and blame of characters in 
terms of them as either being agreeable to themselves or to others, or as useful to 
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541 Smith, TMS IV.2.5 
542 Hume, Enquires, 248.  
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themselves or to others. As I argue in there, when it comes to moral deliberation, for 
Hume, usefulness takes precedence over agreeableness.  
 For Smith, Hume betrays the same “love of system” as does Mandeville in his 
attempt to reduce moral considerations to utility. One can imagine Hume responding as 
follows: since Smith explains moral life in terms of one principle – sympathy – he is 
subject to the same criticism, that he is more concerned to offer a simple explanation than 
one that fully captures the breadth of our moral experience. Smith even refers to his view 
as the “system of sympathy.”543 While sympathy is the force that allows for the 
possibility of moral praise and blame, Smith’s explanation of how it functions is rather 
complicated. He sums up his view at the end of TMS VII, noting that our approval or 
disapproval of another’s conduct and character is derived from four sources: 1) our 
ability to sympathize with the agent’s motives; 2) our ability to sympathize with the 
gratitude or resentment felt by those parties impacted by the agent’s conduct and 
character; 3) the extent to which an agent’s motives and patient’s gratitude or resentment 
are concordant with the general rules regarding what is fit and proper; (4) the extent to 
which these actions are a part of a “system of behavior” that tends to promote the general 
happiness.544 Notice that sympathy only plays a direct role in the first and second sources 
of moral judgment. 
 There are a number of points to be made about the third and fourth sources of 
approval and disapproval. Let me emphasize two points. Although our perception of, say, 
someone’s gratitude being in concordance with a general rule regarding the extent to 
                                                        
543 Smith, TMS VII.iii.1.4 
544 Smith, TMS VII.iii.3.15 
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which one should feel grateful in a particular circumstance does not engage our 
sympathy, Smith claims that moral rules are nothing more than inductive generalizations 
of our collective sympathetic responses. The purpose of moral rules is two-fold: first, to 
test our own sympathetic response, and the responses of others, against a standard, to 
ensure they are not anomalous; second, to make decisions more quickly than we would 
otherwise. As many scholars have pointed out, what becomes troubling about Smith’s 
account of general rules is the rigidity that he seems to give them, noting that we should 
cultivate a “sacred regard” for them. Given the malleability of human nature, and the 
origin from which general rules are derived, referring to them as divinely authored seems 
to be a bridge too far. The second point concerns Smith’s comments on utility. Smith is 
concerned with expected as opposed to actual utility; insofar as he is interested in one’s 
conduct, as opposed to their character, Smith treats actions as a part of a larger system, 
meaning that he does not consider the utility of individual actions.545   
 Although Smith refers to his system as one centered on sympathy, we can see that 
his view of moral approval and disapproval is more complicated than Hume. While Smith 
escapes the criticism he levels at both, it does not follow that his theory is superior on 
account of it being complex, unless the aim is solely to paint our moral lives more 
colorfully than does Hume. But Smith’s criticism is not merely that Hume’s views are too 
simplistic; rather, the simplicity is indicative of a mistaken approach to thinking about 
morality – one that is unduly philosophical, as opposed to anchored in nature. It is true 
                                                        
545 Smith gives utility a large role in the Wealth of Nations, under the consideration of 
“expediency.” That said, for him, the topic of WN is not ethics, strictly speaking, but political 
economy. and so different principles are operative as the subject under consideration is no longer 
individuals’ actions or character. More in section VI.  
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that human beings are, at times, motivated by considerations of self-love, vanity, or even 
the desire for domination, according to Smith. Human beings also enjoy well-ordered 
desks, rooms, buildings, and social structures; there is something beautiful about 
everything occupying a particular space and fulfilling a particular function. The 
perception of well-orderedness is, as Hume would say, equally agreeable and useful. That 
said, to say that we can explain a father taking on a second job to support his daughter’s 
interest in playing hockey wholly in terms of the father’s self-interest, or that we praise 
him for doing so wholly in terms of his being useful to his daughter or to society at large 
is a philosophical abstraction. 
 For Smith, the abstraction in which Hume is engaged does violence to our moral 
experience, particularly our sentiment-based obligations to those in our little department. 
To ground these obligations in self-interest, utility, or any other impartial principle is an 
inaccurate account of how we make sense of them in our lives; notably, appealing to such 
a principle puts all our distinct obligations to others on a level-playing field. According to 
Smith, this characterization of what we ought to do regarding others does not capture the 
moral seriousness of our commitments to near and dear, or to the nature of my duties to 
others generally, regardless of their standing to me. When it comes to the content of these 
moral duties, Smith is insistent that our nature sets the terms of deliberation and is the 
basis of any reasonable account of ethics.   
 Like many 18th century British moralists, Smith was particularly aware of how he 
presented his doctrines – attention to Smith’s method of presentation can, at times, yield 
as much information about his ethical thought as can the content of his doctrines. Smith’s 
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commitment to a moral theory that is based on our commitments to our little department 
is expressed in the form that the TMS takes; that is, as a series of descriptions of how our 
sentiments function and the general shape of our moral lives. Like Butler, Smith eschews 
the appeal to utility to explain how we relate to virtue and the duties we have regarding 
others and ourselves. Smith leaves us with a picture of morality that is complex and 
reflective of our experience.  
 
Ethics: Method and Limits 
 In this chapter I have examined an account of partiality that stresses the 
importance of our sentiments as action-guiding. This view requires that we place trust in 
our natural disposition to love and care for those closest to us. The role of impartiality, 
for Butler and Smith, is not to turn a critical eye on these sentiments but to counter our 
all-too-human tendency to deceive ourselves, especially by way of abstract principles. 
Concerns about abstraction are clearest in Butler’s treatment of self-deception and 
Smith’s comments on the Stoic principle of suicide. But there remains a tension in 
Butler’s ethics; love of God requires that we suppress our natural tendencies for the 
purposes of carrying out our divine mission. There is no such tendency in Smith, who 
rebuffs all appeals to the system of nature to guide our conduct. For Smith, all the creator 
has to teach us regarding how we should carry ourselves in this life is to be found in our 
frame. 
 Smith is the fullest expression of what some call the “sentimentalist” tradition of 
moral philosophy in the 18th century, which is seen to begin with Shaftesbury, or at least 
Hutcheson, and continue to Smith. Broadly speaking, a sentimentalist grounds morality in 
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our sentiments and sees them as action-guiding. Since our sentiments are many, and the 
values they represent and help reinforce are even greater, a sentimentalist is largely 
uninterested in the project of reducing our moral responses to a set of basic principles on 
which we can reflect. Instead, as we see in Smith and in Butler, sentimentalist figures are 
more interested in studying how our sentiments inform how we should relate to others 
and even to ourselves. Hume is interested in the contours of our passions; however, like 
Descartes, Hobbes, and Malebranche, Hume is skeptical about their value. In this way, 
Gay and Hume do not share Butler’s (and Smith’s) commitment that God or nature has 
shaped our frame such that our passions give us insight into how we should act.  
 Smith ends TMS VII by discussing practical ethics and the two approaches that 
philosophers have commonly taken concerning this subject. One approach, which he 
associates with the Ancient moralists, offers descriptions of virtues and vices in order to 
illustrate the “deformity and misery” of the latter and the “propriety and happiness” of the 
former.546 Whether it be by sketching an anatomy of our sentiments, or providing us with 
a general sense of how we should act, Smith claims the approach is imperfect. While he 
sees his task as partly one of describing our sentiments with continually greater accuracy, 
he claims that even the incomplete illustrations we have of the virtues – whether 
prudence and benevolence, or those discussed by Cicero or Aristotle – are sufficient to 
give us a sense of what it means to act virtuously, and to compel us to do so.547 
                                                        
546 Smith, TMS VII.iv.3. 
547 “By the justness as well as the delicacy of their observations they may often help to both 
correct and to ascertain our natural sentiments with regard to the propriety of conduct, and 
suggesting many nice and delicate affections, form us to a more exact justness of behaviour, than 
what, without such instruction, we should have been apt to think of” (Smith, TMS VII.iv.6). 
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 The second approach to practical ethics, which Smith associates with the casuistry 
of both the schoolmen and writers on jurisprudence, “endeavour[s] to lay down exact and 
precise rules for the direction of every circumstance of our behaviour.”548 Smith is 
suspicious of the attempt to provide precise rules in matters other than justice. I agree 
with most scholars that Smith’s approach in TMS is one of ethics, although he associates 
it primarily with the Ancients. Smith aims to improve his audience with his writings, at 
least in the case of TMS (the issue becomes more complicated with the Wealth of Nations 
or the Lectures on Jurisprudence). I follow the line of interpretation that treats Smith as a 
practical moralist, concerned with the project of “animat[ing] to us what is generous and 
noble” and “soften[ing] us to what is gentle and humane.”549 Given the imperfect nature 
of a science of ethics, for Smith, all one can accomplish in writing an ethics is to 
moderately improve on those of the Ancient moralists. For Smith, improvement is made 
by offering illustrations of virtue of vice in a manner suitable to our times.  
 Given Smith’s views about the nature of ethics, what interests me is his comment 
that works of casuistry “teach us to chicane with our own consciences, and by their vain 
subtleties serve to authorize innumerable evasive refinements with regard to the most 
essential articles of our duty.”550 He notes that the “frivolous accuracy” introduced by the 
casuist contributes to their “dry and disagreeable” nature and the fact that those who take 
them seriously are most likely to “fall into error.”551 On its face, the former criticism is 
superficial while the latter is more serious and flows from the “frivolous accuracy” the 
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casuist displays in their work. However, Smith’s claim is that the presentation contributes 
directly to the aforementioned error. He argues that these works are “incapable of 
exciting in the heart any of those emotions which it is the principal use of books of 
morality to excite.”552 That casuistry invites us to speculate about morality without 
considerations of the heart, which makes us likely to commit moral failings.  
 While casuistry creates an obstacle to the functioning of our moral sentiments, it 
is not the only force that concerns Smith when it comes to our ability to be properly 
guided by our nature. He notes that ethics is most prone to “embellishments of 
eloquence.”553 While painting the character of virtue in great colors is important for the 
aim of “inflaming our natural love of virtue,” Smith thinks certain manners of writing can 
undercut our natural sentiments.554 His concern about embellishment can be seen most 
clearly in his criticisms of Shaftesbury, whose writing serves as “an example of the 
pompous and grant style.”555 Smith treats this style as an attempt by Shaftesbury to 
separate himself from the “true propriety of language” and, in turn, the affections and 
conduct of human life.556 Here we are reminded of the Stoics, whose high-minded 
manner of writing contributed to thinking about morals and about how they ought to 
relate to others. Any reader of Shaftesbury is familiar with this use of style to evoke high-
minded sentiments and conduct, a style that Smith finds dangerous.  
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 While Smith is worried about how embellishments in ethical writing can help give 
weight to mistaken views, he is more concerned about how authors like Mandeville use 
their writing to chip away at our moral confidence. By using a tone that is “lively and 
humorous, though course and rustic” in its eloquence, Mandeville is able to give “his 
doctrines an air of truth and probability,” despite their “erroneous” nature.557 For Smith, 
Mandeville’s works neither inflame our natural love of virtue nor our desire for self-
command. Mandeville instead lampoons the “great, awful, and respectable virtues” as a 
“cheat and imposition on mankind,” while those “soft, amiable, and gentle virtues” are 
treated as products of vanity.558 He suggests that all love of virtue is merely the desire to 
be seen as distinguished by others. Smith, like others writing at this time, was concerned 
with Mandeville’s writings because they captured the imagination of polite society. 
 Smith ends his examination of virtue on a seemingly optimistic tone. He makes a 
distinction between natural philosophical theories and those of moral philosophy, noting 
that the former (he then gives the example of Descartes’ vortices) can persist despite not 
being anchored in truth since their subject matter is distant from us. As Smith writes: 
 “When a traveler gives an account of some distant country, he may impose upon 
 our credulity the most groundless and absurd fictions as the most certain matters 
 of fact. But when a person pretends to inform us of what passes in our 
 neighborhood, and of the affairs of the very parish which we live in, though here 
 too, if we are careless as not to examine things with our own eyes, yet the greatest 
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 falsehoods which he imposes on us must bear some resemblance to the truth, and 
 must even have a considerable mixture of truth in them.”559 
 
Smith is satisfied to inform us that the theories in moral philosophy are susceptible to a 
degree of evidence not required by those in natural philosophy. Nevertheless, what is 
problematic about the writings of Shaftesbury, the Stoics, or of Mandeville is that they 
are far from “groundless and absurd fictions” – they possess a small connection to the 
truth of things. What makes ethical writing important, for Smith, is that there is a great 
deal at stake and that even pernicious moral theories have a recognizable pull on the our 
imagination, even for those who are hardly “injudicious” or “inexperienced” readers.560 It 
is incumbent on the moralist to exercise caution in how they analyze our passions and the 
manner in which they choose to speculate about moral matters. Although our nature 
defends us from any gross perversion of our sentiments, the shape they take can be 
influenced by customs and the writings and teachings of a time.561 
 I return to the differences between Hume and Smith in the conclusion of the 
dissertation. For now, it is important to say a bit more about the implication that Smith’s 
moral view has on the problem of partiality. For Smith, there is no problem when it 
comes to how our sentiments shape our values and inform us how to act. The problem 
comes from those forces that interrupt the functioning of our sentiments. The vast 
majority of these forces are political or legal, and their examination belongs not to ethics 
but to jurisprudence, a topic that comes up at the end of TMS. Smith famously projected 
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that he would write a work that gave “an account of the general principles of law and 
government and of the different revolutions they have undergone in the different ages and 
periods of society.”562 Though the work was never completed, its contents come down to 
us through student notes on the subject. A treatment of its contents goes beyond the scope 
of this dissertation, though the beginnings of an answer are contained herein. 
 This demarcating of our moral lives into different areas of study, each of which 
has its own standards of evidence has its roots in the natural law theory of Pufendorf. 
This view becomes influential by the 19th century and is reflected in the work of Bentham 
and Mill, as much as in the writings of Kant and Hegel. There are ways in which this 
solution to the problem of partiality – making it a matter of politics instead of ethics – is 
unsatisfactory. After all, one must still answer the question of how politics and ethics 
relate to one another. Regardless, Smith’s point is that the tension we see between our 
partial and impartial commitments is not native to ethics. This tension only appears to us 
as salient once we take matters of jurisprudence seriously; only when we view our lives 
as citizens and not as simply as members of families or particular communities, that we 
are confronted with the problem of partiality.  
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CONCLUSION 
 In this dissertation, I have presented an interpretative framework through which to 
understand the British Moralist tradition. In discussing this tradition, scholars have often 
focused on questions of moral metaphysics and moral obligation, eschewing matters of 
practical ethics. I have cast this tradition in a different light, centering my narrative on the 
problem of partiality. I have made the case that this problem originated in the 18th 
century as a result of certain tensions in Locke’s moral thought. By doing so, I aimed to 
show that the British Moralists’ concerns were ultimately practical. To the extent that 
these figures were taken by questions about the nature of moral properties, for example, 
they wished to address concerns about selfishness, factionalism, moral disagreement, and 
how to weigh different moral considerations. Ethics, for them, is a tool to help us better 
navigate our conflicts so that we can live well together.  
 I have traced the problem of partiality from Locke through Cockburn, 
Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson in Chapter 1, to Gay and Hume in Chapter 2, to Butler and 
Smith in Chapter 3. Now, I return to Hume and Smith in the context of considering a 
solution to the problem of partiality. Of the figures considered, only the theories 
presented by Hume and Smith are robust enough to solve the problem of partiality. I 
proceed as follows. First, I discuss Hume’s solution to the problem of partiality and the 
“dilemma of variability” that his account faces. Second, I discuss Smith’s solution to the 
problem of partiality and how his skepticism informs his view of the problem. Third, I 
explore the practical orientation of the British Moralists and how Smith’s practical ethics 
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contributes to this tradition. Fourth, I consider the extent to which the problem of 
partiality can be solved. 
 
Hume’s Solution to the Problem of Partiality 
 Hume argues that we desire our own happiness and the happiness of those near 
and dear over that of strangers. The imbalance of these desires lends itself to faction and 
conflict whenever it is not possible to act for the general interest. Luckily, according to 
Hume, we possess the mechanism of sympathy which, through the relations of contiguity 
and resemblance, connects us to the desires and passions of others, even of those neither 
near nor dear. We cannot be indifferent to the fates of our fellows. Still, Hume maintains, 
when it comes to rendering judgments about conduct and character, or making 
determinations about what to do, our particular interests are often given undue weight. 
We allow our partial concerns to shape our ideas of what is moral. We therefore often 
find ourselves in situations where we sincerely take ourselves to be justified in our 
conduct despite all countervailing evidence.  
Hume’s View 
 Hume argues that the aforementioned situation is intolerable, noting “the more we 
converse with mankind, and the greater social intercourse we maintain,” the more we 
recognize that “…every man's interest is peculiar to himself, and the aversions and 
desires, which result from it, cannot be supposed to affect others in a like degree.”563 
Through reflection, Hume points out that we are lead to adopt a “method of correcting 
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our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our language where the sentiments are more 
stubborn and inalterable [emphasis mine].”564 While we are unlikely to change the 
sentiments of others directly, we can find a shared way to speak about morals. To do so, 
we require a language “moulded on some more general views, and must affix the epithets 
of praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of 
the community.”565 For Hume, such a language would allow us to reflect on the value of 
conduct and character from a common perspective.   
 How does Hume imagine that this language would function? He contrasts the so-
called general language with the language of self-love. Hume notes the use of the 
language of self-love: “when a man denominates another his enemy, his rival, his 
antagonist, his adversary, he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to 
express sentiments, peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and 
situation.”566 When speaking from the general language, Hume envisions that we expand 
our scope of concern and consider the interests of people more generally. In using the 
moral language, I no longer refer to others as a rival, or as an adversary, but as 
imprudent, benevolent, unjust, etc. By doing so, I allow others the opportunity to either 
concur with or reject my description; their testimony provides me with the evidence 
about which traits and conduct are conducive or detrimental to the common interest. 
Through the process of observing, describing, reflecting, and conversing with others, we 
are able to provide fine-grained judgments that accurately track the general interest. 
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 Through the progress of individual correction, we gradually establish standards to 
coordinate our judgments. Hume recognizes that, even with this coordination, there will 
be differences in how people feel about particular moral phenomenon, though he does not 
think that these differences in feeling present a concern. The point of the general 
language is to provide a common ground from which conduct and character are spoken 
about. It may be that violations of politeness bother me more than they do others. The 
strength of my evaluation is not determined by the extent to which others share in my 
disapprobation but in the recognition that an action is, in fact, impolite. Hume argues that 
as we identify ourselves with the general interest, we come to feel these evaluations 
independently of their relation to our particular interest (though there are limits to this 
process).567 The most that we can hope for is to recognize the mutual interest as 
authoritative, even when these considerations seem uninspired in the face of our more 
selfish and partialist tendencies.  
 As I argued in Chapter 2, according to Hume, we come to treat the general 
perspective as authoritative through a shift in our identity. This shift has an internal and 
external component. Externally, our conversations about shared concerns alter our ideas 
of which traits, characters, etc. are of value.568 We begin to see our own interests as 
entangled with that of others, and ourselves as engaged in a project of living well with 
others. Internally, our pride, which often puts us at odds with others through the force of 
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comparison, becomes informed by how others view us.569 No longer do we consider 
ourselves merely as an individual, or as a member of a family, but as part of a moral 
community.570 While our needs are not expected to overlap completely with the group, 
our conduct and character is either conducive or detrimental to the common interest. As 
we wish to think well of ourselves, and for others to share in this judgment, we fashion 
ourselves in a manner most apt to secure this correspondence.571 The internal and external 
components conjoin, accounting for our increased temperance, refinement, and delicacy.   
The Dilemma of Variability 
 Hume gives us a model for resolving disputes between conflicting sets of interests 
and desires by providing us with a common point of evaluation to which we can all 
commit. He also offers us a plausible story of how we come to see ourselves as bound to 
the interests of others, which allows us to construct norms that foster living well 
alongside one another. In this way, Hume’s proposed solution to the problem of partiality 
tracks the interests and concerns of the moral community, even when these interests 
change over time. While he admits it is possible that people will develop different norms 
from community to community, Hume thinks that we can confront this problem without 
                                                        
569 Intially, Hume argues that our pride is supportive of the “almost universal propensity of men, 
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undercutting the validity of our moral science.572 After all, it would be a mistake to 
suppose that we could lay down norms to stand for all people and ages. There is enough 
overlap between the interests of people to promote general stability between factions and 
communities. Given the additional insights of history, this continuity between norms 
allows us to construct a genuinely informative moral science.  
 A great strength of Hume’s account – its sensitivity to variability – is also its 
greatest weakness. The standard of mutual benefit is hardly sufficient to guide action on 
its own terms; rather, it provides a test for our actions, policies, or norms. But actions, 
policies, and norms are distinct categories, and Hume is ambivalent about which are 
subject to considerations of usefulness. My interpretation of his account throughout the 
dissertation has been that norms, rather than an individual’s actions, are the proper object 
of the moral standard. In this manner, an individual is meant to assent to norms of 
judgement and action that are justified in terms of their being generally beneficial to the 
community.  For Hume, praiseworthiness does not necessarily require that one know the 
full extent of a specific norm’s usefulness. Instead, it is only important that one seeks to 
fashion oneself in light of justifiable norms, thereby becoming refined and developing the 
sentimental disposition to act virtuously.  
                                                        
572 Hume notes that “the principles upon which men reason in morals are always the same; though 
the conclusion which they draw may be very different. That they all reason aright with regard to 
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 Even so, we are left with the problem of how to weigh our duties to others – that 
is, we are still left with the problem of partiality. Any norms that we use to make these 
determinations will be based in the standard of usefulness. The resulting determinations 
will either be too revisionary or too conservative. I considered the potential revisionary 
consequences of Hume’s theory in Chapter 2. There, I focused on the idea that some 
alterations to our values and sentimental dispositions are not desirable. I argued that the 
requirements of delicacy are too stringent for most people – they would be expected to 
alienate themselves from their commitments to those near and dear with the intention to 
cultivate higher aims. For those who undergo this transformation, they would view their 
fellows with either contempt or indifference. Comparison undercuts sympathy and 
stymies feelings of fellowship. In the worst cases, the delicate would create their own 
faction and develop an enthusiasm that set them apart from the moral community. In such 
a case, Hume’s theory would increase partiality. 
 Of course, considerations of usefulness might reinforce our partial attachments as 
opposed to dismantle them. It would be detrimental to the moral community if people 
eschewed their attachments to those near and dear. Imagine the damages of undermining 
the bonds of family and friendship for the purpose of instilling in people a sense of higher 
aims. Hume’s moral theory is far from a call for revolution in the social order. In fact, he 
is rather conservative when it comes to his endorsement of policies or norms. Instead of 
greatly revising our moral beliefs and commitments, Hume’s ethics may leave everything 
as it is and then justify the status quo on the basis of usefulness. In this case, we might 
worry that Hume offers post-hoc justifications for whatever norms happen to exist. After 
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all, facing up to the problem of partiality means distancing ourselves from our moral 
intuitions and making room for the interests of those with whom one is not yet connected. 
The moral perspective requires that we feel the pull of impartiality and seek to find 
equilibrium between our concerns and its demands.   
 Regardless of how you interpret Hume’s normative theory, by showcasing either 
its revisionary or conservative tendencies, there is much to take away from his ethics. I 
have focused on Hume’s concern for practical questions; that his ethical thought begins 
from the recognition of a conflict in common-sense morality that leads to faction and 
disorder. Hume’s aim is to help us develop strategies to bolster the sociable aspects of our 
nature. In time, and with practice, we may begin to look past our narrow concerns, and to 
see ourselves as part of a project to live well alongside others. At the end of the Treatise, 
Hume refers to himself as an anatomist of morals, as opposed to a painter.573 While I do 
not refuse Hume this description of his project, there is as much edification as 
explanation in his writings. It is Hume’s focus on edification and practical conflicts that 
connect his theory with the British Moralist tradition. I return to discuss the practical 
orientation of British Moralists later on. I turn now to offer further reflections on the 
work of Butler and Smith.  
 
Smith’s Solution to the Problem of Partiality 
 I see Smith and Butler’s moral theories as closely aligned. According to Butler, 
virtue consists in following our nature. There are three aspects of our nature: particular 
passions (compassion, anger, etc.), dispositions of self-love and benevolence, and 
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conscience. By way of self-love and benevolence, we possess stable desires for the 
happiness of ourselves and of others. Our passions are then designed to secure the means 
for fulfilling these desires. Some passions are aimed more directly at securing our own 
happiness, while others are more concerned with the happiness of others. If the passions 
function properly, we can do right by ourselves and others all at once. While the passions 
have natural aims, they may seem to conflict with one another. Anger may cause us to 
strike a person who has rear-ended our vehicle. Compassion could block this anger when 
we see how upset the other person is at themselves for their mistake. To function 
properly, we require some means by which to balance our passions with one another. 
Conscience plays this role, allowing us to achieve harmony in our frame. 
 According to Butler, the key to confronting the problem of partiality is found in 
our nature. If we attend to the structure of benevolence and love, “it will teach us, that 
the care of some persons, suppose children and families, is particularly committed to our 
charge by Nature and Providence; as also there are other circumstances, suppose 
friendship or former obligations, which require that we do good to some, preferably to 
others.”574 We should cultivate good-will for all, but it is dangerous to extend our duties 
of benevolence beyond the little department. We are not competent judges of what 
produces the general happiness. An additional concern for Butler, when it comes to the 
possibility of vice, is that we silence our sentiments on account of their conflict with our 
narrow self-interest. His solution is to cultivate love for God so that we are brought closer 
to our nature. We must remember the ends for which we were created: to reduce suffering 
                                                        
574 Butler, Sermon 12.27, p.110. 
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to the extent that we can and to ensure the happiness of those in our little department. We 
cannot hope for a more righteous end.   
Smith’s View 
 To a great degree, Smith’s moral theory overlaps with Butler’s ethics. Smith 
provides a more sophisticated account of how we determine whether an action is 
conducive to virtuous ends and how this determination comes to strike us as 
authoritative. The first part of Smith’s theory is found in his discussions of propriety and 
sympathy. Propriety is the criterion of moral judgment – we approve of characters on 
account of their conduct and affections being proper, given the circumstances. Smith 
distinguishes propriety, in the narrow sense, which concerns the extent to which another’s 
affection is fitting to its object, from merit, which refers to the consequences of another’s 
action. Propriety, in the broad sense, is determined by sympathy: our concordance with an 
agent’s passions, or the passions of those who are impacted by the agent’s action. 
Sympathy is then the ground of moral judgment. Our propensity to approve of conduct 
and characters is explained by sympathy. Without sympathy, we are unable to determine 
if a passion or action was proper or merited and morality would seem alien to us. 
 The other aspect of Smith’s ethics is his account of moral authority, which I do 
not discuss in the dissertation. Therein we confront Smith’s account of the impartial 
spectator. He introduces the concept in TMS III to get clearer on our idea of moral duty. 
Provided that we can determine the propriety and merit of other people’s conduct, 
questions remain: how do we apply these standards to our conduct? What explains the 
fact that these standards strike us as authoritative? Why not just make an exception for 
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ourselves? Smith’s answer is the impartial spectator. Moral education begins when we 
rely on the sanction and praise of others to motivate the idea of duty; however, over time 
we gain the ability to check ourselves – we become our own spectators.575 Like Butler’s 
account of conscience, Smith’s impartial spectator is a mechanism for ensuring that our 
sentiments are functioning properly, that our judgments are tracking the concordance of 
our fellows, and that our conduct is not the result of violent passions authorized by self-
deceit.576 Unlike Butler, Smith argues that the impartial spectator is not a natural capacity 
but a cognitive achievement that results from interaction with our fellows. Smith 
recognizes that the impartial spectator will not be sufficient to secure virtuous conduct – 
we still require assistance from others.577 
 The worry about Smith’s account is that its foundation is shaky at best. On one 
front, Smith seems to put undue faith in the rightful functioning of our sentiments and the 
mechanism of sympathy. What justifies the fact that our response to harmful behavior is 
resentment for the perpetrator? Why not compassion for the victim or curiosity about 
whether and why the perpetrator thought that their action was justified? People are often 
wrong about which actions warrant anger. One might argue that Smith is naïve or relies 
on God to secure the veracity of our sentiments, but this criticism misses the skeptical 
orientation of Smith’s ethics. For him, our sentiments give us the only proximate 
evidence we have regarding how we should conduct ourselves. I examined two aspects of 
Smith’s skepticism in Chapter 3. First, his method for determining what is virtuous does 
                                                        
575 TMS III 3.2.3. 
576 TMS III 3.4.4. 
577 TMS III 3.3.1. 
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not proceed on the basis of first principles. Smith begins his inquiry into morals by 
observing how we proceed in our daily lives and gathering evidence about how we 
respond to different situations. We discover the content of morality by looking at how we 
react to others. The project of the moral philosopher is to collect data about this 
responsiveness and construct a framework to explain the data.  
 Second, Smith’s ethics is grounded in sympathy – judgments about how we ought 
to act are based in sympathetic concordance. For him, our judgments receive weight from 
their concord with others. We can only depend on others to help guide our conduct. 
Through testing and revising our judgments, they are seen to be trustworthy. This method 
of testing and revising our beliefs is proposed by Carneades: “[in] ordinary life, when we 
are investigating a small matter we question one witness, when it is a greater matter, 
several witnesses, and when it is an even more essential matter we examine each of the 
witnesses on the basis of the mutual agreement among the others.”578 We call on others to 
ground our moral claims and to curb our self-certainty. Without their assistance, we 
proceed naively, avoiding what is required to develop the skills for moral judgment. 
Smith supplements this model of revision with illustrations of moral virtue. He argues 
                                                        
578 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, ed. Richard Bett. (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), 38-9. The method of testing and revising our moral beliefs proposed by Carneades 
has had tremendous influence on moral epistemology. Of course there is nothing inherently 
skeptical about testing our moral beliefs by way of bringing them into mutual agreement with the 
beliefs of others; a similar method, reflective equilibrium, is proposed by Nelson Goodman and 
John Rawls, and used by many scholars in moral and political philosophy. At base, Carneades’ 
method is coherentist insofar as it takes no particular belief set as foundational, but aims to 
produce concordance between belief sets. Whichever belief set results from this concordance is 
deemed trustworthy and should be at least provisionally adopted. Carneades’ skepticism explains 
why he would accept this method. If, as Carneades argues, we do not have access to a standard 
that successfully grounds our moral beliefs, and we have no choice but to have said beliefs, the 
most we can hope for is a belief set that concords with the readily available evidence – namely, 
our non-moral beliefs and the moral beliefs of others.   
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that providing a model for virtue awakens our sentiments and allows for a greater 
commitment to morality. By providing us with a model for virtue, our sentiments are 
awakened and we experience a greater commitment to morality.  
Skepticism and the Problem of Partiality 
 As I discussed in Chapter 3, Smith means for the TMS to educate his audience on 
how to live virtuously. This process involves a complex relation between philosophy and 
nature. At times, Smith means for philosophy to help us refine our nature. Consider the 
case of our unsociable sentiments, which damage our connections to others and even to 
ourselves. Philosophical reflection informs us of these dangers and gives us the tools to 
combat our baser tendencies. Other times, Smith claims that philosophy plays a support 
role for our sentiments, directing them to their natural ends – like in the case of 
resentment, the affective foundation of justice.579 Still other times, he argues that 
philosophy provides rationales for what appear as defects in our nature (moral luck, etc.). 
I have argued throughout the dissertation that, for Smith, nature sets the limits of 
reasonable philosophical discussion.580 As our nature compels us to show greater concern 
                                                        
579 Smith, TMS II.ii.2.1. 
580 One might argue that this reading of Smith puts him close to Hume, at least the conservative 
interpretation. While both Hume and Smith agree that nature sets a limit to reasonable 
philosophical discussion, they render the idea of our nature differently. For Hume, to say that we 
naturally approve and disapprove of characters on the basis of utility or agreeableness is not 
philosophical, in a narrow sense of the term. There is nothing speculative about the examining 
our practices of praising and blaming and inferring general principles that are operative in these 
particular cases. The principles that result from this exercise are deemed natural insofar as they 
reflect common moral experience. In this way, Hume is saying we cannot allow speculative 
principles (truth, relations of reason, fittnesses, etc.) to undercut these natural principles. Smith’s 
problem with Hume is that his explanations of moral phenomena are unduly determined by the 
principles he infers from our moral practices. Smith argues, contra Hume, that our attributions of 
praise and blame cannot be understood fully in terms of usefulness and agreeableness. Despite 
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for those in our little department, Smith claims it is the role of philosophy to inform us of 
what this duty entails rather than correcting this natural partiality.  
 These sentiments are the only source we possess to guide our conduct. Our nature 
provides us with this roadmap because the “happiness of mankind” cannot be left 
dependent on the “slowness and uncertainty of philosophical researches.”581 In Chapter 3, 
I considered the following quote:  
 “To what purpose should we trouble ourselves about the world in the moon? All 
 men, even those at the greatest distance, are no doubt entitled to our good wishes, 
 and our good wishes we naturally give them. But if, notwithstanding, they should 
 be unfortunate, to give ourselves any anxiety upon that account seems to be no 
 part of  our duty. That we should be but little interested, therefore, in the fortune 
 of those whom we can neither serve nor hurt, and who are in every respect so very 
 remote from us, seems wisely ordered by Nature; and if it were possible to alter in 
 this respect the original constitution of our frame, we could yet gain nothing by 
 the change.”582 
 
As I pointed out there, Smith is responding to the Stoic idea that virtue requires being 
able to see oneself as beholden only to the system of nature. I argued that, according to 
Smith, this position is problematic on both epistemic and moral grounds. There are many 
beings in this world – while we should sincerely wish them all well, it would be improper 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Hume’s attempt to explain our nature, Smith claims that his explanations fall prey to speculation 
and ignore key aspects of our moral experience. I explore this topic more in Chapter 3, 
particularly in my discussion of how Smith weighs the perspectives of nature and philosophy.  
581 Smith, TMS III.5.4 
582 Smith, TMS III.3.9. 
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for us to turn our attention away from our little department towards the tribulations of 
those outside our moral community. What I did not discuss in the preceding chapter was 
the idea that, for Smith, we should still regard ourselves as a part of the system of nature. 
In fact, it is crucial that we do so if we are to take our duties seriously. The Stoic’s 
problem is that they reject the proximate evidence they have about what nature demands 
of them – their sentiments – in favor of attempts to discern the intentions of the system.   
 System-level thinking is distinctly philosophical for Smith, and problematic when 
it comes to understanding our moral duty. We can see a connection between Smith’s 
critique of Stoicism and his objection to Hume’s appeal to usefulness as a moral standard, 
which he discusses in TMS IV. For Smith, the attempt to capture moral judgment in 
terms of usefulness, or the extent to which an action “promote[s] or disturb[s] the 
happiness both of the individual and of society” fails to properly account for our moral 
experience.583 He claims that “the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense 
of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility.”584 While humanity, generosity, 
and public spirit are useful, we do not praise them on these grounds. Smith claims that we 
praise traits on account of our sympathy with those who are impacted by their expression. 
It is possible to justify a disproportionate concern for our little department on the grounds 
of usefulness. If everyone were to have equal concern for every other, friendship and love 
would not exist in their current form. However, Smith claims that this justification based 
in utility is nonetheless mistaken.  
                                                        
583 Smith, TMS IV.2.1. 
584 Smith, TMS IV.2.5. 
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 The problem with justifying the concern for our little department in terms of 
usefulness is two-fold: it runs contrary to our experience and to what consider 
normatively significant about our relationships. On the first point, consider the case of 
someone who buys a birthday present for their younger sister. The result of their gift is 
that the sister feels appreciated and the bond between the siblings is tightened. We can 
see how this consequence is useful for both parties. When we praise the gift-giver, and 
find the entire interaction agreeable, matters of usefulness are far from our mind. To 
describe the interaction as useful is an abstraction and hardly tracks the lived experience 
of the siblings. Let us say that this person’s sister does not care to receive a present and 
wishes instead that their sibling donate money to charity. By giving money to charity, the 
sibling tightens the bond with their sister and makes her feel appreciated while also doing 
well by others. Notice that there are two sets of values operating: the action itself (giving 
to charity) and the action qua-gift-giving. 
 When we praise the gift-giver, we do so on account of their having bought a 
present for their sister; when we praise the action, its object is the sister. To the extent 
that we invoke usefulness, it is only in the second judgment and not the first. It would be 
improper to conflate these two judgments. Let us say that, instead of buying a present, the 
gift-giver were to donate to charity absent the sister’s request to do so; this action would 
hardly count as valuable in both senses. Perhaps it is better for this person to donate 
money to charity instead of buying their sister a present. Still, it seems improper to 
capture the value of this action in terms of the amount of usefulness that I can bestow on 
one party as opposed to another. The characterization of what I ought to do in either case 
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does not capture the moral seriousness of my decision, or the nature of my duties to other 
people generally. When it comes to our duties, Smith is insistent, like Butler, that our 
nature and not abstract principles set the terms of deliberation and is the basis of morality.  
 Since the philosopher must rely on our nature to guide their practice, their method 
cannot consider morality as a matter of abstraction. As I have argued throughout this 
dissertation, to do so is to ignore the aim of ethics: to find a way to live well together. 
Notice: this aim is practical as opposed to theoretical. The issues that face us – self-
deceit, faction, disagreement, etc. – are inescapably concrete. Smith’s skepticism allows 
him to obstruct any tendency to engage in speculation about morals and to remain fixed 
on practical concerns. Even without the shared predilection for skepticism, the British 
Moralists were primarily focused on questions related to practical ethics. We can see this 
emphasis by looking at how the moralists positioned themselves against their 
interlocutors. Although Hutcheson and Smith seem opposed when it comes to relying on 
our proper relation to the system of nature, they view their project in much the same light. 
For both figures, moral philosophy is meant to edify and to educate its audience. The 
main obstacle to this project is cynicism, or a cultivated indifference to virtue. The 
moralist tries to awake us to what we already know: that what we do and what we 
become is a matter of great concern.  
 
Practical Philosophy and the Moralist Project 
 Selby-Bigge’s contrasts the “moralist” with both the “satirist” and the skeptic. 
Moralists, to a large degree, take the principles of commonsense morality at face value – 
their aim is to persuade people to act in accordance with these principles and to give them 
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the tools to do so skillfully. Satirists, in turn, lampoon this very commitment. As Selby-
Bigge points out, “when the moralist says that men ought to regulate their conduct on 
certain principles and ought to cultivate certain motives in preference to others, the 
satirist tests the possibility of these principles, by asking whether in fact men do usually 
or ever act on them: he does not ask how far men recognize them as ideals or standards of 
conduct.”585 He notes: “the whole force of satire, as distinguished from cynicism, is the 
force of contrast—between profession and practice, between reality and sham; and the 
denunciation of the sham is by implication the recognition of the reality.”586 According to 
the satirist, people are unable or unwilling to guide themselves on the basis of moral 
principles, even when they recognize them as true and authoritative. On this view, the 
moralist’s project is well-meaning but misguided. 
Selby-Bigge distinguishes the satirist from the skeptic, though he argues that one 
mindset can lead to the other. Impatience and contempt with people’s routine inability to 
act on their commitments may lead us to question the validity of the commitments. We 
might think that morality, either in its narrow or broad sense – extending from matters of 
justice to politeness – is a mere fiction. In this way, the smugness of the satirist gives way 
to what Selby-Bigge calls “scientific skepticism,” where tools of empirical science are 
used as a means to undermine the ground of our moral principles and the sources of 
moral motivation.587 As he notes, “philosophers also sometimes take an unphilosophical 
                                                        
585 Selby-Bigge, The British Moralists, xi. 
586 Selby-Bigge, The British Moralists, xii. 
587 Selby-Bigge, The British Moralists, xiii. 
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pleasure in emphasizing the mean beginnings of things.”588 This attempt to undercut the 
ground of our moral practices, armed with the tools of scientific observation, serves as a 
formidable opposition to the moralist’s project. After all, if people begin to believe that 
there is no reality to moral distinctions, they will see no reason to recognize distinctions 
of virtue and vice, or to guide themselves in light of such recognition. They will instead 
choose to act on their passions and narrow self-interest.  
Some moralists are led to consider moral metaphysics in an attempt to combat 
scientific skepticism. All the figures treated in this dissertation do so to some extent or 
another. Still, as Selby-Bigge points out, the satirist is a bigger concern for the moralist. 
Why? When virtue becomes a target of the satirist’s wit, he says, “the respectable person 
finds that when his cloak of smug pretence is stripped off he is no more naked than the 
statesmen or divine, and sees no reason why he should be clothed than such good 
company, while the disreputable person takes credit to himself for his superior 
frankness.”589 One of the chief reasons that philosophers have long tied virtue to 
happiness is that, by doing so, happiness animates virtue. Once one sees others living 
viciously, seemingly without consequence, their commitment to morality is weakened. 
And since most people, either in the 18th century or today, are not philosophers, it is not 
the arguments of figures like Mandeville that loosen the grip of ethics on their minds, but 
the attempts to make the life of virtue look foolish.590  
                                                        
588 Selby-Bigge, The British Moralists, xiii. 
589 Selby-Bigge, The British Moralists, xiv. 
590 Mandeville is one of the few figures in the British Moralist tradition who is equally a satirist 
and a scientific skeptic. I have discussed Mandeville only periodically in this dissertation, though 
his impact on philosophy and popular writing during the period cannot be overstated. One of the 
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Typically, the satirist comes up in conversations about the extent to which self-
love influences our moral feelings and judgments. The satirist, using their wit and refined 
style, tries to convince us that our feelings of love, benevolence, compassion, etc. are but 
a cloak for self-interest. Because we are cognitively sophisticated beings, we can 
successfully hide these facts from other people and even from ourselves. As many have 
noted, however, the satirist runs up against moral experience here. It is all too obvious 
that we feel love and concern for at least some of our fellow beings, even if we are also 
selfish and narrow-minded at times. The satirist does not have a similar problem when it 
comes to considerations of partiality. Given our natural concern for those near and dear, 
what reason could we possibly have for looking beyond their interests? Chances are that 
few instances of partial conduct will create widespread societal strife or even undercut 
one’s well-being. After all, if one is able to do better for oneself and one’s little 
department than for others, one can then enjoy the fruits of such success alongside the 
joys of dominance and the rewards of an eminent reputation.  
The moralist faces a difficult task, namely that of confronting the satirist. It would 
be much easier to claim that all normative value is derived from an impartial perspective 
and that all attachment to family, party, nation, etc. is a contingent consequence of 
primitive psychological mechanisms. From this perspective, the moralist could argue that 
these basic attachments should not be taken seriously from a moral point of view. That 
said, as moralists attempt to do right by commonsense morality, they cannot deny that we 
                                                                                                                                                                     
reasons Mandeville had this impact was because of his uncanny ability to combine the knowledge 
of the new science, including advancements in medicine, with the polite style of satirical prose. 
Hutcheson, Gay, Hume, Butler, and Smith all wrestled with Mandeville’s work. One could rightly 
read much of the British moralist tradition as a response to Mandeville.  
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have normatively significant connections to our near and dear and that these connections 
ought to be action-guiding, at least in some respect. We cannot absolve ourselves of these 
commitments, lest we endanger our own humanity in the process. The moralist also 
cannot deny that, at some level, it appears as if there is little incentive to extend our scope 
of concern. How does one go about convincing another that they should transcend their 
own natural commitments, and tie their identity with this transcendence, given that there 
is no straightforward advantage to doing so?591  
 Few moralists would claim that argumentation is sufficient to achieve this end. 
Instead, they appeal to description and illustrations of virtue to ensure that people are 
driven to widen their narrow sense of concern. This project belongs to practical ethics as 
opposed to moral theory.592 As I have argued throughout the dissertation, instead of 
putting matters of speculation front and center, the British Moralists are concerned with 
how to expand our naturally narrow scope of concern, with how to undercut faction and 
self-deceit, and with how to get people to see themselves as engaged in a larger ethical 
project alongside others. But we are still left with the question with which we began: how 
do we weigh the duties to our near and dear with the duties we have to others? I return 
briefly to the problem of partiality.  
 
                                                        
591 Hume puts this point well: “What is that to me? There are few occasions, when this question is 
not pertinent: and had it that universal, infallible influence supposed, it would turn into ridicult 
every composition, and almost every conversation, which contain any praise or censure of 
manners” (Hume, “Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,” Enquiries, 5.1.12, p. 217.). 
592 Heydt, Moral Philosophy in the Eighteenth-Century, 3. 
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Problems Without Solutions? 
 Offering a solution to the problem of partiality goes beyond the aim of this 
dissertation. I have instead attempted to cast some light on this problem. As human 
beings, we have conflicting priorities. We are not only students or teachers; we are also 
parents, siblings, colleagues, mentors, citizens, etc. What is required of us in each of 
these contexts is not always clear. Maybe we find ourselves in a situation where we 
cannot be a good colleague and a good sibling at the same time. Even when these 
conflicts do not arise, where we act without running afoul of our conscience, we still ask 
whether it is right to give one relation greater weight than another. Perhaps we should 
attend to the needs of our siblings before those of our colleagues because of the more 
established relationship, or because we are more aware of their needs, or because not 
doing so would unduly harm the family. There are many ways to differently account for 
what seems like an intuitively correct decision. 
 In this dissertation, I have focused on the question of how, given the fact of 
natural partiality, we weigh these various considerations. As we have discussed 
throughout, a chief aim of ethics in the 18th century is to undercut the growth of faction; 
developing strategies for how to confront this problem is a practical one. I do not have a 
satisfactory answer to the problem of partiality, and I am not sure that Gay, or Hume, or 
Butler, or Smith do either. At the same time, I take it that any answer to this problem 
would inevitably come off as either one-sided or disingenuous. Certain philosophical 
problems are not meant to be solved, so much as they are meant to frame our thinking 
about moral phenomenon. Consider the case of love. We mean different things by love; 
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chances are that any attempt to define it will run contrary to our experience in some way. 
Still, love is a concept that allows us think through other moral questions: what are the 
limits of the self? what binds us to others? do we have control over this process? should 
these connections be normatively binding?  
 My sense is that the problem of partiality should be thought of along the same 
lines as love in moral discussions. The problem is that there is an additional practical 
concern with partiality. It is all well and good if probing the scope and limits of 
reasonable partiality enables us to get clearer on certain normatively significant 
questions. However, we are still stuck, caught between conflicting considerations, and 
not knowing which to give priority in specific circumstances. Absent a solution to the 
problem, we are left with our commonsense intuitions, which reinforce the very partiality 
that worried us from the beginning. The same partiality that underwrites bias, faction, and 
gives way to discord. Will we not end up in the same circumstances? Hume, Smith, and 
others were well aware that this result was possible. Smith returns to self-deception and 
the desire for dominion throughout his work, while enthusiasm is an ever-present danger 
for Hume.  
 So, what is left for us to do? Throughout the dissertation, I have discussed the 
strategies that Gay, Hume, Butler, and Smith use to expand the limits of our natural moral 
concern. Once we come to appreciate the moral perspective, we recognize that our own 
partialist tendencies can no longer go unquestioned – they must be justified. While it is 
difficult to know how these tendencies can receive justification, the fact that justification 
is required should be obvious to any aspiring moral agent. Perhaps, in light of these 
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complications, the most that we can do is remind ourselves that our partialist 
commitments, desires, and judgments cannot be given unquestioned authority in 
deliberation. If we successfully use the tools given to us by Hume, Smith, and others to 
cultivate the disposition to step back and recognize the considerations at stake in any 
decision, we will act with less self-certainty and self-conceit. Given the complexity of 
moral life, we cannot afford to act in an inattentive or unreflective manner, lest we 
reinforce faction and exacerbate the dangers of indifference and injustice. 
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